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Abstract 
 
An Examination of Large Commercial Banks within G-10: Risk, 
Efficiency, and the 1996 Market Risk Amendment  
 
Author: Michael Forsyth, in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The financial industry changed significantly through the 1990s as commercial banks 
pursued additional profits through non-traditional and off-balance sheet (OBS) 
activity. The regulatory bodies had to accept the changing risk nature of the industry 
and the response was the introduction of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment (MRA) 
by the Basle Committee. The MRA, through a series of 4 key announcements, was 
reached in January 1996 and fully implemented from January 1997, whereby banks 
were required to hold incremental capital to cover unexpected losses from market 
risk. In this study a multivariate regression model is used to investigate the effect of 
the MRA announcements on the returns to shareholders of commercial banks within 
G-10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The empirical results 
suggest that bank shareholders in Italy, Sweden, and especially Japan benefited from 
the introduction of the MRA, while bank shareholders in the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and especially US experienced significant losses from 4 announcements that 
led to the final proposal of the 1996 MRA.  
 
The significant growth in income generated through OBS activities, such as trading 
and fee-based income, changed the risk profile financial institutions. This study 
employs four VaR methodologies (parametric, historical simulation, Monte Carlo 
simulation, and Extreme Value Theory) to calculate bank risk in a period of high 
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financial market volatility: 1992 through to 1998. The results show a strong increase 
in VaR for the years 1997 and 1998, with Japan showing the largest risk ranking over 
the period, while the US and Sweden were at the low end of the risk range. The VaR 
results indicate it may be misleading to compare risk scores across financial 
institutions if the reported numbers are based on different VaR methodologies. The 
results from the Monte Carlo (MC) and Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approaches 
result in the highest VaR estimates, while the parametric results were consistently 
lower. 
 
This thesis also employed Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute bank-level 
technical efficiency under Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and Variable Returns to 
Scale (VRS) between 1992 and 1998. The results for the entire bank sample across 
the period of study show inefficiency levels of 39% and 33%, under CRS and VRS 
respectively. The inclusion of off-balance sheet (OBS) activity in the DEA score is 
found to be significant, and indicate that the exclusion of this variable as an output 
leads to a misspecification and underestimation of bank efficiency. A Tobit regression 
approach was used to examine the relationship between bank efficiency and various 
bank and environmental variables. The second stage findings show that inflation is 
detrimental to bank efficiency, while a negative relationship is found between VaR 
and efficiency, indicating inefficient banks appear to take on less risk. A positive 
relationship is found between the MRA dummy variable and bank efficiency. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I Background 
 
The nature of bank risk changed significantly throughout the 1990s as commercial 
banks focused more on non-traditional activities such as trading income and off-
balance-sheet activity (OBS) in order to generate additional revenues. Avery and 
Berger (1991) and Koppenhaver and Stover (1991) noted that banks are able to 
increase risk, and therefore expected return, through greater derivative exposure. 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) found that non-interest income has accounted for a 
growing share of bank revenue.  
 
The main sources of non-interest income are fee and commission revenues, with net 
trading income a dominant factor. The dramatic rise in non-interest revenues has 
arisen from investment banking, trading, and brokering. Culp and Mackay (1994) 
emphasise that the innovation and growth in OBSA has yielded substantial gains to 
the US economy by enabling firms to lower the cost of funding and diversify their 
funding sources, whilst improving their competitive position.   
 
However, evidence has shown that by expanding the scope of non-traditional 
activities, overall risk levels within the banking industry have increased. For example, 
Peek and Rosengren (1997) found that banks active in the derivatives market have 
lower capital levels and inherently more risk. Wall, Reichel, and Mohanty (1993) 
found that expansion into non-traditional banking activities impedes bank efficiency, 
and the level of profitability gained from taking additional risk is not worthwhile. 
Sinkey and Carter (2000) also found that banks engaging in derivative activities tend 
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to be larger in size, and have weaker capital levels, smaller maturity gaps, and 
reduced net interest margins. 
 
The changing nature of commercial banking into non-traditional activities, in 
particular OBSA, challenged regulators to adopt a more innovative approach to bank 
capital regulation. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a regulatory body 
created by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten nations. The Group of Ten 
is made up of eleven industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States). The purpose of the Basle Committee is to encourage convergence toward 
common approaches and standards, and to recommend statements of best practice in 
banking supervision. The Basle Committee does not have legislative authority, but 
member countries are implicitly bound to put into practice its recommendations. The 
committee does allow for some flexibility in how national authorities implement these 
recommendations. 
 
In 1988, the Basle Committee proposed a set of minimal capital requirements for 
banks. These requirements came into effect in 1992; with Japanese banks being 
permitted an extended transition period because of their capital deficiency. The 
requirements addressed credit risk and the risk of a counterparty defaulting on its 
obligations, and have come to be known as the 1988 Basle Accord. The aim of the 
Accord was to ensure that financial institutions retain enough capital to protect 
themselves against unexpected losses from default risk. The main strength of the 
Basle Accord was its simplicity in requiring a minimum 8% capital holding level. 
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However, this simplicity enabled banks to take advantage of loopholes and faults, 
resulting in an additional burden to the financial system.  
 
In the early 1990s, the Basle Committee decided to update the 1988 Accord to include 
bank capital requirements for market risk, which is the risk to an institution's financial 
condition resulting from adverse movements in the level or volatility of interest rate 
instruments, equities, commodities, and currencies. It is fundamentally different from 
credit risk, the traditional basis for banking regulation, which requires a relatively 
straightforward judgment about the likelihood of a borrower defaulting. The Basle 
Committee released a series of proposed amendments to the 1988 Accord, whereby 
banks were required to separate and identify a banking book and a trading book and 
hold capital specifically for trading book market risks. The Amendment prescribed 
that banks use a Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodology to determine the percentage of 
capital needed to cover trading book risk. VaR is a risk measurement tool used to 
calculate the worst possible loss to a portfolio within a certain confidence limit.  
 
II Objectives and contributions 
 
The thesis has three main objectives: first, to evaluate the reaction of commercial 
banks to the Basle Committee’s 1996 Market Risk Amendment; second, to examine 
and measure bank risk, by calculating each bank’s VaR using four different 
methodologies over the time-frame 1992 to 1998: and third, to evaluate bank 
efficiency throughout the six-year period, while including an examination of OBS 
activity. The study also takes into account the determinants of bank efficiency.  
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The first objective of this thesis is to evaluate the reaction of commercial banks to the 
Basle Committee’s 1996 Market Risk Amendment. This Amendment was the first to 
allow banks to use their own methodology and risk models to manage capital and risk. 
The reaction to the Amendment is examined with the primary aim of measuring the 
impact this regulation had on bank stock market returns. This study differs from 
existing capital regulation literature in several ways: First, it considers a sample of 
large commercial banks in eleven developed countries as opposed to being limited to 
one specific country; Second, it examines the shareholder reactions over a period of 
time, specifically from the initial market risk proposal in April 1993 through to the 
finalisation of the Amendment in January 1996; Third, it examines the financial 
impact of a change in bank capital regulation, which should enhance our 
understanding of the impact of regulatory changes in the future, for example the 
impact of Basle II; Fourth, little is known about how banks have reacted to the MRA, 
therefore, this study should be of interest to regulators, governments, and the 
investment community. 
 
The second key objective of this thesis is the examination and measurement of bank 
risk in relation to their pursuit of non-traditional activities. Theoretically, the ideal of 
risk measurement is clear, however, in practice it is difficult to formalize and 
quantify. Financial institutions are subject to many sources of risk, including credit 
risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. The most prominent of these 
risks in trading is market risk, as it reflects the potential losses caused by the change 
in value of interest rates, equity markets, or foreign exchange rates. Throughout the 
1990s the growth of trading activity in financial markets, in addition to periods of 
economic instability, and a number of widely publicized trading losses resulted in a 
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re-analysis by academics and investors of the risks financial institutions face, and how 
they are measured. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) argue that banks must take on 
greater levels of risk due to declines in traditional banking and associated reductions 
in profit levels. The changes that are taking place within the banking system may 
provide incentives for, or impose the need for, assuming a higher risk profile. 
Simmons (1995), and Chaudhry and Reichert (1999) argue that derivative instruments 
and non-traditional activity leads to higher bank risk. In contrast, numerous studies 
have found that the use of derivatives and OBSA have reduced the interest-rate and 
currency exposure of banks (Shanker, 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Choi and 
Elyasiani, 1997). 
 
There is a lack of empirical evidence in relation to how the risk levels of banks has 
changed as these institutions have moved away from the more traditional aspects of 
banking. Furthermore, existing commercial bank risk literature is predominantly 
limited to U.S. banks. This study utilises VaR methodology to investigate the 
riskiness of commercial banks within G-10 countries. The VaR method is now tagged 
as a modern and robust methodology for measuring financial risk and is used to 
calculate how much a financial institution can lose with a probability p over a given 
time-horizon. This method is popular due to its conceptual simplicity and its ability to 
reduce the financial risk associated with a given position or portfolio down to just one 
number. Furthermore, the Basle Committee endorsed the VaR approach for measuring 
market risk, thus increasing its credibility.  
 
VaR can be calculated in numerous ways and its value depends on the assumptions 
made and models used. The most common classification of VaR methods found in the 
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literature is that of parametric VaR estimates, historical simulation (non-parametric), 
and Monte Carlo simulation (non-parametric). The three methods are complementary, 
but each offers a different view of risk and much debate has focused on which method 
is more robust. Ideally, an institution would calculate all three methods in order to 
obtain the most accurate picture of their risk exposure. In addition, Dowd (1999), and 
Ho (2000) proposed a third non-parametric approach to calculate VaR: Extreme 
Value Theory (EVT). The thesis employs all four VaR approaches in order to obtain 
an accurate and valid measure of how bank risk changed during the period 1992 to 
1998.  
 
A number of conclusions will come from the analysis of VaR. First, to examine the 
changing nature of bank risk throughout the 1990s; Second, to determine which 
country has the riskiest banks; Third, to assess which year was the most volatile in 
terms of bank risk; Fourth, which VaR method produces the highest risk score, and 
whether there are important differences in VaR results when these alternative 
methodological approaches are utilised. 
 
This thesis measures the changing nature of bank risk based on each bank’s exposure 
to interest rate risk, equity risk and foreign exchange risk. Bank risk is measured for a 
sample of international commercial banks, and direct comparisons can be made for 
each bank’s VaR. The period studied, 1992 to 1998, represents a time when banks 
were changing the nature of their business and ultimately their risk profile. Therefore, 
comparisons can be made of each bank’s VaR over time.  In addition, this study is one 
of the first to explicitly consider the risk profile of large commercial banks within G-
10, using both parametric and non-parametric VaR techniques. Each of the four VaR 
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methodologies is employed to estimate each bank’s weekly VaR based on the impact 
on equity value of changes in interest rates, equity market volatility, and foreign 
exchange rate movements. 
 
In addition to studying how the risk profile of banks has changed, the third key 
objective of this thesis is to examine bank efficiency levels. This thesis applies Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate the efficiency of large commercial banks in 
G-10 countries for the period 1992 to 1998. DEA is a relatively new technique that 
measures the relative efficiency of each bank by comparing it to an efficient frontier 
based on an optimal set of input/output variables taken from the bank sample studied. 
Given the fact that banks are changing rapidly, it is of considerable interest to 
measure the efficiency of evolving institutions, and to explain measured variation in 
the efficiency of institutions.  
 
The research on efficiency in financial institutions is extensive. While multiple studies 
have examined efficiency levels of various types of banks, and across many countries, 
very few have focused on commercial banks specifically within G-10. The majority of 
studies have focused on commercial banks in the U.S. or in Europe, whereas this 
study considers Canadian and Japanese institutions in addition to U.S. and European 
banks.  
 
A key contribution of this thesis is the inclusion of non-traditional activities in the 
efficiency analysis. Most efficiency studies measure bank output via traditional 
activities, such as loan generation and deposit investment. Commercial banks now 
focus more on non-traditional business such as derivatives activity, wealth 
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management, and trading. The exclusion of these OBSA results in an inaccurate 
efficient frontier. Clark and Siems (2002) measured the impact of off-balance-sheet 
activities on the efficiency measure of banks and found that such activities are 
important determinants in explaining bank efficiency.  
 
Financial institutions around the world have experienced substantial changes. 
Technological progress, reduced information costs, stronger competition and 
significant deregulation all led to substantial changes. Typically, commercial banks 
have expanded into non-traditional banking activity. It is accepted in the literature 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997) that efficiency measures for both parametric and non-
parametric approaches have significant advantages over accounting ratios for 
measuring performance. To assess banks’ ability to increase profitability and risk 
while conforming to new regulation and global competition is very important. Both 
regulators and practitioners rely increasingly on efficiency analysis to measure bank 
performance and compare institutions. This study uses DEA, a non-parametric 
technique, to measure efficiency levels of G-10 commercial banks. Furthermore, 
second stage analysis examines the relationship between bank efficiency, risk and 
regulation.  
 
DEA is a data-driven approach and the location and shape of the efficient frontier is 
determined by the data sample. The construction of the frontier is based on a ‘best 
observed practice’ and is therefore only an approximation to the true, unobserved 
efficient frontier. The reason being that the frontier is made up of data observations of 
ratios of output to input and the efficient frontier is defined by these ratios. Being a 
non-parametric technique, DEA has the advantage of requiring no assumptions about 
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the functional form and that it needs no assumptions regarding the probability 
distribution of the error terms, which avoids potential estimation bias.  
 
However, this does not avoid the problem of how to assess the quality of the DEA 
model and how the results reflect reality. The implications from using a non-
parametric approach is: 1) As DEA is deterministic, this method does not take into 
account statistical error, random shocks or noise; 2) Results are sensitive to model 
specification, particularly in small samples; 3) It is critical to be clear about what 
variables should be classified and included as inputs and similarly so for outputs; 4) 
Not only the choice of but also the number of banks will affect efficiency evaluations. 
The central concern when judging the quality of a DEA model is that it should be 
formulated based on the purpose for which the results will be used.   
 
In sum, the third objective of this thesis is to investigate bank efficiency levels, 
including OBSA in the analysis. This study contributes to the existing literature: First, 
by employing a non-parametric DEA approach to compare the efficiency scores 
across G-10 banks, and to determine the rank scores of bank efficiency by country; 
Second, by examining the change in efficiency of G-10 banks during the period 1992 
to 1998; Third, by establishing if differences in efficiency between G-10 countries are 
the result of their respective economic environments. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000) have shown that country-specific environmental variables may explain 
efficiency gaps between countries; Fourth, by investigating the impact of OBSA on 
bank efficiency using a DEA input-oriented model across all G-10 countries; Fifth, by 
using a tobit regression approach, this study attempts to determine whether a bank’s 
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efficiency level is dependent on its VaR. Sixth, a dummy variable is included to 
assess the impact of the 1996 MRA on bank efficiency. 
 
To summarise, the three main objectives of this thesis are: 
- To evaluate the reaction of commercial banks to the Basle Committee’s 1996 
Market Risk Amendment. 
- To examine and measure bank risk, including the risks associated with OBSA, 
by calculating each bank’s VaR using four different approaches over the time 
frame 1992 to 1998.  
- To determine the change and determinants of commercial bank efficiency 
levels throughout the six-year study period.  
 
The outline of the thesis is as follows: This first chapter has presented the research 
problem and clarified the objectives of this thesis; Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review and hypotheses surrounding each key objective of the thesis; Chapter 3 
presents the methodologies used in this study and the main concepts of event study, 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are explained; Chapter 
4 presents the empirical results and a discussion of the findings; Chapter 5 presents 
conclusions and directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2. 1 The 1996 Market Risk Amendment (MRA) and Bank Capital Regulation 
 
I Introduction 
 
The changing nature of commercial banking into non-traditional activities, in 
particular off-balance sheet activities (OBS), challenged regulators to adopt a more 
innovative approach to bank capital regulation. The Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision is a regulatory body created by the central bank Governors of the Group 
of Ten nations. The Group of Ten is made up of eleven industrial countries (Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States). The purpose of the Basle Committee is to 
encourage convergence toward common approaches and standards, and to recommend 
statements of best practice in banking supervision. The Basle Committee does not 
have legislative authority, but member countries are implicitly bound to put into 
practice its recommendations that are designed to ensure that banks operate in a safe 
and secure manner. The Basle Committee’s proposals aim for international 
convergence in terms of regulatory standards, but the committee does allow for some 
flexibility in how national authorities implement these recommendations. 
 
In 1988, the Basle Committee proposed a set of minimal capital requirements for 
banks. These requirements came into effect in 1992 with Japanese banks being 
permitted an extended transition period because of their capital deficiency. The 
requirements addressed credit risk and the risk of a counterparty defaulting on its 
obligations, and have come to be known as the 1988 Basle Accord. The aim of the 
Accord was to ensure that financial institutions retain enough capital to protect 
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themselves against unexpected losses from default risk. The main strength of the 
Basle Accord was its simplicity in requiring a minimum 8% capital holding level. 
However, this simplicity enabled banks to take advantage of loopholes and faults, 
resulting in an additional burden to the financial system. The Accord was voluntary, 
specified four tiers of capital, and was applied to international banks.  
 
In the early 1990s, the Basle Committee decided to update the 1988 Accord to include 
bank capital requirements for market risk, which is the risk to an institution's financial 
condition resulting from adverse movements in the level or volatility of interest rate 
instruments, equities, commodities, and currencies. In this way, market risk is 
fundamentally different from credit risk, the traditional basis for banking regulation, 
which requires a relatively straightforward judgment about the likelihood of a 
borrower defaulting. The Basle Committee released a series of proposed amendments 
to the 1988 Accord, whereby banks were required to separate and identify a banking 
book and a trading book and hold capital specifically for the trading book’s market 
risk. The Basle Committee’s 1996 Market Risk Amendment prescribed that banks use 
a Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodology to determine the percentage of capital needed to 
cover trading book risk. VaR is a risk measurement tool used to calculate the worst 
possible loss to a portfolio within a certain confidence limit.  
 
Prudential regulation has been strengthened substantially, especially in the area of 
minimum capital standards. New regulation, namely through Basle II, has offered a 
tool to strengthen risk disclosures and market discipline. However, the 
implementation of Basle II remains a problem based on current financial turmoil and 
the wide variety of risk exposures financial institutions have. Furthermore, regulators 
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must also rely on market discipline to motivate prudent management by enhancing the 
degree of transparency in banks’ public reporting.  This can be achieved by public 
disclosures that banks must make to lend greater insight into the adequacy of their 
capitalisation.  
 
One of the key problems, and what supervisors have been working on for sometime, 
is the lack of convergence in supervisory practices, across different banks and 
countries. In terms of G-10 countries there is not a uniform reporting structure with 
respect to all the activities commercial banks are allowed to pursue. On the positive 
side, this means that common patterns that emerge from an international comparison 
are informative for a regulatory and efficiency debate. However, it is important to 
note the influence of each country’s environmental factors (economy, lending 
practices, country-specific regulation) on measures of bank risk, efficiency and 
overall performance. Differences in regulations, institutions and market structures 
across countries mean that conclusions drawn from the analysis of one country should 
be generalised to others only very carefully. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) conducted a survey on bank regulation and 
supervision practices across countries. It could be possible to use this survey in future 
research to assess banks that have been exposed to external audits, degree of 
transparency within their financial statements, and also the use of external credit 
ratings and reliance on credit monitoring. It would also be useful to examine whether 
a country has explicit regulatory requirements for the amount of capital that a bank 
must maintain relative to common guidelines. Other measures which could be 
examined are whether a country has laws establishing pre-determined levels of bank 
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solvency; the extent of each country’s government safety net that act as deposit 
insurance systems. One other interesting point to examine would be the fraction of 
banks in a country that is government owned, especially to the extent to which a 
country’s ownership structure influences its bank capital ratio and the types of 
nontraditional activities pursued.  
 
The first objective of this thesis is to evaluate the reaction of commercial banks to the 
Basle Committee’s 1996 Market Risk Amendment. This Amendment was the first to 
allow banks to use their own methodology and risk models to manage capital and risk. 
The Amendment is examined with the primary aim of measuring the impact this 
regulation had on bank stock market returns. This study differs from existing capital 
regulation literature in several ways: First, it considers a sample of large commercial 
banks in eleven developed countries as opposed to being limited to one specific 
country; second, it examines the reactions of banks over a period of time, specifically 
from the initial market risk proposal in April 1993 through to the finalisation of the 
Amendment in January 1996; third, it examines the financial impact of a change in 
bank capital regulation, which should enhance our understanding of the impact of 
regulatory changes in the future, for example the impact of Basle II, the finalized 
version of which was released in 2004; fourth, little is known about how banks have 
reacted to the Amendment, therefore, this study should be of interest to regulators, 
governments, and the investment community. 
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II The Basle Committee’s Amendment to the 1988 Basle Accord 
(i) The Standardised Approach (April 1993 Proposal) 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision published ‘The Supervisory Treatment 
of Market Risk” in April 1993 and proposed a standardized market risk measurement 
framework.  This framework separated market risk into four asset classes; interest rate 
positions, equity market positions, currency positions, and commodity positions, with 
separate calculation methods for each asset class. Therefore, capital requirements for 
interest rate positions are calculated on the basis of interest rate sensitivity with a 
standard set of assumed volatilities in the yield curve. The capital requirement on 
equity market risk is calculated on every position from an individual equity basis. The 
currency risk capital requirement is calculated as a percentage of a bank’s net open 
position in each currency. The commodity risk requirement is calculated as a 
percentage of a bank’s open position in each commodity plus a requirement for 
maturity mismatch of the contracts.  
(ii) The Internal Models Approach (April 1995 Proposal) 
 
In April 1995, the Basle Committee released a revised proposal making a number of 
changes. An important provision, the internal models approach, allowed banks to use 
either their own proprietary VaR risk model, as opposed to a standardized approach, 
for calculating market risk capital requirements. The use of a proprietary VaR 
measure required regulatory approval where a bank was subject to an independent risk 
management evaluation to prove it was following acceptable risk management 
practices. Market risk capital requirements were now set to the greater of the previous 
day’s VaR, or the average VaR over the previous sixty business days, multiplied by a 
factor of at least three. Proprietary measures would need to support a 10-day 99% 
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VaR metric and also address the non-linear exposures of options. Diversification 
effects could be recognized within broad asset classes – fixed income, equity, foreign 
exchange, and commodities. Regulators also allowed banks to correlate risk across 
products or asset classes, reducing the capital required.  
 
The capital charge for banks that use in-house models is three times the daily VaR of 
the preceding 60 days. Multiplying by a factor of three ensures banks set aside 
considerably more capital. A number of banks unsuccessfully lobbied for a reduction 
in the multiplier. Factors that could influence the estimation of risk, such as flawed 
distribution assumptions, the inadequacy of past events as a guide to future events, 
and extreme market movements may hinder the accuracy of a VaR calculation. 
However, the multiplication factor of three, which was designed to account for all the 
potential shortcomings in the modelling process, was arbitrary and weak (Walwyn 
and Litterman, 1998). 
 
The calculation of VaR is based upon a 10-day holding period for any transaction, 
however, as the holding period for many trades is less than ten days, this is unrealistic. 
Furthermore, the proposal does instruct banks which VaR method to use i.e. the 
parametric, historical simulation, or Monte Carlo methods. The Basle Committee 
opted for 99 percent confidence intervals, meaning that 99 percent of the time the 
bank would not lose more money than the calculated VaR. However, the risk is that 
banks might rely too heavily on the VaR number to represent their maximum possible 
losses. Perhaps a lower confidence level would have been more realistic and provided 
better signals to banks regarding the level of reliance that can be placed on the VaR 
figure.  
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The 1996 Amendment to the Basle Accord ensures a bank’s minimum capital 
requirement takes into consideration market risk and the current trend for increased 
trading activity. There is a gap in the research concerning the effect the Amendment 
has had on the stock prices of commercial banks, which this study seeks to address. 
The reaction of banks in Japan, Canada, the United States, and Europe will be 
examined in terms of abnormal returns surrounding the four major announcements 
leading up to the Basle Committee’s final proposal. Analyzing and clarifying the 
drivers of abnormal returns during these periods should provide a better 
understanding of the impact bank capital regulation changes have on banks within G-
10. 
 
III Controversy surrounding the Market Risk Amendment 
 
Much debate has focused on The Basle Committee’s approach for the calculation of 
VaR, particularly in regard to the pre-commitment approach (PCA) versus the internal 
models approach. The PCA has a pre-determined time period, where a bank is 
allowed to represent its VaR within certain parameters over a fixed time period. At 
the conclusion of each fixed time period, the bank’s minimum net capital level must 
be increased or decreased by an amount equal to the difference between the actualized 
VaR and the model's projections. Kupiec and O’Brien (1997) were advocates of the 
pre-commitment approach, whereas Gumerlock (1996) argued that the Basle 
Committee’s regulatory mechanisms for measuring and monitoring market risk are 
superior to that of the pre-commitment approach.  
 
The 1996 Amendment increased the likelihood that banks might underreport market 
risk exposure in order to lessen their capital burden. Lucas (2001) found evidence that 
 26
banks were indeed underreporting market risk and questioned the effectiveness of the 
regulatory body’s back-testing procedures and penalty system. A more stringent 
penalty scheme might give banks greater incentive to provide more accurate risk 
metrics. However, imposing penalties for VaR inaccuracies may deter banks from 
adhering to the regulatory system. It is also important for regulators to consider the 
possibility of severe market fluctuations before imposing harsher penalties.  
 
Gizycki and Hereford (1998) note that one advantage of the 1996 Amendment is that 
it enabled banks to use their own quantitative internal risk model, thus adding 
flexibility to risk measurement. However, although the Amendment is applicable to 
the trading book, most banks hold interest rate risk on their banking book. As a result, 
the requirement for capital to be set aside for a trading book’s market risk provides 
the incentive for banks to allocate more risk to their banking book, resulting in 
regulatory capital arbitrage. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that the regulatory 
risk-based capital standards have increased risk awareness overall, and led to the 
development of more sophisticated risk models.  
 
In sum, there is much disagreement across the literature concerning the Amendment 
to the Basle Accord. This study moves away from a theoretical standpoint and 
examines the actual impact on bank returns in the event window surrounding each 
major proposal leading up to the Amendment.  The next section comprises a 
discussion of previous literature examining the effects of bank capital regulation 
changes prior to the 1996 Amendment.  
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IV The Reaction to Bank Capital Regulation 
According to Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni (2001) it is widely acknowledged that 
changes to bank capital regulation have an impact on bank behaviour. Their school of 
thought is that the introduction of capital will improve the resilience of banks to 
negative financial shocks. However, the authors go on to mention another aspect 
concerning bank risk taking behaviour, whereby the capital buffer may encourage 
banks to take on more risk. 
 
Eyssell and Arshadi (1990) examined the stock price reaction of 27 leading US banks 
to three of the Basle Committee’s major bank capital regulation announcements 
during the period 1986-88. The authors found significant negative returns surrounding 
these announcements. Madura and Zarruk (1993) found similar negative returns, more 
so for larger banks. Cooper, Kolari and Wagster (1991) studied the effects of capital 
requirements on the share prices of banks in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States for twelve announcements during the period January 1987 to July 
1988. Their findings show significant declines in the equity returns of US, Canadian 
and UK banks, with the US banks showing the strongest reaction. In the case of 
Japanese banks, the evidence is inconclusive, and the authors put this down to 
investor uncertainty regarding hidden reserves.  
 
Wagster (1996) examined eighteen news announcements leading up to the 1988 Basle 
Accord and the reaction of 57 banks from 7 countries. The main impact found was a 
cumulative wealth gain of 32% in the Japanese bank sample. Wagster (1996) assumed 
that the market perceived the Accord as confirming the competitive edge Japanese 
banks had over their counterparts in terms of market share gains: If Japanese banks 
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needed to raise additional capital as a result of the regulation, it would pose little 
difficulty due to their strong existing reserves. Lu, Shen, and So (1999) analysed the 
impact the Basle Accord had on the returns of small banks. They hypothesized that 
previous regulation inhibited smaller banks, and the new regulation allowed these 
banks to diversify and expand their asset base. Consistent with the authors’ 
hypothesis, the reactions from smaller banks to the announcements were positive. Lu, 
Shen, and So (1999) also reported a negative reaction by the larger banks in the 
sample, supporting previous literature (Madura and Zarruk (1993)). 
 
Other studies have looked at bank equity returns in terms of changes in market 
conditions, policies, and regulatory schemes. Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) 
investigate how changes in the federal funds target-rate levels affect commercial 
banks’ stock prices. They found that an inverse relationship exists, dependent on the 
size of the bank and its present capital levels. Biswass, Fraser, and Hebb (2000) 
examine the changes in deposit insurance premiums in the early 1990s on bank 
returns. The authors found that increases (decreases) in the premium resulted in 
decreases (increases) in the market values of the banks studied. Larger banks were 
most affected by this due to their tendency to operate with low levels of equity capital. 
Bhargava & Fraser (1998) study the stock market reaction related to four Federal 
Reserve decisions allowing Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to engage in investment 
banking and expand the nature of their business. The reaction to this regulation was 
significantly negative, owing to the increase in market risk exposure along with the 
added burden to the federal safety net.  
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The evidence from these empirical studies, which concentrate mainly on bank capital 
regulation in place prior to the 1996 Amendment, is predominantly negative overall. 
To date there has been little literature examining the impact of the announcements 
leading up to the 1996 Amendment of the Basle Accord; one of the key objectives of 
this thesis is to address this omission. 
 
Based on the previous literature the following hypotheses are formed in relation to the 
1996 Market Risk Amendment and the impact on bank equity values: 
 
    The 1st Announcement: The Basle Committee issued a framework for applying 
capital charges to commercial banks’ market risk.  
 Announcement Date: 15th April 1993. 
 
In April 1993 the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issued its first paper 
entitled ‘The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks’. The Committee proposed a 
structure for applying capital charges to market risk. The Committee envisaged the 
use of a ‘standardized methodology’, that is to calculate the net position in each 
financial contract (interest rate, equity, or currency) and multiply by 8%. However, 
the standardized approach fails to take into account the most accurate risk 
management techniques and is not sophisticated enough to consider correlations and 
portfolio effects across instruments and markets. As a result, this regulation reduces 
any competitive advantage banks have built up in terms of risk management and 
reporting practices. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Large commercial banks within G-10 will experience significant 
negative abnormal returns from the first Basle Committee bank capital regulation 
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announcement in regard to market risk. 
 
  The 2nd Announcement: The Basle Committee provides banks with the option 
to use an internal models approach for allocating capital to market risk.  
 Announcement Date: 28th April 1995. 
 
The internal models approach enables the determination of a bank’s capital 
requirement on the basis of its internal risk measurement systems. Under this 
framework, financial institutions are required to report a daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
figure at the 99 percent confidence level calculated over a ten trading-day period. The 
minimum capital requirement on a given day is equal to a multiple of the average 
reported 10-day VaR in the past 60 trading days. The use of internal models 
represents a major departure from previous regulatory regimes, allowing for more 
flexibility by moving away from a uniform supervisory standardized approach. The 
internal models approach ensures a more transparent reporting system, as all banks 
must calculate VaR. This allows a direct comparison between the risk levels of 
various institutions (Gizycki and Hereford, 1998). In addition, some banks may not be 
as advanced as others and may not have the necessary resources to facilitate an 
internal models approach. In addition, the 10-day 99 percent confidence level is based 
predominantly on an assumption of normal returns, and therefore does not consider 
extreme event risk. In sum, the proposal is innovative and the first to pass risk 
measurement control over to the industry, however, the internal models can result in 
banks’ under-reporting risk and thereby the amount of capital allocated to market risk.  
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Hypothesis 2a: The reaction to this proposal is expected to be significantly negative 
due to the VaR methodology not being sophisticated enough to capture extreme risk, 
in addition to providing an incentive for banks to underreport their risk.   
 
  The 3rd Announcement: The first public disclosure of the trading activities of 
Commercial Banks and Securities Firms. A joint report published by the Basle 
Committee and The International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO).  
 Announcement Date: 28th November 1995. 
 
The Basle Committee and IOSCO surveyed the trading activities of a sample of large 
commercial banks and securities firms within G-10 and was one of the first to address 
the issue of derivative trading complexity. The findings showed that the trading 
activities of these banks had grown rapidly and become much more complex in recent 
years. The findings stressed the need for banks to provide regulators with more 
transparent qualitative and quantitative reports of the risks that were being taken. 
Furthermore, market participants should be able to assess a bank’s performance in 
managing exposures to credit risk and market risk as well as the impact of trading 
derivatives activities on earnings. The report stressed that meaningful public 
disclosures play an important role in helping supervisors foster financial market 
stability.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The reaction to this report is expected to be positive because it 
increased the level of transparency for risk within the financial system, while 
providing solutions for future risk measurement and reporting practices that would 
benefit both regulators and the investment community.   
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  The 4th Announcement: The final Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
incorporate Market Risk. A companion paper was also released describing the 
way in which G-10 supervisory authorities plan to use ‘back-testing’ (ex-post 
comparisons between model results and actual performance) in conjunction 
with banks’ internal risk measurement systems as a basis for applying capital 
charges.  
 Announcement Date: 4th January 1996. 
 
The objective in introducing this significant amendment to the Capital Accord is to 
provide an explicit capital cushion to bolster banks against the risk exposure 
associated with trading derivatives. This additional capital requirement is expected to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system. 
Furthermore, the amendment enforces a set of strict qualitative standards to guide the 
process by which banks calculate and report their market risk capital requirements.  
 
By allowing banks to calculate their own capital levels through an internal models 
VaR methodology, the Basle Committee did not recognise that market price 
movements are not always normally distributed and may display fat tails, where 
movements have a wider dispersion. In addition, VaR estimates are typically based on 
end-of-day positions and generally do not take into account intra-day volatility. 
Furthermore, measuring risk from a historical volatility basis is not always a good 
approximation for the future. Another major drawback of the internal models 
approach is the prospect of arbitrage opportunities between the banking book and the 
trading book due to the lower capital charge that may be given to trading positions 
under the VaR approach suggested by the Basle Committee.  
 
Furthermore, the Basle Committee deemed that all internal VaR numbers had to 
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multiplied by a minimum factor of three calculate the capital to be held. If significant 
discrepancies were found between actual trading and modelled VaR numbers, then a 
plus factor would be added to the minimum number of three. Furthermore, the 
multiplier of 3 may not be severe enough when it comes to penalising banks for 
running inaccurate risk models. Furthermore, there was no statistical rationale behind 
this multiplication factor: it was arbitrary and attempted to compensate for such issues 
as model risk, extreme events, and misrepresentation of capital.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The framework announced by Basle, enforcing a uniform ten-day 
holding period interval and an arbitrary multiplication factor to calculate capital 
charges for market risk, will result in significant negative returns. 
 
2. 2 Bank Risk and Off-Balance-Sheet (OBS) Activity 
I Introduction 
The second key objective of this thesis is the examination and measurement of bank 
risk, through a volatile timeframe of 1992 to 1998, where banks significantly 
increased their pursuit of non-traditional activities. One of the major developments 
since the 1992 full implementation of the Basle agreements is the increase in bank’s 
off-balance-sheet (OBS) activity. OBS activity can be defined as transactions that do 
not appear on the balance sheet. Banks transfer assets off the balance sheet in order to 
reduce capital requirements and improve capital adequacy. In moving to OBS 
activity, banks no longer rely on clients to earn interest income, but use their size and 
reputation to offer a variety of fee-based services and reduce a bank’s reliance on 
interest income. Banks have also developed expertise in risk management, thereby 
offering hedging solutions to companies through derivative contracts. Major sources 
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of non-interest income for banks include service charges on deposits, trust-activity 
income, and trading profits.  
 
Throughout the 1990s the growth of trading activity in financial markets, in addition 
to periods of economic instability, and a number of widely publicized trading losses 
resulted in a re-analysis by academics and investors of the risks faced by financial 
institutions, and how they are measured. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) argue that 
banks must take on greater levels of risk due to declines in traditional banking and 
associated reductions in profit levels. The changes that are taking place within the 
banking system may provide incentives for, or impose the need for, assuming a higher 
risk profile. Simons (1995), and Chaudhry and Reichert (1999) argue that derivative 
instruments and non-traditional activity lead to higher bank risk. In contrast, 
numerous studies have found that the use of derivatives and OBS activity have 
reduced the interest-rate and currency exposure of banks (Shanker, 1996; 
Venkatachalam, 1996; Choi and Elyasiani, 1997). 
 
II Bank Risk, Capital Regulation, and OBS activity 
Regulators may have achieved their primary goal of improved capitalisation, 
however, the issue of overall bank risk may not be resolved through this requirement 
alone. Park (1997) models how regulators screen banks and the asset choice of banks.  
The results indicate that banks tend towards a riskier asset portfolio as they become 
subject to higher capital requirements. Similarly, Blum (1999) argues that the positive 
relationship between risk and expected returns means that higher capital requirements 
increase the opportunity costs of equity, thus encouraging riskier investments. 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) examine risk-shifting incentives in US banks during the 
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period from 1985 to 1994 and conclude that low capitalised banks engaged in more 
risk-shifting activities than others. Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) study US banks for 
the period 1989 to 1991 and examine the impact of the 1991 FDICIA legislation on 
bank risk. This legislation enforced penalties for banks when their capital levels went 
below certain predefined levels. The findings of Aggrawal and Jacques (2001) 
showed that under-capitalised banks increased their capital levels by between 200 and 
800 basis points per annum more than well-capitalised banks. Correspondingly, Rime 
(2001) finds that Swiss banks reacted to regulatory pressure by increasing capital 
levels without increasing risk. Bichsel and Blum (2001) also examine Swiss data and 
find a positive correlation between changes in capital and changes in risk. However, 
Beatty and Gron (2001) found no significant difference in pre and post-regulation 
conduct of US banks.  
 
The empirical literature on the monitoring of banks by their regulators provides a 
number of insights, but leaves open other issues that need to be addressed. The 
necessary information the market requires to assess banks is difficult to come by due 
to the opacity of banks and the lack of liquidity of bank loans. The revenues stemming 
from banks’ traditional lending base are likely to remain relatively stable as switching 
and information costs make it financially difficult to break the lending relationship 
banks benefit from, whereas the revenue streams from non-traditional activities are 
less predictable. Boyd and Graham (1986) find larger banks’ expansion into non-
traditional activities increases the risk of failure. Berger, Demetz, and Strahan (1999) 
find that as banks become larger and more diversified, they tend to hold riskier assets 
and less equity. Theoretically, diversification can reduce bank risk but Berger, 
Demetz and Strahan (1999) have shown that banks as pursuers of new activities have 
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resorted to lower capital levels, increased loan portfolios and the use of more 
derivatives. The study by DeYoung and Roland (1999) finds that as banks move 
towards non-traditional earning activities, earnings volatility increases as well as total 
leverage. Kwan (1997) examined the returns on the securities activities of banks and 
found that these institutions were riskier and not necessarily more profitable than 
other affiliates not engaging in securities activity. 
 
Studies have found that fee-based income does stabilise profits. Supporters of this 
view generally report their findings in terms of potential. Mester (1992) finds 
diversifying non-traditional and traditional banking leads to diseconomies of scope 
and some economies of scale. Davis and Salo (1998) find in OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries that as non-interest income 
increases, overall profitability falls. The authors also find non-income growth to be 
much slower in the US when compared to Europe, and also more volatile. Another 
finding reported by this study is that larger banks are now much more dependent on 
this form of income. Aggeler and Feldman (1998) study the income pattern of US 
banks and find net interest income increased by over 12% in the period 1992 to 1997, 
yet the largest earning gains stemmed from non-interest income which increased by 
34% over the period.  
 
Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) argue that most research finds no economies of 
scale because it ignores differences in banks’ capital structure, lending practices and 
risk taking. Results indicate bank size has a negative impact on bank capital ratios and 
a positive impact on the credit risk ratio. Loan activity allows a bank to hold less 
capital, invest less in low-yield, high-liquidity assets and increase holdings of higher 
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risk and return assets. Possibly due to changes in regulation and the fact that larger 
banks have greater access to capital markets, these banks tend to operate with lower 
amounts of capital or feel they have less pressure to increase capital due to the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ effect and the existence of a government safety net. There also appears to 
be evidence that off-balance sheet activity and loan sales help banks lower their 
capital levels to avoid regulatory taxes and improve their risk tolerance (Demetz, 
2000).  
 
Overall, the empirical evidence does not conclusively determine whether diversifying 
through non-traditional activities reduces risk. Evidently, many questions and 
hypotheses have arisen concerning whether bank performance is significantly altered 
by banks pursuing and engaging in new profit-pursuing activities. There is a 
significant gap in the current literature in terms of studies evaluating bank risk on a 
quantifiable basis, whilst taking into account the significant growth in off-balance 
sheet assets and non-interest income. Furthermore, existing commercial bank risk 
literature is predominantly limited to US banks. This study employs Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) methodology to investigate the riskiness of commercial banks within G-10 
countries. This study does not account for the different lending practices within each 
country of G-10. One possible avenue for future research is to examine the 
relationship between risk and loan activity (net loans as a percentage of total assets) in 
the context of VaR and efficiency. If the data was available it would be very 
interesting to study the different lending practices of the major financial institutions 
within country. This would provide a detailed analysis of each country’s exposure to 
different asset classes and risk buckets.   
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III Value-at-Risk (VaR) Methods 
 
The VaR method is now tagged as a modern and robust methodology for measuring 
financial risk and is used to calculate how much a financial institution can lose with a 
probability p over a given time-horizon. This method is popular due to its conceptual 
simplicity and its ability to reduce the financial risk associated with a given position 
or portfolio down to just one number. Furthermore, the Basle Committee endorsed the 
VaR approach for measuring market risk, thus increasing its credibility.  
 
VaR can be calculated in numerous ways and its value depends on the assumptions 
made and models used. The most common classification of VaR methods found in the 
literature is that of parametric VaR estimates, historical simulation (non-parametric), 
and Monte Carlo simulation (non-parametric). The three methods are complementary, 
but each offers a different view of risk and much debate has focused on which method 
is more robust.  
 
Studying the method and the accuracy of disclosed VaR figures based on proprietary 
models is important, especially regarding bank capital regulation. In order to reduce 
the capital charges linked to market risk, banks may try to underestimate their VaR 
(Lucas, 2001) or even decrease the quality of risk management systems (Danielsson, 
Jorgensen and de Vries, 2002). However, Cuocco and Liu (2006) conclude that VaR-
based capital requirements can be very effective in ensuring calculation and reporting 
accuracy of market risk. VaR research has typically focused either on the 
quantification of VaR (Roulstone, 1999, and Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s 1999- 2001 surveys) or the accuracy of VaR disclosure (Perignon, 
Deng and Wang, 2006). Few empirical studies have examined the accuracy of actual 
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VaRs figures (Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002, Jaschke et al. (2003), Berkowitz, 
Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2006, and Perignon, Deng and Wang, 2006). Berkowitz 
and O’Brien, (2002) find that over 80% of their bank sample reported higher VaR 
values, and exceeded the 99th percentile by an average of 70%. However, Jaschke et al 
(2003) found that two-thirds of their sample had higher VaR values, but were on 
average less than the 99th percentile by 4%.  
 
The literature on VaR suggests it is important to both quantify VaR in addition to 
measuring the accuracy of disclosure. This is inline with one of the three foundations 
of Basel II agreement in terms of meaningful disclosure. Little is known on the actual 
accuracy of disclosed VaRs. Future research should try to test whether disclosed 
VaRs are useful in forecasting the volatility of trading revenues, but this does depend 
on receiving bank specific data on trading activity and performance. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to categorise banks that are and are not well capitalised and if 
there are any significant differences between their actual and reported VaR.  
 
The most commonly used method for calculated VaR is a parametric approach due to 
its ease and speed of calculation. This approach assumes a normal distribution, 
however, it fails to consider that stock returns can be asymmetric and tend to have 
fatter tails than inferred under a normal distribution. Therefore adopting a parametric 
approach to calculate VaR may result in the under-estimation of a bank’s risk. 
 
Historical simulation is a non-parametric approach that makes no assumptions about 
the shape of the distribution of asset returns: This is the method’s largest advantage. 
Historical simulation calculates the hypothetical distribution of returns based on how 
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the asset would have behaved under past scenarios. However, this non-parametric 
approach works under the assumption that future risks are much like past risks, which 
is less likely in today’s volatile market environment. Another potential risk of this 
approach occurs where the past timeframe, used in the VaR calculation, is 
characterised by low volatility and includes no extreme events. Underestimation of a 
bank’s VaR would occur under these circumstances. 
 
A second non-parametric approach is Monte Carlo simulation, which generates 
random pricing scenarios. Jorion (1997) claims that this approach is the most flexible 
of all VaR estimation techniques. The hypothetical returns under each scenario are 
converted into a histogram of expected profits and losses, from which VaR can be 
calculated. Similar to the historical simulation, an advantage of Monte Carlo 
simulation is that is does not assume asset returns are distributed normally. However, 
the methodology is computationally intensive, especially for extensive asset 
portfolios.  
 
Dowd (1999), and Ho (2000) proposed a third non-parametric approach to calculate 
VaR; Extreme Value Theory (EVT). Traditional VaR calculation methods tend to 
ignore extreme events and focus on risk parameters that consider up to 99% of the 
distribution of returns. This presents a major problem because it is the extreme events 
that move markets significantly and result in the largest losses. By focusing on the 
extreme tail of a distribution, VaR can be estimated with a confidence of greater than 
99 percent. The difference EVT makes to VaR estimates is that it represents that tail 
of an extreme value distribution. As a result, a VaR figure calculated using EVT 
would be higher than a VaR figure calculated using traditional methodologies.  
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In sum, the parametric approach assumes a normal distribution in returns of the 
evaluated parameters. Historical simulation assumes the returns will follow a similar 
level of volatility as in the past. Monte Carlo simulation considers a random 
generation process of parameter returns. EVT uses past movements in the market to 
determine extreme levels of risk. This study employs all four VaR approaches in order 
to obtain an accurate and valid measure of how bank risk changed during the period 
1992 to 1998.  
 
This thesis measures the changing nature of bank risk based on each bank’s exposure 
to interest rate risk, equity risk, and foreign exchange risk. Bank risk is measured for a 
sample of large international commercial banks and direct comparisons can be made 
for each bank’s VaR. The period studied, 1992 to 1998, represents a time when banks 
were changing the nature of their business and ultimately their risk profile. Therefore, 
comparisons can be made of each bank’s VaR over time.  This study is one of the first 
to explicitly consider the risk profile of large commercial banks within G-10, using 
both parametric and non-parametric VaR techniques. Each of the four VaR 
methodologies is employed to estimate each bank’s weekly VaR based on the impact 
of changes in interest rates, equity market volatility, and foreign exchange rate 
movements. Based on previous literature this study examines the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: As banks have increased their non-traditional activities this should 
result in an overall increase in bank risk as measured by VaR. 
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Hypothesis 6a: Banks exposure to currency and foreign exchange risk has diminished 
through the study period based on a greater exposure to off-balance-sheet activities 
and less reliance on more traditional forms of business. 
 
Hypothesis 7a: Based on the underlying assumptions, parametric VaR understates the 
riskiness of banks when compared to the other approaches (historical simulation, 
Monte Carlo and EVT). 
 
2.3 Bank Efficiency Literature 
 
I Introduction 
 
In addition to studying how the risk profile of banks has changed, the third key 
objective of this thesis is to examine bank efficiency levels. This thesis applies Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate the efficiency of large commercial banks in 
G-10 countries for the period 1992 to 1998. DEA measures the relative efficiency of 
each bank by comparing it to an efficient frontier based on an optimal set of 
input/output variables taken from the bank sample studied. Given the fact that banks 
are changing rapidly, it is of considerable interest to measure the efficiency of 
evolving institutions.  
 
The research on efficiency in financial institutions is extensive; Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) noted that nearly 120 papers were published on this topic between 1992 and 
1996. While multiple studies have examined efficiency levels of various types of 
banks across many countries, few have focused on commercial banks specifically 
within G-10, while there are a multitude of efficiency analyses on US bank efficiency 
(for instance, Aly et al (1990); Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) and Miller and Noulas 
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(1996); Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997); Berger and Mester (1997); and 
Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993)). A key contribution of this thesis is the 
inclusion of non-traditional activities in the efficiency analysis. Most efficiency 
studies measure bank output via traditional activities, such as loan generation and 
deposit investment. Commercial banks now focus more on non-traditional business 
such as derivatives activity, wealth management, and trading. Lang and Welzel 
(1996), Drake (2001) acknowledge the increased involvement of banks in non-
traditional activities and include non-interest income within the efficiency model. 
Altunbas et al (2001), Isik and Hassan (2003), and Rao (2005) use off balance sheet 
items as an output variable. This study estimates the efficiency of the bank sample 
with and without off-balance sheet activities in order to observe whether it will have 
an impact on efficiency. Furthermore, regression is used to explain the efficiency of 
banks.   
 
In sum, the third objective of this thesis is to investigate bank efficiency levels, 
including OBS activity in the analysis. This study contributes to the existing literature 
in a number of ways. First, it employs a non-parametric DEA approach to compare 
the efficiency scores across G-10 banks, and to determine the rank scores of bank 
efficiency by country; second, it examines the change in efficiency of G-10 banks 
during the period 1992 to 1998; third, it establishes whether differences in efficiency 
between G-10 countries are the result of their respective economic environments; 
fourth, it investigates the impact of OBS activity on bank efficiency using a DEA 
input-output model across all G-10 countries; and fifth, by using a Tobit regression 
approach, this study attempts to determine whether a bank’s efficiency level is 
dependent on its VaR.  
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II Efficiency Analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The majority of studies of bank efficiency can be categorised into those that use either 
parametric techniques or non-parametric techniques. Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
report the mean level of bank cost inefficiency for 60 parametric studies as 15%, and 
the mean for the 62 non-parametric studies as 28%. DEA has become a popular 
method for measuring efficiency in different national banking industries as studies by 
Elyasiani and Medhian (1990), Berg et al (1993), Brockett et al (1997) demonstrate. 
US commercial banks are by far the most studied from the point of view of efficiency. 
The literature below discusses at US, non-US and country comparison studies. 
 
III U.S. Bank Efficiency 
 
Aly et al (1990) applied a five output, three input DEA intermediation approach to 
322 US banks. They found that efficiency levels were relatively low and technical 
efficiency dominated scale efficiency. Studies by Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) and 
Miller and Noulas (1996) compared the relative efficiency of small and large banks 
using DEA. Both studies concluded that larger banks were more efficient during the 
competitive and less regulated era of the 1980s. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) studied 
the effect of deregulation on profit efficiency. They found profit efficiency levels 
between 81% and 85%, far higher than those of other studies, for instance, Akhavein, 
Berger and Humphrey (1997); Berger and Mester (1997); and Berger, Hancock and 
Humphrey (1993) find efficiency levels of 24%, 46%, and 65% respectively. 
 
Spong, Sullivan and De Young (1995) try to identify a number of characteristics of 
the most efficient and least efficient banks. They then use these characteristics to 
reveal factors that are present only within financial institutions that are run efficiently. 
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The study examines banks that are deemed efficient by satisfying selection criteria 
both in terms of cost efficiency and profitability. The final sample resulted in seventy-
three efficient banks and seventy low efficiency banks. Their findings suggest that the 
average bank in the low efficiency sample has a cost efficiency index of 71%, 
indicating that the most efficient bank could produce the same outputs for 71% of the 
cost.  
 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) examined the trade-off between risk and capitalisation 
and measured the inefficiencies of 256 large bank holding companies during the 
period 1986 to 1991. They used a simultaneous equation approach to draw upon 
agency theory and highlight the incentives for management in managing risk and how 
these incentives may be affected by regulatory pressure. The findings of this study 
suggest that risk; capital and inefficiency are simultaneously determined. They also 
report that as asset quality decreases, measured inefficiencies under risk neutrality 
also decrease. These results are consistent with the findings of Hughes, Lang, Mester 
and Moon (1996). Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) also found that as capital increases, 
banks become more efficient; i.e. that well-capitalised banks are run more effectively. 
They also indicate that rapidly growing institutions tend to be less efficient than 
institutions with moderate growth patterns and are likely to have higher loan risk.  
 
The impact of bank regulation and capitalisation on bank efficiency has been widely 
studied, especially the US (Berger and Mester, 2003; Sturma and Williams, 2004). 
Overall, the effects of these regulatory efforts have been mixed (e.g., Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar, 2003; Altunbas et al., 2001; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007).  Some studies 
suggest that financial reform improves efficiency. Das and Ghosh (2006) used DEA 
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to evaluate the efficiency of Indian commercial banks during the post reform period 
of 1992-2002.  They found that medium-sized public banks performed reasonably 
well and efficiency improved.  In contrast, other studies find that financial reform has 
no efficiency effect or leads to a decline in operating efficiency.  For instance, 
banking efficiency in the US was relatively unchanged by deregulation (Bauer et al., 
1998; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995). Similarly, Fukuyama and Weber (2002) found 
that the efficiency of Japanese banks during 1992-1996 declined. Das and Ghosh 
(2006) also found a positive relationship between banking efficiency and capital 
adequacy. This result supports the rationale for capital adequacy requirements and is 
consistent with the notion that well-capitalized banks are perceived to be relatively 
safe, lowers their cost of borrowing, and results in enhanced efficiency.   
 
IV Non-U.S. Bank Efficiency 
 
Studies of efficiency have also focused on banks within various countries such as 
Japan (Tachibanaki et al, 1991; Fukuyama, 1993; McKillop et al, 1996), Ireland 
(Glass and McKillop, 1992; Lucey, 1993), and Nordic countries (Berg et al, 1993). 
Adenso-Diaz and Gascon (1997) provide further evidence on bank efficiency levels 
by the identification of alternative measures of efficiency and by linking these to the 
stock returns of Spanish financial institutions. They estimate the measures of partial 
efficiency as a function of production costs, systematic risk, specific risk and branch 
network distribution. DEA is used to estimate the efficiency measures assigned to the 
production costs and branch network distributions of the banks. Daily stock return 
data are used to calculate the risk measures in the analysis, which are systematic and 
specific risk measures. The authors assume a statistical relationship exists between 
some or all of these efficiency functions and market performance. The findings 
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suggest that specific risk is the most influential when determining bank stock price 
performance.  
 
Tachibanaki et al (1991) used a two-output translog cost function with a sample of 
sixty-one banks for the period 1985 to 1987 and found evidence of economies of 
scale. Fukuyama (1993) used a DEA intermediation approach for 145 commercial 
banks in the country, finding that these banks should have produced the same level of 
outputs, consuming 14% less resources when compared to maximum utility. 
McKillop et al. (1996) analysed cost and efficiency within the five largest Japanese 
banks and found a range of between 1.08 and 1.28 for economies of scale (a figure 
greater than one represents economies of scale). Altumbas et al. (2000) employ a 
parametric model and a fourier flexible stochastic cost frontier model to determine 
both scale economies and X-efficiencies in Japanese banks. The three outputs they 
utilize are total loans, total securities, and off-balance-sheet items; the three inputs 
being labour, capital, and total funds. It is important to note that Japanese banks were 
known to conceal the extent of their of bad debts throughout the 1990s (Hall, 1999).  
 
Glass and McKillop (1992) use a multi-product translog model to examine efficiency 
levels within Irish banks for the period 1972 to 1990, incorporating two inputs and 
two outputs. They found no evidence of economies of scale, whilst significant 
economies of scope were discovered in the latter years of the 1980s. Lucey (1993) 
studied seventeen banks to estimate the profit function and report technical efficiency 
levels averaging 83% over the period between 1988 and 1991.  
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Berg et al (1993) employ a DEA model to study 126 banks in Sweden, 503 in Finland, 
and 130 in Norway. The findings show Finnish banks as relatively inefficient and 
compare the relative efficiency of the three countries using a CRS model and VRS 
model. The CRS approach determines the efficient frontier from the sample of banks 
sampled. This approach is appropriate when all banks are operating at an optimal 
scale. McAllister and McManus (1993) note that factors such as imperfect 
competition and regulatory requirements may cause banks to operate at a sub-optimal 
level. The VRS approach ensures an inefficient bank is benchmarked against similar 
sized banks.  As a result, VRS envelops the data more closely than CRS and 
consequently VRS technical efficiency scores are greater than or equal to CRS 
technical efficiency scores. Bukh et al (1995) studied banks in Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark and found efficiency levels of 54%, 85%, 52%, and 78% 
respectively using a DEA framework.  
 
A number of more recent studies (Beccalli et al., 2006, Eisenbeis et al. 1999, Chu and 
Lim, 1998) have sought to link bank efficiency to stock returns, generally finding a 
positive relationship. Beccalli et al., (2006) find a positive relationship between bank 
efficiency and stock returns suggesting a positive relationship between efficiency and 
shareholder value creation.  In terms of returns, the risk-taking propensity of banks is 
expected to have a significant influence on the ability to generate returns. The number 
of studies dealing with bank risk is again substantial and deals with a variety of issues 
including: measurement methodologies (Duffie 2005, Lucas and Klaassen, 2006 and 
Galluccio and Roncoroni, 2006); the adequacy of new capital requirements to credit 
risk management practices (Jacobson et al., 2005); relationships with other risks 
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(Zheng 2006). As a result of Basle II recent studies have focused on operational risk 
and measurement issues (Scandizzo 2005, De Fontnouvelle et al., 2007). 
 
 
V Cross-Country Efficiency 
 
The comparison of different country’s banking systems and performance is quite 
problematic as there are many country-specific factors to consider. These elements 
can distort efficiency results and raise several difficulties in comparing country 
specific results. Cross-country studies by Yildrim and Phillipatos (2002), and Kosak 
and Zajc (2004) did not take country-specific variables into account when measuring 
efficiency. Bikker (2002) and Maggi and Rossi (2003) calculated bank inefficiency by 
including country dummy variables. Grigorian and Manole (2002) employed a 
different approach where the authors estimated bank efficiency scores in the first 
stage, then in the second stage regressed the efficiency results on country-specific 
macroeconomic variables. Bos and Kool (2006) followed a similar approach.  
 
Allen and Rai (1996) compared cost inefficiency across 15 developed countries. The 
findings show that large banks exhibit the highest measures of cost inefficiency. The 
authors also find institutions in Japan, Australia, Austria, Germany, Sweden, and 
Canada to be the most efficient, while banks in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States are least efficient. Pastor et al (1997) apply DEA to 427 banks 
in eight countries where efficiency averaged 86%, ranging between 55% and 95%. 
This study found the UK to be at the lower end of the scale, while France was the 
leader. Concurring with past evidence, the US was viewed as relatively inefficient, 
being second lowest with an 81% efficiency average. However, it is important to note 
that cross-country studies are difficult to interpret as different regulatory and 
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economic conditions that exist in each country. On the other hand these studies do 
provide valuable information for comparing banks within specific countries and 
determining inefficiencies, which is key for major banks operating in a global 
marketplace.  
 
Pastor et al (1997) used a DEA technique to define a common frontier for EU 
countries that incorporated the different environmental variables of each country. 
Their results indicate that Germany, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, and France had 
the highest efficiency scores. Dietsch and Weill (1998) studied 11 EU countries 
covering the years 1992 to 1996 using cost and profit frontiers and found a mixed 
picture of efficiency scores across countries. Bikker (2002) studied 15 EU member 
states over the years 1990-1997 using stochastic frontier methods and showed a clear 
trend of increasing efficiency over time with Luxembourg, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark being the most efficient and Belgium, Greece, and Italy at the 
low end of the spectrum.  
 
Hasan, Lozano-Vivas, and Pastor (2000) examine bank efficiency within ten leading 
European countries. The authors calculate the technical efficiency of banks within 
each country using an input-oriented DEA approach based on a variable-returns 
model. The authors note that the measure only represents basic efficiency and 
incorporates bank variables only. The authors create a common frontier by taking into 
account different bank technologies and environmental factors. The outputs used are 
loans, deposits, and other earning assets. Inputs are labour and physical assets and are 
represented by personnel expenses and non-interest expenses. The environmental 
factors used represent the macroeconomic state of the respective countries.  
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As banks evolve and expand through more OBS activity, traditional bank efficiency 
and performance measures will not accurately reflect a bank’s condition and position 
within the marketplace. To accurately model bank efficiency, the inputs and outputs 
should reflect the range of activities that banks engage in. The authors find that 
excluding a proxy for OBS activity may distort traditional efficiency measures and 
results. The authors also find that efficiency is not linked to size when a proxy for 
activities is included in the model. In order to evaluate the effects of including OBS 
activity, the authors employ two efficiency models; one with and one without the 
OBS proxy. The authors use three inputs and three outputs to measure the level of 
efficiency. The average efficiency between the high and low profit frontiers, as 
categorized by the return-on-equity, is between 53% and 77%. The findings of Siems 
and Clark (1997) show the inclusion of an OBS proxy helps explain why banks do not 
become less efficient as they consolidate and grow. The study showed that with the 
inclusion of OBSA, banks appear to be equally efficient across asset size categories.  
 
Rogers (1998) points out that non-traditional activities have been largely ignored in 
the estimation of bank efficiency. Siems and Clark (1997), Rogers (1998) and Isik and 
Hassan (2003) note that models excluding non-traditional outputs may have a 
negative impact on banks that are heavily involved in such activities. Consequently, 
some recent studies have addressed this issue of increased important of non-
traditional activities, by including the value of off-balance sheet items or non-interest 
income in the output vector (Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003; Drake and Hall, 2003; Bos 
and Kolari, 2005). However, many other studies continue to estimate efficiency 
frontiers without accounting for non-traditional activities (e.g. Maudos et al., 2002; 
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Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; 
Lensink et al., 2008).   
 
 
While the study of EU cross-country bank efficiency is robust, little has been done to 
model off-balance sheet activity. This thesis aims to add to the existing literature in 
this direction and extend the sample to include banks from Canada, Japan, and the 
United States. The comparability of banks across countries is inhibited due to each 
country’s efficiency estimate being relative only to the efficient frontier for that 
country. The frontiers for each country are different and therefore only illustrate the 
dispersion of banks in terms of that country’s best-practice standard. Alternatively, 
bank efficiency can be tested against a global frontier. Bank efficiency comparisons 
against a global frontier allow for a better comparison across nations as banks are set 
against one standard benchmark. Following a similar approach to Casu and Molyneux 
(2003), this study defines the common frontier following the traditional approach, i.e. 
building up the G-10 frontier by pooling the data set for the banks in all 11 countries 
in the sample.  
 
In addition to applying DEA to evaluate G-10 bank efficiency performance, this study 
examines the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8a: Efficiency scores change significantly with the inclusion of an off-
balance-sheet variable as an additional output. 
Hypothesis 9a: There is a statistical relationship between bank efficiency and equity 
performance. 
Hypothesis 10a: Macro-economic variables significantly impact a bank’s efficiency 
score.  
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Hypothesis 11a: Efficiency scores increase as a bank’s VaR increases. 
Hypothesis 12a: The 1996 Market Risk Amendment has a significant impact on a 
bank’s efficiency. 
 
The aforementioned literature provides little guidance with respect to the impact of 
the 1996 Market Risk Amendment; the risk profile of commercial banks through 1992 
to 1998, a period of high market volatility; and little has been done to examine the 
impact of off-balance-sheet activity across G-10 banks. Furthermore, this study 
attempts to explain the determinants of efficiency by considering macro-economic 
variables, each bank’s VaR, and the impact of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment on 
efficiency levels. The next chapter discusses the methodologies and data sample used 
to test the hypotheses stated above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54
Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter discusses the various methodologies used in the analysis. The key 
elements of each methodology are explained and a critical appraisal is presented. 
Section II deals with the event study methodology; Section III discusses data 
envelopment analysis; Section IV discusses value at risk and Section V draws some 
conclusions. 
 
I Event-Study Methodology 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) claims that speculative market prices fully 
reflect all available relevant information. Event studies are used in tests of EMH to 
determine if prices incorporate information fully surrounding the announcement of a 
key event. A capital market is said to be efficient if asset prices fully reflect all 
available information. If EMH holds, the information about the event should be 
incorporated into prices before or on the day the information is revealed. As a result, 
there should be no impact on returns after the event. The efficient market hypothesis 
is categorized by three forms - the weak form; the semi-strong form; and the strong 
form. The weak form efficient market hypothesis asserts that current prices fully 
reflect the information held in the historical price series. Thus, any market participant 
cannot predict future price changes from analyzing past price patterns. The semi-
strong form of market efficiency asserts that the current price of a stock not only 
reflects all historical information, but is fully responsive to all current public 
information. The price response to any public information will therefore be quick, 
accurate and unbiased.  The strong form efficient market hypothesis asserts that the 
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current price fully reflects all historical information, all public and private 
information, and therefore no market participant can monopolize private information 
to earn abnormal returns. The distinctive feature of an efficient market is that prices 
reflect all available information. If prices reflect all information in an accurate and 
instantaneous manner, then there is no chance to form a trading strategy to earn 
incremental returns.  
 
The event-study technique provides an estimate of the market’s reaction to an 
announcement. Event-study can provide evidence on the movement of stock prices 
around the occurrence of specific events, particularly those outside the norm. This 
methodology is based on the theory that markets are deemed efficient and all publicly 
available information is incorporated into the share price upon release, thereby 
removing any arbitrage opportunities or abnormal profit making. 
 
This thesis uses event-study methods based upon residual analysis of the market 
model (Henderson (1990); Brown and Warner (1985)) to examine the impact of the 
1996 Amendment to the Basle Accord announcements. This model has been widely 
used to examine market reactions to activities that might influence investor decision-
making. The inclusion of an interest rate factor adds explanatory power to bank stock 
movement (Benink and Wolff, 2000). As financial institutions usually function and 
profit through the interest spread between deposits and loans, the interest rate risk is 
widely regarded as one of the most important risks faced by banks, as pointed out by 
Mishkin (1999). Furthermore, Choi and Jen (1990) and Kwan (1991) find interest 
rates to be a significant factor in explaining bank stock returns and support the two-
factor event study methodology that includes interest rates.  
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The issue of interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns has been largely explored in 
banking literature. Empirical studies have provided substantial evidence for bank 
stock returns exhibiting a statistically significant relationship with interest rate 
changes. (Flannery and James, 1984; Brewer andWang, 2000). However, studies by 
Choi et al. (1996), Allen and Jagtiani, (1997) and Benink and Wolff, (2000) conclude 
that interest rate sensitivity has decreased in the early 1990s due to the availability of 
interest rate derivatives and their use for hedging. Most of the studies use a variety of 
short-term and long-term returns as the interest rate factor without providing any 
rationale for their use.  Yet, there is no consensus on the choice of the interest rate 
factor that should be used in testing the two-factor model (Adjaoud and Rahman 
(1996), Flannery, et al. (1997) and Elyasiani and Mansur (1998)). By way of contrast, 
if long, medium, or short- term rates become more volatile, bank stock returns also 
become more volatile in the following period (Elyasiani and Mansur, 1998). Faff and 
Howard (1999) state that bank’s may be more exposed to short-term interest rates as a 
result of the maturities mismatch between the major components of the banks’ 
balance sheet in the form of deposits and loans.  More recently, as the importance of 
the traditional bank product mix has declined and focused on shorter-term securities, 
the maturity length of the interest rate risk has also declined.  It is also possible that 
long term interest rate sensitivity is low as banks are better placed to hedge this 
exposure as compared to shorter term interest rate risk. Nevertheless, Lynge and 
Zumwalt (1980), Unal and Kane (1988), Bae (1990) have shown that bank returns are 
likely to be more sensitive to longer-term interest rates than either medium or short 
term. As of now there is no real consensus in the literature regarding the interest rate 
factor that should be used.  
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Examples of two-factor models, largely concerned with market and interest rate risk, 
include Brewer and Lee (1990), Akella and Greenbaum (1992), Madura and Zurruk 
(1995), and Adjaoud and Rahman (1996). Alternatively, Choi, et al. (1992) and 
Wetmore and Brick (1994) employed a three-factor approach to model market, 
interest rate and foreign exchange rate risk simultaneously. In line with the 
globalization of banking and increased non-traditional activities, banks do have 
significant foreign currency exposure. However, Gizycki and Lowe (2000) suggest 
that while exposed to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates banks may have 
adequately hedged their exchange rate risk. However, Brooks et al (2000) argue that 
proxies for foreign exchange rate risk do not adequately reflect the true exposure of a 
bank’s exchange rate risk. Nonetheless, this study does suffer from limitations in this 
regard, all of which suggest future directions for research. Similarly, this study 
follows Choi and Jen (1990) and Kwan (1991) who used a two-factor approach that 
utilized short-term interest rates. However, an alternative approach might be a model 
that includes a foreign exchange rate factor and also long-term interest rates. 
 
Event studies involve estimating the market model to determine what the expected 
returns for the duration of the event period examined. Abnormal returns associated 
with an event are calculated by subtracting expected returns of the market model from 
the actual rates of return from the event. The bank return generating process is 
described by the following equation: 
 
 Rit = α i + β i ⋅ Rmt + γ i ⋅ RIt + εit       (1) 
    
where:  
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Rit  =  daily rate of return of stock i in time t  
αi  =  intercept  
βi  =  measure of systematic risk  
Rmt  =  daily rate of return on the market index in time t  
γi  =  measure of interest rate sensitivity  
Rit  =  daily rate of return on interest rates in time t  
εit     =  disturbance term over the estimation period  
 
Using the market model approach, it is possible to estimate for each bank coefficients 
α  β, and γ for the period prior to the event window of each announcement. The 
estimation method commonly used for estimating the coefficients is the Ordinary 
Least Squares method, where the estimation period generally ranges between 120 and 
250 days (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
Daily returns were calculated for the three parameters α β, and γ for an estimation 
period from 150 days before each announcement (day -150) until 26 days (day -26) 
prior to each announcement. Events were defined to occurring on day zero (t = 0), 
after which daily returns were calculated for the event window (days -10 through +5) 
using the aforementioned equation. 
 
The ‘normal’ return is predicted for the days covered by the event window. The 
difference between the ‘actual’ and the ‘normal’ return during the event window is 
termed ‘abnormal’ return and is calculated using the following equation: 
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ARit
"Abnormal "
{ = Rit
"Actual"
{ − ˆ α i + ˆ β i ⋅ Rmt + γ i ⋅ RIt[ ]
"Normal "
1 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 
= ˆ ε it     (2) 
 
The abnormal return, or residual, is the difference between the actual return and the 
return predicted by the market model for each event period. Abnormal returns are 
expected to be zero under the null hypothesis. If there were no abnormal returns, ˆ εit  
would be equal to zero. In order to derive conclusions about the effect of bank capital 
regulation announcements in a broader sense, the average of the abnormal returns 
(AAR) is used to estimate the average effect of the event across the number of banks 
examined, N, and is represented as: 
 
 
AARt = 1N ⋅ ARiti=1
N∑        (3) 
 
The total effect of the event over time is termed the cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) and is the simple sum of AARt  over various time intervals of the event 
window.  
 
 
CAARSE = AARt
t= S
t= E∑        (4) 
 
In the analysis tS and tE are start and end points, respectively, for the time period of 
interest. 
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CAARSE  and AARt  are tested for their significance using both parametric and non-
parametric t-tests. Prior to conducting the t-test, the aggregate of the pre-event 
standard deviation of abnormal bank returns is computed. The following formula 
estimates the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns during the estimation or 
pre-event period (from -150 to -26):  
 
 i,pre=
σ
ARit − AARpre( )
−150
−26∑ 2
n −1       (5) 
 
where:  i,pre=σ = standard deviation of abnormal returns of bank i estimated from the 
pre-event measurement period. AARpre  = the average of abnormal returns of bank i 
estimated from the pre-event measurement period. n = the number of days in the pre-
measurement period.  
 
The standard deviation of abnormal returns for each bank can be aggregated by 
squaring and summing these values across all banks, dividing by the number of banks 
in the sample, and then taking the square root of the value. The formula is as follows:
 
 
 N ,pre=
σ i,preσ
2
i=1
N∑
N        
(6)  
 
where: N ,pre=σ = the aggregate of pre-event standard deviation of abnormal returns 
across all banks. N = the number of banks in the sample. 
 
 61
The t-test for AARt  is: 
 
 
AARtt − stat = AARt
N ,preσ        (7) 
For cumulative abnormal returns, the t-test formula is: 
 
 
CAARtt − stat = CAARt
N ,preσ tN       (8) 
 
Parametric t-tests rely on the important assumption that a bank’s abnormal returns are 
normally distributed. The issue with this is that the normal distribution depends on 
homoscedastic errors (constant variance) and clearly this is not the case at the time of 
the announcement when abnormal returns may occur.  Hence the usual t-test is flawed 
because it assumes a normal distribution as the number of observations increases. 
Therefore, this study also employs non-parametric testing. To test for the fraction of 
positive and negative average abnormal returns, the generalized sign test (GST) is 
used. The sign test is a simple binomial test of whether the frequency of positive 
abnormal returns equals 50%. The GST is a refined version of the sign test, and 
allows the null hypothesis to be a value other than 50%. The null hypothesis for the 
GST is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation period. The 
fraction of positive returns expected is derived from the abnormal returns seen during 
the estimation period (-150 to -26 days), and set against event period (-10 to +5 days).  
 
 
p = 1
n
1
150i=1
n∑ itS
t= 1E
150E∑  where itS = 1 if itAR > 0, otherwise 0  (9) 
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This test statistic uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution with 
parameter p , and defines w  as the number of banks in the event window, where the 
cumulative abnormal return is positive. The generalized sign test is as follows: 
 
 
Gz =
w − np
np 1− p( )12⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
       (10) 
(i) Event-Study Data Selection 
The Basle Committee’s four key announcements during the period January 1992 to 
December 1997 were collected from The Bank of International Settlements and from a 
news search on Financial Times CD-ROM News. The Amendment is complex in its 
content and the proposals that led up to its formalisation were diverse. As a result, this 
study focuses only on the four key announcements relating to major changes in bank 
capital regulation for market risk. 
 
Daily stock prices for large commercial banks in each country were collected from 
FT-Prices CD-ROM and Bloomberg. The daily market-closing observations of each 
country’s interest-rates on short-term government debt were also collected, along with 
each country’s respective equity indices from DataStream International and 
Bloomberg. The final sample satisfies the following data filters: 1) The announcement 
of each proposal leading up to the Amendment must be found in the records of The 
Bank of International Settlements. 2) The countries subject to the Amendment have 
publicly available interest rate and equity index data for the period from 150 days 
before to 10 days after each announcement. 3) Each sample bank has not been taken 
over or failed during the period studied. 4) Share price data was available for each 
bank from 150 days before the first announcement on the 15th of April 1993 and 10 
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days after the final announcement on the 4th of January 1996. This procedure resulted 
in a sample of 109 banks. 
 
II Value-at-Risk (VaR) Methodology 
 
Analysing commercial banks solely on the basis of the average returns generated for 
the investor is a straightforward way to make comparisons. However, an analysis of 
returns alone is not sufficient. Risk is an essential and integral part of making returns 
for investors. Methods for measuring risk have proliferated, to the point that there is 
little or no conceptual cohesion between the different approaches. However, all risk 
measures share the common theme of trying to combine uncertainty with the 
probability of loss, disappointment or an unsatisfactory outcome.  
The following section discusses in turn the major risk measures that are applied in the 
financial community, starting with the simplest. The goals and essential properties of 
each are considered, while discussing their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
(i) Ranges, Quartiles and Percentiles 
 
The simplest form of risk is the dispersion of observed returns, usually in equity 
values. The range is the distance between the highest and lowest observed returns but 
this method is extremely sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data. Furthermore, 
it only provides information about the maximum and minimum returns, yet does not 
show any evidence of the other returns and the movements in between these extreme 
values. Therefore, percentiles are sometimes used to measure the variability of a 
distribution. They are often used to describe a data set by dividing the data into four 
groups, with each group containing a quarter of the observations. The pth percentile is 
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a number such that p% of the returns of the set fall below and (100 – p)% of the 
returns fall above. 
 
(ii) Variance and Volatility (Standard Deviation) 
 
Over a single period, the risk of an investment should be associated with the possible 
dispersion of returns around the arithmetic mean, denoted R. The larger the 
dispersion, the greater the potential risk. For instance, take a series of T  returns and 
measure the dispersion of returns around the mean return. The variance solves the 
problem of averaging to zero and is calculated as the average squared deviation from 
the mean return. Squaring the deviation makes each term positive so that values above 
the mean do not cancel out values below the mean return. Second, squaring adds more 
weighting to the larger differences. However, the return differences are squared, so 
that the units of variance are not the same as the units of return. Hence it is necessary 
to take the square root of the variance to come back to the same units as the returns, 
the standard deviation. The standard deviation is often referred to as the volatility.  
 
Interpreting an average return or a volatility figure is relatively easy. The normal 
distribution is the most widely used general-purpose distribution because it has 
several attractive statistical properties: Firstly, all normal distributions have the same 
general shape and are characterized by two parameters, the mean and standard 
deviation. Secondly, in a normal distribution, the mean, median and mode are equal 
so the distribution is symmetrical. The central limit theorem tells us that the sum of 
random variables approximates a normal distribution with a large number of 
observations. 
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Assuming normally distributed returns is extremely appealing to researchers and 
practitioners because of the well known mathematical properties that make them easy 
to process and understand. However, it is worth considering how accurate such an 
approximation is. Empirical observation of financial markets has often revealed large 
movements occur more frequently than would be expected if returns were normally 
distributed. For instance, the 1987 equity crash recorded negative returns that were 
over twenty standard deviations from the mean, relative to the volatility noted in the 
period before the crash. Furthermore, most return distributions are skewed, where 
there is a greater likelihood of yielding higher or lower returns than would be 
expected under normal distribution conditions.   
 
Skewness is the third central moment of a distribution, after the mean and standard 
deviation. It measures the symmetry of a return distribution around its mean. 
Therefore, zero skewness indicates a symmetrical distribution. A positively skewed 
distribution is the outcome of rather small losses but larger gains, so it has long tail on 
the right-hand side of the distribution. Mathematically, the skewness is calculated as 
follows: 
 
 
T
(T −1)(T − 2)
Rt−1,t − R
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⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ t=1
T∑
3
 
T is the number of observations  (11) 
 
As a reference, the standard normal distribution is perfectly symmetrical and has a 
skewness coefficient equal to zero. Kurtosis is the fourth central moment of a 
distribution. It measures the degree of peak and heaviness of the tails of a distribution. 
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A normal distribution has a kurtosis value equal to zero.  Formally, the kurtosis is 
defined as:  
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where: T is the number of observations. The measure is always positive regardless of 
the sign of the deviation of the observation from the mean. The normal distribution 
has skewness and kurtosis values equal to zero. However, normal distributions are 
rarely encountered in practice.  
 
(iii) Volatility to Downside Risk  
 
Volatility via the standard deviation approach measures the dispersion of returns 
around the historical average. Since positive and negative deviations from the average 
are penalized equally in the calculation process, the concept really only makes sense 
in a symmetrical framework. This creates problems because even though two 
investments may have the same mean and volatility, they may differ significantly in 
terms of higher moments of skewness and kurtosis. Secondly, it is questionable how 
relevant the dispersion of returns around the average is. The next argument against 
volatility is that investors are more adverse to negative deviations than with positive 
ones of the same magnitude, called prospect theory and was originally conceptualized 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This theory calls for heavier weight on negative 
returns. Even when the distribution is symmetrical, volatility will not be in line with 
most investors’ perceptions. These drawbacks on volatility as a measure of risk 
explain why the investment community and researchers have developed several 
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alternative risk measures. Unlike standard deviation, downside risk measures attempt 
to define risk more in accordance with the investor’s perception. Most of the 
investment community should be interested in minimizing downside risk rather than 
volatility. Furthermore, distributions may not be normally distributed, and so variance 
or standard deviation cannot perform well as a risk measure. Therefore a downside 
risk measure is what most of the investment community would need to make optimal 
decisions.  
 
Another key measure of risk is the notion of drawdown, which is defined as the 
decline in the net asset value from the highest historical point. Often expressed again 
as a percentage loss, it can be interpreted as the ‘regret’ an investor would have for 
not selling at the most profitable level. Drawdown statistics can be measured in a 
variety of ways. An individual drawdown is basically any losing period during an 
investment cycle. The maximum drawdown is the maximum loss, usually in 
percentage terms, that an institution or investor could have experienced within a 
specific time period. By looking at the size and duration of past drawdown’s an 
institution can assess the financial pain, were that situation to recur. Drawdown’s have 
one major advantage over volatility: they refer to a physical reality, and as such they 
are less abstract. In the United States, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) requires managed futures advisors to disclose their maximum drawdown. 
However, a large number of hedge fund managers voluntarily disclose this statistic as 
evidence of the quality of their track record. However, despite their intuitive nature, 
maximum drawdown statistics should be used with caution. Firstly, all other things 
being equal, this number will be greater as the frequency of the measurement interval 
becomes smaller. Investments that are marked to market daily may thus appear at a 
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disadvantage to less frequently valued investment. Therefore, it is not valid to 
compare this statistic between time series with different reporting intervals. Secondly, 
maximum drawdown’s will be greater for a longer time series. Hence, it is not 
possible to make comparisons between time series with different time lengths. In 
addition, maximum drawdown statistics show a single number derived from a single 
string of data without any averaging method. Due to the uniqueness of this 
observation, the result can be highly error-prone and thus not necessarily always 
useful in building statistical inferences for the future. From a statistical perspective, a 
better risk measure would be the average of a series of largest maximum loss. Lastly, 
this method cannot identify the current risk in a portfolio until after losses occur. 
 
(iv) Beta and market risk  
 
Another relative risk measure is beta, which measures how risky an institution may be 
as compared to the overall stock market. A commercial bank that moves in harmony 
with the market is said to have a beta level of 1. Beta measures the risk of a bank by 
detailing how much its market price changes compared to changes in the overall 
market. The general consensus is a beta value of greater than one suggests the stock is 
riskier than the market, while a stock with a beta of less than one is less risky. 
However, beta only focuses on the impact of the overall stock market, and does not 
consider other influences which are considered specific risk. Beta is an incomplete 
explanation of risk and returns. 
 
The risk measurement methods discussed earlier, volatility, downside risk, maximum 
drawdown statistics, and beta, but they do not provide any information about the 
probability of a given adverse risk factor move. Furthermore, the difficulty with these 
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risk measures lies less in measuring them at the individual level than in aggregating 
them to estimate the total risk. 
 
Ideally, a risk measure should be able to summarize an institution’s exposure to 
market risk as well as the probability of an adverse move. In the Amendment to the 
Basle Capital Accord, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) 
recommended the adoption of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) based approach to assess risk 
and determine minimum capital requirements for financial institutions.  
 
Today, VaR is one of the most widely used quantitative measurement tools for risk 
management. VaR corresponds to a particular percentile of a return distribution. The 
major advantage of VaR is the simplicity of its definition. VaR summarises in a single 
number the worst potential loss an institution or investor risks incurring under normal 
conditions, whatever the risk sources and their complexity. As a result, decision 
makers can decide whether or not to increase or decrease the level of risk. In addition, 
VaR provides investors with standardized risk information and facilitates risk 
transparency.  
 
(v) Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
 
VaR is a relatively recent risk measure in finance, but its equivalent has been used for 
several years in statistics. The VaR of a position is the maximum amount of capital 
that the position can expect to lose within a specific holding period (for example, ten 
days or one month) and with a specified confidence level (for example 95 percent or 
99 percent). In terms of probability theory, VaR at the p% confidence level is the (1 - 
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p)%  quantile of the profit and loss distribution. Note the VaR is often expressed as a 
percentage loss rather than as an absolute dollar loss to facilitate comparisons.  
 
For example, to compute the one-month 99 percent VaR of the FTSE-100 from April 
1984 to October 2002, using monthly data it is necessary to observe the series of one-
month returns for the stock, build up the corresponding return distribution, and 
exclude 1% of the cases as being ‘abnormal’ market conditions, as shown in Figure 1 
below. The worst case remaining return (-12.1%) is the Value-at-Risk of the index, 
expressed in percentage terms. It corresponds to the 1% percentile of the return 
distribution, i.e. 1% of the observed values are lower than the VaR and 99% are 
higher than the VaR. When the distribution of the returns is a normal distribution, 
VaR is simply equal to the average return minus a multiple of the volatility (for 
instance, a confidence level of 99%, VaR is equal to the average return minus 2.33 
times the standard deviation). In this case, the concept of VaR does not generate any 
new information; it is just a different, less technical form of risk reporting, in which 
the term volatility is replaced by the term VaR. It is therefore not surprising that VaR 
has become a standard tool in risk management for banks and other financial 
institutions. However, without the assumption of a normal distribution, VaR can be a 
problematic risk measure. In particular, VaR is not sub-additive (Artzner et al, 1999). 
That is, the sum of the risks of two separate portfolios (X and Y) may be lower than 
the risk of the pooled portfolio (X+Y). Mathematically: 
 
 VaR(X + Y ) ≤ VaR(X) + VaR(Y )     (13) 
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Figure 1 Histogram of FTSE -100 Returns. 
 
 
(vi) VaR Methodology 
 
This thesis calculates VaR by estimating the effect of a bank’s main components of 
risk on its equity value, which arises from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, and stock index returns. This approach is consistent with recent studies focusing 
on VaR within banking (Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002; Frey and McNeil, 2002). 
The methodology is based on a two-stage approach. The first stage uses a 3-factor 
model of the form: 
 
itR = itα + mtβ mjtR + rtβ rjtR xt+β xjtR + itu    (14) 
Histogram: FTSE-100 Monthly Returns
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where: itR  is the return on bank stock i during time period t; mtB mjtR  is the market 
beta and the return on the market index in country j at time t; rtB rjtR  is the interest 
rate beta and the return on short-term government securities in country j at time t; 
xtB xjtR  is the foreign exchange beta and the return on a foreign exchange index for 
country j at time t; itα it,u  are the bank-specific constant and random error term, 
respectively.  
 
The stock price data of a bank is used as a proxy to capital market risk similar to the 
approach used by Chaudry et al (2000), Hirtle (1997), and McAnally (1996). This 3-
factor approach analyses the relationship between bank equity value, market, interest, 
and exchange rate risk by estimating individual betas using weekly stock return data.  
 
In the second stage, the individual betas are used to construct a bank VaR defined as: 
 
VaR=c m,iβ mjσ( )2+ r,iβ rjσ( )2+ x,iβ xjσ( )2⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ 
1/ 2
 (15) 
 
where: c reflects a given level of statistical confidence, the betas pertain to each 
individual bank i, and mjtσ rjt,σ xjt,σ represent the standard deviations of the market 
index, interest rate and exchange rate in country j. These statistics are calculated from 
historical weekly data. 
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In the second stage, the VaR is calculated using 4 different methodologies: the 
parametric approach, historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation, and an Extreme 
Value Theory (EVT) approach. 
 
(vii) The different approaches to VaR 
 
1. Parametric Approach 
The parametric approach assumes the risk factors (interest rates, foreign exchanges 
rates, stock indices) that determine the value of a bank’s equity are normally 
distributed. Since the normal distribution is fully described in its first two moments, 
the mean and standard deviation, standard mathematical properties of the normal 
distribution are used to calculate the loss that will be equalled or exceeded 1 percent 
of the time i.e. Value-at-Risk. The main advantage of the parametric approach is its 
simplicity and ease in calculation. Assuming normally distributed returns, the VaR of 
bank i is simply estimated as: 
 
 VaR i = E (Ri ) + zcσ i         (16) 
 
where: zc depends on the level of confidence, -1.96 with 95 percent probability, -2.33 
with 99 percent probability, and E (Ri)  and σ i are bank i’s  expected return and 
volatility, respectively. For instance, a portfolio with an expected return of +5% per 
month and a monthly volatility of 4% has a 95% one-month VaR equal to -2.84%. 
That is there is a 5% chance that the portfolio will lose more than 2.84% of its net 
asset value in a one-month interval.  
 
 74
The problem with parametric VaR is that it focuses only on the expected return and 
the volatility of the banks considered. Favre and Galeano (2002) show that 
constructing a portfolio using the parametric approach without taking into 
consideration skewness and kurtosis could underestimate the risk by 12% to 40% p.a. 
depending on historical returns.   
 
2. Historical Simulation 
The historical simulation approach calculates the change in the value of bank equity 
by using actual historical movements of the key market factors. Historical VaR is 
computed from the empirical cumulative distribution function of the historically 
simulated interest rate, market, and foreign exchange rate returns. The main advantage 
of this approach is that it is non-parametric and does not assume anything about the 
distribution of returns. However, the major drawback is the assumption that future 
risks are much like the risk environment of the past, which is less likely in today’s 
more volatile environment. To calculate historical VaR, data is required for all risk 
factors (interest rates, market index, and foreign exchange rates) in the past, and a 
model that can assess the impact on returns for each risk factor’s price scenario. The 
use of the actual historical changes in the prices of the chosen market factors to 
compute the hypothetical profits and losses are the distinguishing feature of historical 
simulation. Once the hypothetical profit and losses for each period have been 
calculated, the distribution of profit and losses and the VaR can then be determined. 
The historical simulation process can be described as follows: 
 
The first step is to identify the basic market factors. The market factors were 
identified in the previous section and are the short-term interest rate of country j, the 
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exchange rate index of country j, and the market index of country j. The next step is to 
obtain historical values of the market factors for the period 1992 to 1998. Weekly 
changes in these rates will be used to construct hypothetical values of the market 
factors used in the calculation of hypothetical profits and losses. The next step is key 
whereby the equity value of bank i is subject to changes in all the market factors 
experienced in each year of the study period. Thereafter, the bank equity value is 
evaluated under each of the scenarios and the resulting profits/losses are ranked by 
size. The resulting empirical distribution of returns is viewed as the probability 
distribution. The VaR is then determined as the quantile of the profit and loss 
distribution that is implied by the chosen confidence level. The historical simulation 
does avoid the problems of not requiring the underlying risk factors to be normally 
distributed. However, the method is data intensive and the resulting VaR depends 
heavily on the chosen window length of historical data.  
 
3. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Finally, the Monte Carlo approach estimates VaR by simulating the random 
behaviour of the three risk factors and estimating the impact of their changes on each 
institution’s equity value. The hypothetical values under each scenario make up a 
distribution of gains and losses from which VaR can be calculated. The idea 
underlying Monte Carlo simulation is to approximate the behaviour of a real-world 
system, for example, a commercial bank, within an artificial simulated environment. 
The Monte Carlo Simulation is similar to the historical simulation approach. The 
main difference is that rather than relying on the historical distributions, a simulation 
using the observed changes in the market factors over the last N periods generates a 
distribution of returns. In this study, a random number generator is used to calculate 
 76
1,000 hypothetical changes in the three market factors. These are then used to 
construct hypothetical profits and losses on the equity value of bank i. Finally, the 
VaR of bank i is determined from this distribution of returns. However, criticism has 
focused on the above approach not being able to consider ‘fat tails’ in the distribution 
of returns.  By definition, VaR focuses only on portfolio losses in ‘normal’ market 
conditions and is intended for use as a predictor of low probability events. However, 
as market variables are non-normal VaR does not consider losses during extreme 
market conditions, such as when risk factors take unprecedented values or values that 
occurred outside the historical period considered. Fat tails exist due to many more 
occurrences away from the mean than that predicted by a normal distribution. As a 
result, this study employs a fourth methodology, Extreme Value Theory (EVT). 
 
4. Extreme Value Theory  
Traditional VaR measures seem to ignore extreme events and focus on risk measures 
that address the entire distribution of returns. This is a major problem, as it is the 
extreme and unexpected events that cause most of the losses, and distress in financial 
systems. EVT focuses on the extreme value of the tail of a distribution and the 
confidence level of EVT-calculated VaRs is much higher than that of traditional VaR 
methodologies.   
 
EVT is devoted to the development of models and techniques for estimating the 
behaviour of extreme events. In contrast to classical statistical inference that focuses 
on central measures of a distribution and where the normal curve is the norm, EVT 
focuses exclusively on modelling the tails of the distributions. The justification for 
using EVT techniques is that the distributions of extreme events differ significantly 
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from normality. In practice, extreme value theory suggests two major related 
approaches to extreme returns. The first consists of dividing the sample of available 
returns into consecutive blocks and focusing on the minimum return in each of these 
blocks. The second approach consists of looking only at those returns in the sample 
that are below a given threshold, and modelling these separately from the rest of the 
observations (Embrecht et al (1999)). This study follows the latter approach whereby 
the worst-case losses are reported. 
 
(i) VaR-Study Data Selection 
 
The data for this study includes a cross-country time-series of publicly traded 
commercial banks in the 11 G-10 countries. All these countries have stock exchanges 
and the time period covered is 1992 to 1998. The period is sufficiently long to assess 
the risk factors of each sample bank, and provide a robust set of observations. The 
sample ranges between 76 and 109 with a total of 511 observations. 
 
The weekly return on the stock of each bank is matched with the country index return, 
interest and foreign exchange rates. The sources of this market data were Bloomberg, 
FT Prices and DataStream International. 
 
The steps to conducting the VaR are as follows:  
 
1. Calculate the weekly return on bank stock i.  
2. Calculate the market beta and the return on market index in country j  
3. Calculate the interest rate beta and the return on short-term government 
securities in country j 
4. Calculate the foreign exchange beta and the return on a foreign exchange 
index for country j 
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5. The stock price data is employed as a proxy to capital market risk similar to 
the approach employed by Chaudhry et al (1999, 2000). 
6. The next stage employs the individual beta’s of bank i and is used to construct 
each bank’s VaR, under a given level of statistical confidence 
7. The beta’s pertain to each individual bank, bank i, in addition to the standard 
deviations of the market index, interest rate and exchange rate in country j 
8. The weekly return on the stock of each bank is matched with the country index 
return, interest and foreign exchange rates.  
9. The VaR is computed from equation (15) using historical volatilities for the 
rate of change in the market index, interest rates, and foreign exchange. Each 
VaR represents the fraction of a bank’s equity at risk in one week with a 99% 
degree of confidence.  
10.  EViews, MATLAB, and Excel were used to aggregate the historical data and 
calculate VaR. 
11. The below details the method behind each VaR approach. 
 
 
A variety of methods exist for estimating VaR. Each model has its own set of 
assumptions, but the most common assumption is that historical market data is the 
best estimator for future changes. 
 
Parametric Approach – the assumption is that the risk factor returns (market, interest 
rate, foreign exchange) are always jointly normally distributed and that the change in 
VaR is linearly dependent on all risk factor returns. Since this approach assumes a 
normal distribution, statistical properties of this distribution are applied for the 
calculation of VaR. The calculation of parametric VaR is a two-step process. The first 
is to estimate the distribution of bank equity price changes based on changes in the 
three market risk factors. From this distribution of price changes, VaR is calculated 
simply as the average return minus a multiple of the volatility. One major drawback 
of this approach is the assumption of normality of asset returns, which does not 
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always hold. Also, correlation between assets may not always be stable, particularly 
when there is a major event risk. 
 
Historical simulation approach – the assumption is that the returns in the future will 
have the same distribution as they had in the past. This approach is simple and 
transparent. It involves running the historical bank returns to the 3 market risk factors 
to yield a distribution of changes in each bank’s equity value. From this distribution a 
percentile (the VaR) is calculated. The distribution is sorted in ascending order and, if 
a 95 per cent confidence level is used, then this equates to a return below which five 
per cent of the observations lie. For example, if N equals 100 historical days, then the 
VaR number is represented by the 5th worst loss. This shows the maximum possible 
loss that can be suffered in 95 out of 100 days. The historical simulation approach has 
the advantage that historical data determine the joint probability distribution of market 
variables. The main disadvantages of historical simulation are that it is 
computationally slow and does not easily allow volatility changes to be updated and 
incorporated very quickly. Alternatively, it is possible to use the technique of what is 
known as Extreme Value Theory to smooth the numbers in the left tail of the 
distribution in an attempt to obtain a more accurate estimate of the 1% point of the 
distribution. The approach used in this thesis is to take the worst-case scenario for 
each market factor over the previous timeframes and calculate the VaR on this basis 
i.e. a worst case loss from historical movements. There are conflicting theoretical 
models of VaR accuracy and what is the optimal method. The popularity of the 
historical simulation approach at commercial banks has been noted by Pritsker (2001), 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), Berkowitz, Christoffersen and Pelletier (2006), and 
Perignon, Deng and Wang (2006). However, the VaR approach needs to consider 
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conditions such as dataset quality, simplicity, confidence intervals and returns of 
financial instruments distributions.  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation approach - this methodology has a number of similarities to 
historical simulation method. The main difference is that, rather than carrying out the 
simulation using actual historical changes in the three market factors to generate 
hypothetical portfolio profits or losses, one chooses a statistical distribution that is 
believed to adequately approximate the possible changes in market factors – this is the 
key reason why Monte Carlo results can be higher than other methods as the 
distribution is somewhat discretionary and subjective. Theoretically, any appropriate 
distribution can be chosen, although most use the normal distribution, as its 
parameters are easy to compute and comprehend. After estimating the parameters, a 
random number generator is used to generate thousands of hypothetical changes in the 
values of each market factor. The number of iterations performed in this study was 
1000. For each iteration a random scenario of market movements was used based on 
the standard deviation of the market risk factor returns. Thereafter, the impact on bank 
i’s equity under the simulated market scenarios was computed. The resulting returns 
were sorted in order to provide a simulated distribution of returns. The VaR is 
determined in the same way as was done in the historical simulation method. The 
advantages of the Monte Carlo approach it is perhaps the most effective of all 
methods, especially when more complex instruments are involved in the real world. It 
is also very flexible, as it does not make a definite assumption about asset returns. 
However, the procedure for Monte Carlo simulation can be quite complex and time 
consuming. Also, the distribution chosen is subjective and may not turn out to 
accurately reflect the portfolio returns.  
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III Data Envelopment (DEA) Methodology 
 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) has become more dominant in efficiency 
measurement in many sectors of industry (Banker et al, 1993). The location and shape 
of the efficiency frontier is determined by the data, with the simple notion that a 
decision-making unit DMU employs less input than another to produce the same 
amount of output is considered more efficient. Those observations with the highest 
ratio of output to input are considered efficient, and the frontier is constructed by 
joining these observations up within the input-output space, and therefore connects 
one efficient observation to another. The construction of this frontier is based on the 
best observed practice within the sample studied and can only act as an approximation 
to the true, unobserved efficiency frontier. Inefficient DMUs are ‘enveloped’ by the 
efficiency frontier in DEA, and the inefficiency is calculated relative to this surface 
(Cooper, Seiford and Tone 2000). DEA literature mainly uses the terminology of a 
decision-making unit for each organisation being analysed. The section below defines 
the input-oriented and output-oriented approaches.  
 
(i) Input-oriented efficiency 
 
Input-oriented efficiency keeps output levels fixed and explores the proportional 
reduction in input usage. For instance, assume a DMU uses two inputs ( 1x , 2x ) to 
produce a single output ( y ) as shown in Figure 2 below, source Coelli et al, (1998). 
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Figure 2 Technical and allocative efficiency under an input orientation 
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Here the assumption is that curve 
1zz  represents the production frontier. If any DMU 
is efficient, it will lie on the production frontier or above it if they are inefficient. 
Using the input-orientation, DMUs which lie above the production frontier could 
proportionally reduce their input usage ( 1x , 2x ) for a given level of output ( y ). 
Therefore, DMU A could proportionally reduce its input use, and move to a more 
feasible and technically efficient production point, such as that adopted by DMU B.  
1SS  reflects the ratio of the price inputs  ( 1x , 2x ). In technical efficiency, the distance 
BA is the amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced without a 
reduction in output. This would be expressed in percentage terms by the ratio BA OA . 
The technical efficiency (input-orientation) ( INTE ) of DMU A could be expressed as 
follows: 
 
 INTE = OBOA   which is equal to 1 - BA OA .   (17) 
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Pure technical efficiency ( TE ) shows the deviation from the production frontier 1ZZ  
and this value lies between 0 and 1 with a value of 1 indicating full technical 
efficiency (if DMU A produced at a point B).  
 
If input prices are used and are known, they can be used to calculate the allocative 
efficiency ( INAE ) of the DMU operating at point A by the following ratio: 
 
 INAE = OCOB         (18) 
 
where the distance CB is the reduction in production costs that would occur if 
production were to take place at the efficient point 1B  instead of at the technically 
efficient, but allocatively inefficient, point B. 
 
Therefore, technical efficiency reflects the ability of a DMU to produce the maximum 
amount of output given a set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the 
ability of a DMU to use inputs in optimal proportion given respective prices. The 
product of these measures can be combined to give a measure of total economic 
efficiency ( INEE ) such that: 
 
 INEE = INTE × INAE       (19) 
 
  = OB
OA
× OC
OB
= OC
OA
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(ii) Output-oriented efficiency 
 
An alternative to the above exposition would be to examine efficiency measurement 
under an output orientation. Suppose a DMU produces two outputs, (
1y , 2y ) from a 
single input ( x) as shown in Figure 3, source Coelli et al, (1998). 
 
Figure 3 Technical and allocative efficiency under an output orientation  
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The curve 1ZZ  represents production possibility whereby all efficient DMUs lie on 
this frontier and below it if they are inefficient, such as point A. If there were 
available information about the relative value of the two inputs it would be possible to 
construct 1SS  which reflects the market value of the two outputs ( 1y , 2y ). The 
efficient point of 1B  where 1ZZ  is a tangent to the 1SS  line. 
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The technical efficiency ( OUTTE ) of DMU A could be expressed as follows: 
 
 OUTTE = OAOB         (20) 
 
while the allocative efficiency ( OUTAE ) could be expressed as: 
 
 OUTAE = OBOC        (21) 
 
Total economic efficiency ( OUTEE ) is given by: 
 
 OUTEE = OUTTE × OUTAE       (22)  
 
  = OA
OB
× OB
OC
= OA
OC
 
 
In banking, prices for key statistics are not always available, and so many studies 
restrict the analysis to the calculation of technical efficiency and not total economic 
efficiency. All of these measures of efficiency, (technical, allocative, and economic), 
are bounded by 0 and 1.  
 
DEA assesses efficiency in two stages. Firstly, a frontier is identified based on either 
those DMUs within the sample using the lowest input mix to produce outputs or those 
achieving the highest output mix given their inputs (i.e. the input or output 
orientation). Secondly, each DMU is assigned an efficiency score by comparing its 
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output/input ratio to that of the efficient DMUs that envelope the surface. The 
efficiency of a DMU is determined by its distance from this surface – and highlights 
the extent by which it could improve its outputs given its current level of inputs (or 
reduce its inputs given its current level of outputs). Efficiency in DEA is therefore 
defined as the ratio of a weighted sum of outputs of a DMU divided by the weighted 
sum of its inputs. Technical efficiency (TE ) is computed by solving for each DMU 
the following: 
 
 max =
su × s0y
s=1
S∑
mv × m 0x
m=1
M∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
       (23) 
 
 
subject to: 
 
su × siy
s=1
S∑
mv × mix
m=1
M∑
≤ 1  i =1,....,I     (24) 
 
where: 
 
s0y = quantity of output s  for 0DMU  
 su =  weight attached to output s , su  > 0, s  = 1,….. S  
 m 0x =  quantity of input m  for 0DMU  
 mv = weight attached to input m, mv  > 0, m  = 1,….. M  
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This mathematical form seeks out for 0DMU  the set of output weights and input 
weights that maximises the efficiency, subject to the constraint that when applied to 
all other DMUs, none can have an efficiency level greater than 1. The weights are 
chosen to cast the DMU in the best possible way, in the sense that no other set of 
weights will yield a higher level of efficiency. In order to select the optimal weights, a 
linear objective function is maximised subject to a set of linear constraints and selects 
values for u and v that maximise the ith DMU.  
 
This study employs an input-orientated technical efficiency approach to determine 
bank efficiency levels through the period 1992 to 1998. DEA has been widely used in 
efficiency studies, however, it is important to consider other efficiency measurement 
techniques. The next section will discuss the differences between DEA and a common 
parametric approach, Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and demonstrate why DEA 
was the chosen for this study.   
 
(iii) Comparing Efficiency Methods 
 
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efficiency with 
frontier approaches (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  Many studies have examined the 
efficiency of banks using either parametric techniques, for example the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA), or non-parametric techniques such as DEA. The main 
differences are due to the way in which parametric and non-parametric techniques 
establish and shape the efficient frontier. First, DEA assumes correct model 
specification and that all data are observed without error. In contrast, SFA allows for 
the possibility of measurement error. SFA requires assumptions to be made about the 
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functional form and the error distribution, whereas in DEA there are no standard tests. 
In SFA, the error itself is the focus of attention.  
 
One of the key strengths of DEA is that it can readily model multiple-output 
production processes. Both the SFA and DEA methods may be susceptible to the 
influence of outliers and small sample sizes. DEA is more vulnerable to outliers, 
because of its inherent process of placing each DMU in the best possible way. SFA 
estimates are derived from full sample information and the technique is less prone to 
outsider influence. Nevertheless, it may be that these ‘outliers’ are the very DMUs 
that are most inefficient, so excluding them on the basis of statistical criteria may 
undermine the exercise. Small sample sizes do not prevent the application of DEA, 
but as with all parametric estimation processes, SFA estimates are likely to be more 
imprecise the smaller the sample size.  
 
The first decision in SFA is whether to estimate a production or a cost function. 
Where DMUs produce multiple outputs poses problems and most econometric 
attempts to reduce the estimation to a single output. This is not particularly 
satisfactory, as the estimates of efficiency tend to be sensitive to which output is 
chosen to represent Y (Fernandez, Koop and Steel, 2000). Under SFA, a cost function 
allows a single dependent variable, cost C, to be estimated. Information about 
different outputs can be included as a vector of explanatory variables Y, hence: 
 
                                   (25) 
 
yi = α + β1Yi + β2xi + εi
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Explanatory variables, x, are used to explain differences among DMUs in their 
observed levels of output or cost. In terms of the residual, the requirement for 
efficiency analysis is some indication of what constitutes ‘best practice’. In standard 
econometric analysis, the residual would not be accorded special attention as it simply 
represents the deviation between observed data and the relationship predicted by the 
model and can be interpreted as a statistical error, caused by measurement error or 
other variables not considered. However, in efficiency analysis, the residual can be 
used to describe the extent to which a DMU operates from best practice.  
 
In the case of a cost function, a DMU with a residual of zero is interpreted as showing 
average efficiency, while a negative (positive) residual highlights above (below) 
average efficiency. If Y represents output, the interpretations would be reversed. This 
method indicates that observations can be ranked according to their average 
efficiency. The observation lying the greatest distance below the cost function is 
defined as being most efficient in the sample, as its costs are lower for than that for 
any other observation studied. This then implies that a cost (or production) frontier 
can be estimated. For a cost function this would be done by adding min( iε ) to the 
intercept and subtracting it from the residuals. The process would be reversed for a 
production function. The key assumption under a SFA framework is that the 
inefficiency component and the random component of the residual have different 
distributions. The random component is assumed to follow a normal distribution. If iε  
is normally distributed, all residual variance is assumed to stem from random noise 
and measurement error. If iε  is skewed, then this is taken as evidence that 
inefficiency exists in the sample. Subject to iε  being skewed, stochastic frontier 
analysis decomposes the error term into two parts with zero covariance: 
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 iε = iv + iu   cov( iv , iu ) = 0     (26) 
 
iv  can be viewed as stochastic (random) events that are not under control of the 
DMU. iu  is the term that defines how far the DMU operates above the cost frontier. 
In estimating the stochastic frontier for cross-sectional data, it is necessary to specify 
the distributional characteristics of the two components of the residual. These 
distributions must be different to distinguish between them econometrically.  
The iu  must be observed indirectly since direct estimates of only iε  are available. 
The choice of distribution for iu  will yield different estimates of inefficiency, both in 
the sample and for individual DMUs that are tested.  
 
As stated, the measure of efficiency for each DMU i, 
ieff , depends on the type of 
function estimated. In the case of a production frontier, 
ieff  will lie between 0 and 1. 
For the cost function, the values are usually inverted such that 0 < 1
ieff
<1. 
 
SFA interprets inefficiency by focusing on the residuals. However, results are 
sensitive to the estimation decisions that are made. If estimates of individual DMUs 
are little affected by alternative technical choices, then greater confidence can be 
placed in the results. Given the challenges associated with using SFA, such as 
specification of functional form and identification and extraction of efficiency 
estimates, an alternative analysis is used. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) requires 
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no prior specifications of the functional form, with the efficiency frontier positioned 
and shaped by the data.  
 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Goddard et al (2001) provide a detailed account 
and comparison of different bank efficiency methods. Nevertheless, there is no clear 
consensus on which efficiency approach is more robust (Isik and Hassan, 2003). 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) agree, noting that 69 studies in their survey used a non-
parametric approach (DEA), and 61 used parametric methods. Goddard et al (2001) 
reviewed empirical literature and showed similar results between parametric and non-
parametric approaches. Ultimately, there is no conclusive evidence as to the best 
method for estimating the efficient frontier. Regardless which method is used, the 
choice of input and output variables is vital. 
 
(iv) Efficiency variables 
 
There is ongoing debate regarding the definition of inputs and outputs. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) note that two concepts have been adopted: ‘the intermediation 
approach’ and the ‘production approach’. The first approach considers outputs as 
earning assets and inputs as deposits. Contrary to the above, according to the 
‘production approach’ a bank exists to produce loans, deposits, and other assets 
(outputs) by using labour and capital (inputs). Among others, Lozano-Vivas et al 
(2002) modelled bank efficiency under the production approach, whereas Altunbas et 
al (2001) employed the intermediation approach. Berger and Humphrey (1997) note 
that neither approach is correct theoretically as they do not fully capture the dual role 
of banks as transaction providers and as being financial intermediaries. The authors 
suggest the production approach is more valid for evaluating the efficiencies of 
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branches of financial institutions and the intermediation approach may be more 
appropriate for evaluating the efficiency of entire financial institutions. 
 
As a result, this study adopts an input-oriented intermediation approach, using a 
model with two inputs and two/(three) outputs. The inputs are: deposits and total 
operating expenses. Ideally a separate input for labour would be included. However, 
details on employment numbers or expenses were not available for all banks. As a 
result an operating expense variable was used. Several recent studies that examine the 
efficiency of banks with DEA or SFA techniques acknowledge the increased 
involvement of banks in non-traditional activities and include either non-interest 
(Drake, 2001; Lang and Welzel, 1998) or off-balance-sheet items (Bos and Kolari, 
2005; Rao, 2005) as an additional output. Altunbas et al (1999) and Drake and Hall 
(2003) note that failure to account for risk can significantly distort efficiency scores. 
Lang and Welzel (1998), Drake (2001), Tortosa-Ausina (2002) use non-interest 
income as a proxy for off-balance sheet activities. Altunbas et al (2001) use the value 
of off-balance sheet items rather than non-interest income.  
 
This study estimates the efficiency of the bank sample with and without off-balance-
sheet activities to observe the impact on efficiency and tests for differences in the 
means. As a result one of the outputs in the efficiency analysis of this study is off-
balance-sheet activity. Outputs used are: loans, other earning assets, and (off-balance-
sheet items). This study also incorporates country-specific variables to account for 
several aspects such as macroeconomic conditions. As in previous studies (Pastor and 
Serrano, 2006; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006) this study controls for macroeconomic 
conditions within each country with the annual growth in GDP, CPI, unemployment, 
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and industrial production. Incorporating country-specific economic variables is as 
important as running the correct variables in the DEA model. Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007) indicate that favourable economic conditions will improve bank 
efficiency, while Boyd et al (2001) indicate that countries with high inflation have 
underdeveloped financial systems and banks.   
 
This study employs an input-orientated DEA technical efficiency model. Per Coelli et 
al (1998), the input-orientated measure addresses the question: ‘By how much can 
input quantities be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities 
produced?’ DEA can be implemented by assuming either a constant returns to scale 
(CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). There are arguments that CRS is only 
appropriate when all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale, which might not be the 
case in the face of competition or regulatory requirements. In a sample where a few 
large banks are present, the use of a VRS framework raises the possibility that these 
large banks will appear efficient for the simple reason that there are no truly efficient 
banks (Berg et al, 1991). Avkiran (1999) states that under a VRS approach each unit 
is only compared against units of a similar size, instead of against all units. As a 
result, the assumption of VRS is more suitable for a larger sample of DMUs. In this 
thesis, as in Drake and Hall (2003), and Das and Ghosh (2006), efficiency estimates 
are obtained under both CRS and VRS assumptions. The CRS model works under the 
assumption that no significant relationship exists between the scale of operation and 
efficiency and delivers results for the overall technical efficiency (OTE) of the DMU. 
The VRS model splits OTE into a product of two components, and provides a 
measure for pure technical efficiency (PTE), which is the measure devoid of scale 
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efficiency, which is the second component. Coeli et al. (1998) suggest scale efficiency 
can be calculated as a ratio of TE (CRS) to TE (VRS). 
 
It is also of considerable interest to explain the DEA efficiency scores by 
investigating the determinants of technical efficiency. In such cases, it is common to 
use a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, technical efficiency is assessed whilst in 
the second stage, the DEA efficiency scores, are explained by relevant variables not 
directly included in the DEA analysis, namely risk and country specific variables. As 
defined, the DEA score falls between the interval 0 and 1 making the dependent 
variable a limited dependent variable. The Tobit model is suggested as an appropriate 
multivariate statistical model in the second stage to consider the characteristics of the 
distribution of efficiency measure (Grosskopf, 1996). It is not possible to carry out 
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of efficiency scores on the 
explanatory variables as the efficiency scores of banks go no higher than 1. Due to the 
fact that the efficiency score, the dependent variable, is censored, the appropriate 
model to use is the context is a Tobit regression model, which is a limited-dependent 
variable model (Greene, 2003). As a result this study uses Tobit regression to explain 
the differences in efficiency scores.  
 
(v) Tobit Regression (Second Stage Analysis) 
 
Since DEA efficiency scores are constrained to be between 0 and 1, the distribution of 
scores is censored. Using the DEA efficiency scores as dependent variables, an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will result in biased estimates. As a result, 
following Gillen and Lall (1997) and Chilingerian (1995) a Tobit censored regression 
model is used to evaluate the censored data.  
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(vi) Variables for Tobit Regression  
 
Independent Variables: GDP, CPI, Unemployment Rate, Industrial production, Value-
at-Risk (VaR as measured by the Monte Carlo approach), 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment : 1 if the time period studied is post 1996 when the market risk regulation 
was imposed, 0 otherwise. Environmental factors are influences that are not 
traditional inputs and outputs, and are not under the control of the bank (Coelli et al, 
2005). The key environmental influences used in this study are GDP, CPI, 
Unemployment, and Industrial Production. 
 
Dependent Variable: EFF. The efficiency score EFF was modified to describe the 
degree of inefficiency by setting INEFF = (1/EFF) -1. In this case the inefficiency 
scores are regressed, i.e. thus, a negative sign on a coefficient indicates a positive 
association with efficiency, which allows it to be modelled by the following form: 
 
  
INEFF* = βJ
J
∑ • xJ + v
INEFF = 0, IF INEFF* ≤ 0
INEFF = INEFF*, IF INEFF > 0
 
 
Greene (2003) suggested that a convenient normalization in Tobit studies is to assume 
a censoring point at zero. The Tobit model is adequate when it is possible for the 
dependent variable to assume values beyond the truncation point, zero in the present 
case. McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) argue that this is the case in the DEA analysis, 
where there would be a concentration of variables between zero and unity. 
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Environmental variables describe factors that could influence the efficiency of a bank, 
but are not traditional inputs and are assumed outside the control of the institution. 
Inadequately accounting for the environment may lead to flawed conclusions. 
However, there remains an active debate about how to incorporate such variables into 
DEA. As Fries and Taci (2005) mention, most applications in bank efficiency use a 
two-step procedure, whereby DEA is solved using traditional inputs and outputs, and 
the efficiency scores from the first stage are then regressed on the environmental 
variables. The DEA efficiency scores are then used as the dependent variable in a 
regression analysis. A censored Tobit regression model is often considered 
appropriate for these data, as both ends of the 0-1 distribution bound them. 
 
One problem with second stage regression is that it involves a generated dependent 
variable but, more importantly, the estimated efficiency scores could well be serially 
correlated. Furthermore, the censoring of the dependent variable (the estimated 
efficiency score) may result in too many values of 1, and standard inference is not 
appropriate. Coelli et al (2005) mentions that the two-stage estimation procedure is 
unlikely to provide estimates, which are as efficient as those that could be obtained 
using a single-stage estimation procedure.  
 
One possible approach is to use a three-stage approach to account for the 
environmental variables. The two-stage approach is extended by following the second 
stage Tobit regression with another DEA evaluation. There have been a number of 
adjustments to these approaches, for instance running a double DEA model (Lozano-
Vivas, Pastor and Pastor 2002), or running a second-stage SFA model followed by a 
third-stage DEA model, to additionally take account of stochastic noise. To add to the 
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debate, Banker and Natarajan (2008) have provided theoretical justification for the 
use of the two-stage models in DEA to evaluate contextual variables affecting DEA 
efficiency scores. 
 
(v) DEA-Study Data Selection 
 
The data on US, Canada, Japan and EU commercial banks are derived from 
BankScope, a database published by Bureau VanDjick. The data are collected for a 
sample of commercial bank observations operating in Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.  The country-specific macro-economic variables were collected 
from Bloomberg. The sample for each year ranges between 76 and 109 commercial 
banks. Before analysing the results of the thesis, it is important to note the key facts 
about the commercial banking industry in G-10 countries. First, the industry really 
consists of two markets: retail and wholesale banking. Retail banking is skewed 
towards small firms and households, while wholesale banking focuses on larger firms 
and other financial institutions. Many banks provide both services, but this adds to the 
complexity of analysing commercial banks on an international scale. In general, 
research has not distinguished explicitly between retail and wholesale banking. 
Furthermore, in countries with a heavily bank-oriented financial system, the bank 
industry may evolve differently than in countries where there is more scope for 
securities activities, in terms of both products offered and risk management. This is a 
very important point to consider when making comparisons of banks across various 
countries, especially with respect to economies of scale, lending practices, and how 
diversified the business is between traditional and non-traditional banking activities.  
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Furthermore, although Basle tries to provide an international framework for bank 
capital regulation, there are differences in regulation at the country-specific level. In 
some countries commercial and investment banks are (or have been in the past) 
strictly separated (e.g. the US until recently), while in others (such as Germany or 
Italy) can operate jointly as universal banks and even have cross-shareholdings with 
industrial companies. These differences do make for varied market structures, risk 
appetites, and how bank’s pursue new opportunities, again hampering international 
comparisons. For instance, there are divergences in the activities in which EU banks 
and US banks are able to engage, and this should widen still over time. The US is out 
of step with the majority of the other countries in terms of providing banks with the 
opportunity to engage in securities insurance and derivative activity. The limited 
regulatory intervention in the EU provides flexibility to establish universal banking 
systems.  
 
Commercial banks are still subject to different regulatory treatment than other 
financial firms such as investment banks. The traditional role of commercial banks 
compared to non-depository financial service firms has declined over time, however, 
they do remain the largest and most important type of depository institution in terms 
of total assets. The focus of this thesis is on commercial banks. However, it is clear 
that over time it is becoming ever more difficult to show differences between the 
various types of financial service firms and institutions. One avenue for future 
research would be to compare the risk and efficiency differences between investment 
and commercial banks and if the divide has narrowed as expected through time.  
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This thesis assumes a global frontier with a series of cross section estimations, split by 
year. When efficiency analysis is carried out on cross-sectional data in addition to 
general issues of specifying the estimation model, much attention is drawn to the 
interpretation placed on the residual and the assumptions required in order to extract 
estimates of efficiency. Some of the strong assumptions required for efficiency 
analysis based on cross-sectional data may be relaxed if panel data is employed. Panel 
data has the advantage of exploiting the additional information that is available when 
observed at more than a single point in time.  
 
There are also drawbacks regarding time-invariant estimators in terms of the 
assumption that bank efficiency is constant over time. The assumption of a constant 
level of efficiency is not particularly appealing in contexts where data are observed 
over long periods or the impact of external influences that may affect the pattern of 
efficiency. When panel data are available, one of the most common approaches and 
advantages in DEA literature is to apply a Malmquist index of the change in 
productivity. Productivity change can be measured using a Malmquist productivity 
index and is based on constructing quantity indices as ratios of distance functions. The 
Malmquist index approach is a powerful technique used in efficiency analysis and is 
the most robust method when attempting to determine the dynamic changes in 
efficiency levels. The Malmquist index does not require price information and does 
not rely on any assumptions about functional form. The approach also splits out 
technical change and technical efficiency change and can therefore offer valuable 
insights into productivity change within the banking industry. Furthermore, at a macro 
level, the approach is able to provide useful insights into overall productivity changes. 
The Malmquist approach is essentially used in an explanatory form of data analysis, 
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much can be gained from the analytic insight it provides and should be utilised with 
panel data. 
 
IV Conclusion 
In sum, this thesis employs an Event-Study methodology to examine the impact of 
market risk regulation on bank returns. The risk of the bank sample is examined 
through four robust VaR techniques as detailed above. Data Envelopment Analysis is 
used to measure commercial bank efficiency. Tobit regression examines the 
determinant factors of bank efficiency, taking into account country-specific economic 
variables, risk and dummy variables for the Market Risk Amendment.  
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Chapter 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Reaction to the Market Risk Amendment: Analysis of the Results 
I Introduction 
This section details the results of the event-study analysis of the four key 
announcements leading up to the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. The VaR results are 
then presented by year and by country under each of the four risk methodologies – the 
parametric approach, historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation, and Extreme 
Value Theory approach. In addition the efficiency results are reported. DEA is 
employed under an intermediation approach for constant returns to scale (CRS) and 
variable returns to scale (VRS) and including and excluding an OBS variable for each 
approach. The determinants of efficiency from the Tobit regression results are then 
reported.  
 
II Analysis of Reaction to the First Announcement:  
 
The Basle Committee issued a framework for applying capital charges to the 
market risks incurred by banks. 
 
The event period average abnormal returns (AAR) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
are computed using the two-index market model (Choi and Jen (1990), and Kwan 
(1991)).  The test statistic is constructed following the standard abnormal return 
method described by Brown and Warner (1985). A non-parametric test is also 
employed. The interest-rate coefficients are summarised by country shown in 
Appendix I. 
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Table 1 reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for different time intervals 
surrounding the first event on 15th April 1993. Figure 4, also shown below, displays 
the -10 to +5 day CAR categorized by country. The first hypothesis (H1a) suggests 
that the first announcement by the Basle Committee in relation to allocating capital to 
market risk, has a negative impact the equity value of the bank sample during the 
event study period. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the Committee 
suggested banks use a standardized approach to measure risk, an approach that was 
dated and allowed no flexibility, whereas many large successful banks were already 
utilizing innovative and flexible approaches to calculate risk and capital levels. 
 
The results for the first announcement show that there exists no cross-country pattern 
of significant negative abnormal returns. As a result, hypothesis H1a is rejected. In 
terms of the individual countries results, the United States and Germany showed the 
most statistically significant negative reactions to this initial proposal by the Basle 
Committee. The U.S. bank sample experienced a significant CAR−10,+5  of -4.31% with 
a statistically significant t-test score and a GST result significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. Furthermore, the U.S. returns were significantly negative for the 
window -5 to +5 days and also -1 to +1 days. Germany also reacted with significantly 
negative returns, but only in the -10 to +5 event window with a CAR−10,+5  of -5.10%. 
However, only the non-parametric test yielded a significant result.  For the sample of 
French commercial banks, all four event windows showed negative cumulative 
returns, however, only the CAR0,+5  of – 3.92% was statistically significant at a 90 
percent confidence interval. The GST statistic for the CAR0,+5  was not significant.  
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The Japan results showed large positive returns over the -10 to +5 day window, with a 
CAR−10,+5  of +7.91%. However, the bulk of the upward movement in returns took 
place prior to the announcement date, that is, between -10 and -5 days. The result for 
the sample of Japanese banks is consistent with the findings of Wagster (1996) that 
Japanese banks responded positively to the first piece of bank capital regulation, the 
Basle 1988 Accord that covered credit risk. Similarly, in this case, the Japanese banks 
reacted favourably to the imposition of bank capital regulation for market risk. 
 
Table 1 Reaction to the First Announcement made by the Basle Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Cumulative CAR (%)
Days -10 to +5 -2.38% 0.53% -2.58% -5.10% 2.32% 7.91% -0.02% 0.48% -0.41% 0.77% -4.31%
t-stat -0.76 0.08 -0.79 -1.68 0.29 1.49 -0.01 0.03 -0.19 0.15 -1.97 *
gen. sign test -2.05 -0.18 -0.41 -3.90 ** -0.07 2.82 ** 0.36 0.43 -0.34 0.51 -2.74 ***
Days -5 to +5 -1.58% -1.19% -2.29% -1.61% 0.40% -4.26% -0.20% 1.58% -1.05% 1.02% -2.83%
t-stat -0.61 -0.21 -0.84 -0.64 0.06 -0.97 -0.10 0.12 -0.59 0.24 -2.72 **
gen. sign test -1.00 -0.74 -0.07 -1.55 -0.44 -0.77 -0.45 0.27 -1.49 0.17 -2.95 ***
Days -1 to +1 -0.41% 2.97% -0.39% 0.14% -0.77% 0.15% 0.26% 1.08% -0.02% -0.14% -1.77%
t-stat -0.30 1.02 -0.28 0.10 -0.22 0.06 0.26 0.16 -0.02 -0.06 -1.32
gen. sign test -0.45 2.67 ** -0.48 0.53 -1.03 -0.71 1.15 0.14 0.02 -0.90 -3.77 ***
Days 0 to +5 -0.97% 0.67% -3.92% -0.28% 1.03% -0.27% -0.19% 0.42% -1.28% 0.96% -4.31%
t-stat -0.51 0.16 -1.96 * -0.15 0.21 -0.08 -0.13 0.04 -0.97 0.30 -1.32
gen. sign test -0.78 0.12 -0.35 -0.74 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.61 -1.52 0.19 -1.45
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Figure 4 Reaction to the First Announcement, CAR -10 to + 5 
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III Analysis of the Second Announcement:  
 
The Basle Committee provides banks with the option to use an internal models 
approach for allocating capital to market risk. Announcement Date: 28th April 
1995. 
 
Table 2 reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns in reaction to the second Basle 
Committee announcement on 28th April 1995. Figure 5, also shown below, displays 
the -10 to +5 day CAR categorized by country. The second hypothesis (H2a) expected 
the reaction to this proposal due to banks being allowed to measure their own market 
risk and having the incentive to manipulate the allocation of capital. However, the 
results of the analysis show that banks in the majority of the countries included in the 
sample reacted positively to this second announcement. The internal models approach 
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was the first piece of bank capital regulation that allowed banks to calculate risk using 
their own risk models and this might explain the positive returns surrounding the 
event period. Furthermore, although the move away from the ‘standardised approach’ 
provided banks with more flexibility, some would argue that the internal models 
approach provided banks with incentive and freedom to engage in regulatory arbitrage 
by transferring risk from the trading book to the banking book. Therefore, H2a is 
rejected.    
 
The French banks reacted positively to the internal models approach proposed by the 
Basle Committee, and results were significant with a CAR−10,+5  of +4.57% and a 
CAR−5,+5 of +2.62%. The GST result for these periods was statistically significant at a 
99 percent confidence level and a 95 percent confidence level, respectively.  The 
result for the German bank sample was also positive, but only for the event period of -
5 to +5 days, CAR−5,+5 of +2.17%, and was only statistically significant from a non-
parametric level.  The Italian bank sample showed positive abnormal returns 
throughout the event window, with a CAR−10,+5  of +5.11%, and a GST statistic that 
was significant at the 99 percent level.  Switzerland banks showed a positive reaction 
to the second announcement and had a CAR−10,+5  of +1.44%, with a significant GST 
statistic. This time around, the United States banks showed a statistically significant 
positive reaction, whereas the reaction to the first announcement was statistically 
negative. The CAR−10,+5  for the United States for the second announcement was 
+0.60% and +1.77% for CAR−5,+5. Both CAR figures were statistically significant 
using a non-parametric method. 
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Only the commercial banks within Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
showed negative abnormal returns during the period surrounding the second 
announcement, and none of these were statistically significant. 
 
Table 2 Reaction to the Second Announcement made by the Basle Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Cumulative 
CAR (%)
Days -10 to +5 -1.59% -3.17% 4.57% 1.25% 5.11% 4.37% 0.31% 2.47% 1.44% -0.94% 0.60%
t-stat -0.56 -0.69 1.33 0.38 1.29 1.11 0.10 0.39 0.59 -0.21 0.30
gen. sign test -0.75 -0.81 6.22 *** 1.65 4.53 *** 1.27 0.25 1.33 5.04 *** -0.46 4.64 ***
Days -5 to +5 -1.20% -0.90% 2.62% 2.17% 3.84% 2.08% 0.89% 2.80% 0.24% -0.37% 1.77%
t-stat -0.51 -0.24 0.92 0.81 0.74 0.64 0.33 0.54 0.12 -0.10 1.08
gen. sign test -0.47 -0.95 3.70 ** 5.09 *** 3.09 ** 1.48 0.88 1.99 2.98 ** 0.22 5.50 ***
Days -1 to +1 -0.98% -1.03% 0.02% -0.89% 2.78% -0.47% 0.03% 1.44% -1.24% -0.30% 0.41%
t-stat -0.81 -0.52 0.01 -0.64 1.02 -0.28 0.02 0.53 -1.17 -0.15 0.47
gen. sign test -1.17 -0.35 1.89 -2.01 * 1.47 -0.71 1.19 1.41 -1.39 -0.59 2.56 **
Days 0 to +5 -0.51% 0.27% 0.50% -0.51% 0.93% 1.88% 0.32% 2.75% 1.63% -0.25% 1.30%
t-stat -0.29 0.10 0.24 -0.26 0.24 0.78 0.16 0.72 1.09 -0.09 1.08
gen. sign test -0.74 -0.87 1.90 -0.09 1.71 2.46 ** 0.76 1.58 3.67 ** -0.47 3.89 ***
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Figure 5 Reaction to the Second Announcement, CAR -10 to + 5 
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IV Analysis of the Third Announcement:  
 
The first public disclosure of the trading activities of Commercial Banks and 
Securities Firms. A joint report published by the Basle Committee and The 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Announcement 
Date: 28th November 1995. 
 
Table 3 reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the event period surrounding 
the third significant Basle Committee announcement on 28th of November, 1995. 
Figure 6, also shown below, depicts the -10 to +5 day CAR categorized by country. 
The third hypothesis (H3a) anticipated a positive reaction from the banking 
community to this third announcement by the Basle Committee and IOSCO. The 
reaction was expected to be positive because this proposal increased the level of 
transparency for risk within the financial system and provided solution for risk 
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measurement and reporting. The results are somewhat conflicting with mixed 
reactions to the third announcement. As a result, H3a is also rejected. 
 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United States all showed a significantly positive 
reaction to the issue of the joint report. Germany had a CAR−10,+5  of +3.34% and a 
CAR−5,+5 of +4.99%. The Japanese bank sample showed a CAR−10,+5  of +6.84% and a 
CAR−5,+5 of +5.14%, and the reaction was also positive in event windows -1 to +1 
days, and 0 to +5 days. The Swedish reaction was +5.87% in the period -10 to +5, but 
was not statistically significant, yet CAR−1,+1 was statistically significant with a return 
of +3.57%. The reaction from U.S. banks was positive with a CAR−10,+5  of +2.44%, 
with the ten-day period surrounding the event also showing a statistically significant 
positive return of 2.96%.  
 
Significantly negative reactions were seen in the sample of banks from Canada, 
France, and Italy. The reaction from Canadian banks was significant at CAR−5,+5 and 
CAR0,+5  windows, with returns of -1.34% and -1.28% respectively. French banks 
experienced significantly negative returns with a CAR−5,+5 of -4.99% and a CAR0,+5  of 
-4.07%. The Italian bank sample showed negative returns across all the event 
windows, but only CAR−5,+5 was significant with returns of -3.12%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109
Table 3 Reaction to the Third Announcement made by the Basle Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Cumulative CAR (%)
Days -10 to +5 1.46% -1.27% -1.37% 3.34% -2.06% 6.84% 0.04% 5.87% -1.66% -0.13% 2.44%
t-stat 0.77 -0.29 -0.39 1.14 -0.43 1.99 * 0.01 1.21 -0.80 -0.03 1.22
gen. sign test 1.01 -2.18 * -2.91 ** 3.28 ** -0.80 5.98 *** 1.09 1.18 -0.73 -0.69 3.94 ***
Days -5 to +5 0.52% -1.34% -4.99% 2.76% -3.12% 5.14% -0.35% 4.28% -0.74% 0.43% 2.96%
t-stat 2.39 * -2.99 ** -3.46 ** 2.28 * -3.81 ** 2.29 ** -1.38 2.14 * -1.35 0.77 3.47 ***
gen. sign test 1.73 -2.78 ** -0.78 6.89 ** -0.45 5.73 *** -0.50 0.94 -1.18 0.24 4.10 ***
Days -1 to +1 0.11% 0.11% -2.07% 1.37% -0.59% 2.81% 0.00% 3.57% -0.98% -0.55% 0.47%
t-stat 2.05 0.20 -2.57 * 5.72 *** -0.55 3.47 *** 0.02 3.75 ** -2.48 * -1.09 1.62
gen. sign test 0.97 1.27 -1.00 2.89 ** -1.11 6.23 *** 1.07 2.17 * -1.28 -1.20 0.18
Days 0 to +5 -0.07% -1.28% -4.07% 1.51% -1.41% 4.35% -0.59% 2.09% -0.19% 1.22% 1.32%
t-stat -0.74 -4.08 *** -3.00 ** 2.43 * -1.99 3.10 *** -2.01 3.82 ** -0.45 2.09 * 2.49 **
gen. sign test -0.89 -2.16 * -0.71 2.61 ** -0.07 7.26 *** -0.55 0.62 -1.05 0.12 3.44 ***
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Figure 6 Reaction to the Third Announcement, CAR -10 to + 5 
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V Analysis of the Fourth Announcement:  
 
The final Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market Risk. A 
companion paper was also released describing the way in which G-10 supervisory 
authorities plan to use ‘back-testing’ (ex-post comparisons between model results 
and actual performance) in conjunction with banks’ internal risk measurement 
systems as a basis for applying capital charges. Announcement Date: 4th January 
1996. 
 
Table 4 below, reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the event period 
surrounding the fourth and final significant Basle Committee announcement relating 
to market risk, made on the 4th of January, 1996. Figure 7, also shown below, shows 
the -10 to +5 day CAR categorized by country. The fourth hypothesis (H4a) expected 
a negative reaction from the sample of banks that were studied. This was due to the 
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fact that the methodology suggested by the Basle Committee was not robust enough 
when applying a uniform ten-day holding period and a 99 percent confidence interval 
to calculate VaR. Furthermore, the Committee applied an arbitrary multiplication 
factor of 3 or more to account for any unforeseen event risk, model inaccuracies, and 
for misrepresentations of risk in the banking book, instead of the trading book.  
Although the Amendment to the Basle Accord provided a new market risk framework 
for the financial industry, the methodology it employed was not robust or flexible 
enough to counter the changing risk profile of banks and the environment they 
operated within.  
 
The results from the reaction to the fourth announcement by the Basle Committee are 
conflicting, with Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
displaying a negative reaction, whereas the sample of banks studied within Germany, 
France, and Japan showed a positive reaction to the final announcement.  Therefore, 
H4a is rejected. 
 
The reaction by the six largest commercial banks in Canada was negative, CAR−10,+5   
-1.24%, but was only statistically significant at the non-parametric 90 percent 
confidence level. A negative reaction was also seen from the sample of Swedish 
banks, with a CAR0,+5  statistic of -4.75%, significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level for both parametric and non-parametric tests. The reaction from the sample of 
U.K. banks was negative with a CAR0,+5 of -1.43% and t-stat of -2.84, however, the 
non-parametric test was insignificant. The reaction of U.S. banks to the final 
announcement by the Basle Committee was negative in the -10 to +5 day event 
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window with a CAR−10,+5  of -4.72%, and significant at the 95 percent confidence level 
for both parametric and non-parametric tests.  
 
The CAR results of France, Germany, and Japan were positive. French bank returns 
were showed a significant CAR of +1.47% over the 3-day event window surrounding 
the announcement. Similarly over the same period, German banks reacted in a 
significantly positive manner, with a CAR−1.+1 of 1.77%. The reaction from Japanese 
banks was statistically significant in the CAR0,+5  period, with a significant return of 
+1.74% at the 95 percent confidence level on a parametric and non-parametric test.  
 
Table 4 Reaction to the Fourth Announcement made by the Basle Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Cumulative 
CAR (%)
Days -10 to +5 0.48% -1.24% -0.87% 0.95% -1.93% 0.29% 0.06% -3.50% 0.91% -2.82% -4.72%
t-stat 0.26 -0.30 -0.26 0.33 -0.40 0.07 0.02 -1.57 0.45 -0.68 -2.22 **
gen. sign test 0.63 -2.24 * -1.01 1.34 -1.78 1.18 1.31  -2.57 * 1.64 -2.03 -2.46 **
Days -5 to +5 1.01% 0.28% -0.64% -0.05% -0.63% -0.21% 0.22% -2.33% 0.97% -0.81% -1.40%
t-stat 1.82 0.28 -0.64 -0.07 -1.04 -0.32 0.47 -1.51 1.93 -1.87 -1.82 *
gen. sign test 0.60 1.62 -0.89 -0.50 -1.31 -1.21 1.15 -2.14 * 1.33 -1.68 -0.15
Days -1 to +1 0.42% 0.54% 1.47% 1.77% -0.54% 0.66% -0.45% -1.47% 0.21% 0.56% 1.77%
t-stat 1.75 1.01 2.93 ** 2.88 ** -1.08 1.19 -1.04 -1.08 1.47 1.56 1.37
gen. sign test 0.93 1.19 2.24 * 2.45 * -1.11 1.45 -1.72 -2.00 1.20 0.16 1.48
Days 0 to +5 1.42% -0.10% -0.83% -1.14% -0.73% 1.74% -1.20% -4.75% 1.04% -1.43% -1.14%
t-stat 2.49 * -0.13 -0.90 -1.69 -0.95 2.71 ** -0.69 -3.51** 2.10* -2.84 ** -1.12
gen. sign test 1.80 -1.24 -1.08 -0.60 -0.82 2.40 ** -0.50 -4.24** 1.94 -1.87 -0.90
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Figure 7 Reaction to the Fourth Announcement, CAR -10 to + 5 
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VI Summary of Market Risk Amendment Announcement Results 
 
As shown in Table 5 below, the cumulative reaction of the G-10 banks for each 
announcement is inconclusive. Overall, the first announcement by the Basle 
Committee proposing a standardized approach to measure market risk was met with a 
negative reaction. In contrast, the second proposal, in which the Basle Committee 
allowed banks to adopt an internal models approach, resulted in a positive shift in 
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bank sample returns. Similarly, the third announcement, which was a joint report by 
the Basle Committee and IOSCO concerning the risk practices and reporting 
procedures of financial institutions led to positive abnormal returns across the sample 
of G-10 commercial banks. The final announcement, which formalized the Basle 
Committee’s requirements on how banks must allocate capital to cover market risk 
was met with negative approval overall. These results suggest that the financial 
system recognizes the importance of risk management methodologies and practices, 
but reacts adversely when risk measurement strategies are limited by regulators.  
 
However, the results are more telling when considered from a country-by-country 
perspective. Figure 8 depicts the overall CAR across the four Basle Committee 
announcements for each of the eleven countries. Japan’s overall positive CAR of 
+19.42% is the most dramatic result and opens up a variety of research opportunities, 
such as exploring the risk and efficiency levels of these banks, which is examined 
further into this thesis.  Although the reaction was not as significant as that of the 
Japanese bank sample, the returns from Italian and Swedish banks are also positive 
overall.  The most significant negative reaction was from the sample of United States 
banks, with an overall CAR of -5.99%. This result most likely reflects that fact that 
the Basle Committee’s new proposal for market risk was not in accordance with 
existing risk practices of U.S. banks and was not flexible or innovative enough for the 
level and complexity of risk these institutions were taking. The Canadian bank sample 
also had a negative reaction overall, with a CAR of -5.16%. 
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Table 5 Cumulative Reaction across all 4 Basle Committee Announcements 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Cumulative Reaction across all 4 Basle Committee Announcements 
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The divergence in results across the G-10 countries make for interesting research 
possibilities. This thesis goes on to examine the risk and efficiency profiles of the 
Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Cumulative 
CAR (%)
Days -10 to +5 (2.03)% (5.16)% (0.26)% +0.45 % +3.43 % +19.42 % +0.39 % +5.32 % +0.29 % (3.13)% (5.99)%
Days -5 to +5 (1.25)% (3.15)% (5.30)% +3.26 % +0.48 % +2.76 % +0.56 % +6.34 % (0.58)% +0.27 % +0.51 %
Days -1 to +1 (0.86)% +2.59 % (0.97)% +2.39 % +0.88 % +3.15 % (0.16)% +4.63 % (2.03)% (0.42)% +0.88 %
Days 0 to +5 (0.12)% (0.43)% (8.31)% (0.42)% (0.17)% +7.70 % (1.66)% +0.51 % +1.20 % +0.51 % (2.83)%
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sample banks and determine the relationships between the banks’ reaction to the 1996 
Amendment, their efficiency levels, and also their risk profiles.  
 
4.2 Analysis of Value-at-Risk (VaR) Results 
I Introduction 
Risk is a multi-dimensional event and no single algorithm can estimate VaR by 
considering all possible market changes such as dataset quality, confidence intervals, 
and returns of financial instruments distributions (Kao-Tai Tsai, 2004). However, this 
study utilises four different VaR methodologies (parametric approach, historical 
simulation (HS), Extreme Value Theory (EVT), and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation, in 
order to mitigate some of the weaknesses inherent in the various approaches. For 
instance, the parametric approach assumes a normal distribution, and the historical 
simulation approach assumes past volatility will be similar to that of the future.  
 
Estimating the VaR of a bank involves determining a probability distribution for the 
change in the value of the bank over a specific time-period. The value of the financial 
institution at time t depends on the risk factors, or market variables. For this study, the 
risk factors are exchange rates, interest rates, and market returns. Thus, the VaR 
estimation is calculated based on the distribution of the underlying risk factors.  
 
Using a three-factor multi-index model, the key risk drivers for each bank were 
identified. The sensitivity of each bank to changes in interest rate, exchange rate, and 
the stock market is captured by factor coefficients. The VaR of each bank is computed 
by using the historical volatilities for the rate of change in interest rates, exchange 
rates, and each country’s respective stock market. Each VaR statistic represents the 
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fraction of a bank’s equity at risk over a one-week period with a 99% degree of 
confidence. The equity value of a bank is assumed to fluctuate with these three key 
individual risk factors given the historical volatilities and respective betas. The VaR is 
independent of bank size and is shown as a percentage, allowing for comparisons to 
be made across countries.  
 
In Table 6, the estimated betas from the three-factor model in are shown for the 
sample of Belgian banks. Each coefficient represents the sensitivity of a bank's stock 
to a change in one individual factor. The market betas for Belgian banks are generally 
positive and suggest that banks’ profits and equity values move in a similar direction 
to the general market index. The average market rate beta for the Belgian banks over 
the time period is 0.38. The interest rate betas do not show a large degree of statistical 
significance, but the beta factors that are significant are generally negative, which 
suggests that their stock performance is vulnerable to rising interest rates. The foreign 
exchange rate betas show no direction and the results are generally mixed.  
 
The VaR results for Belgian banks are shown in Table 7. The weekly VaR in percent 
of bank equity at risk is shown for each VaR methodology – parametric, historical, 
extreme value theory (EVT), and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation. As can be seen from 
Table 7, the results from the parametric and historical distribution approaches are 
lower than the EVT and Monte Carlo results, consistent with the findings of Herring 
and Schuermann (2005). The EVT approach should show a higher risk level as it 
takes the worst-case scenario that has occurred for a specific year for each risk factor 
and assumes this occurs at one point in time. The Monte Carlo approach simulates the 
random behaviour of the three risk factors and estimates the impact of their changes 
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on each institution’s equity value. The hypothetical values under each scenario make 
up a distribution of gains and losses from which VaR can be calculated. As shown in 
Figure 9, the average weekly VaR over the period 1992 to 1996 was close to 2% in 
the bank sample for Belgium. However, there is a sharp increase in risk for 1997 and 
1998 up towards 5%.  
 
Table 8 shows the Canadian bank factor betas for each risk coefficient. For the period 
1992 to 1998 there is a strong positive relationship between Canadian banks equity 
returns and that of the market return. Over the period the average market beta is 0.51, 
but reached a high of 0.72 in 1998. Canadian bank’s equity values have, on average, a 
negative relationship with interest rates. There is a statistically strong relationship 
with interest rates in the period 1992 to 1996 with an average beta of -0.36 over this 
timeframe. In the years 1997 and 1998, the relationship continues to be negative, but 
to a lesser degree, and is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that during 
1997 and 1998, Canadian banks were less exposed to interest rate volatility, either 
through better hedging practices, or because profitability was less dependent on 
interest rate levels. For the Canadian bank sample, in the majority of cases the foreign 
exchange rate betas are negative and statistically significant. The average exchange 
rate beta is -0.34 and suggests that equity value suffers during periods of currency 
strength versus the U.S. dollar.  
 
The VaR for Canadian banks is computed using the volatilities for the rate of change 
in interest rates, exchanges rates, and the stock market. The Canadian VaR results for 
the period 1992 to 1998 are shown in Table 9. Figure 10 displays the average weekly 
VaR for the Canadian bank sample by year. For the years 1992 to 1995, the VaR 
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percentages are relatively close to one another and range between 2- and 2.9%. There 
is a strong increase in risk for 1997 and 1998, with a weekly VaR of 3.39% and 
5.93% respectively.  In terms of the different VaR approaches, the historical 
simulation and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation results are very similar. The EVT 
approach yielded slightly higher risk levels. However, the parametric approach was 
consistently lower than any other approach with a weekly average VaR of close to 
1.7% lower risk than the results from the MC estimation. For the Canadian sample, 
the difference between the parametric and MC simulation was 1.95%. 
 
The estimated betas for the sample of French banks are shown in Table 10. With the 
exception of a few institutions, the results are generally positive, but few statistics are 
significant. Of particular interest is the level of significance in 1998, which is much 
higher than previous years with a statistically significant market beta of 0.43. This 
finding suggests that the larger French financial institutions were playing a greater 
role in the outcome of equity markets. The VaR results of the French bank sample are 
shown in Table 11. The trend improves gradually through the period 1992 to 1996. 
Once again the years 1997 and 1998 show a large increase in the average weekly VaR 
statistics across all four VaR methodologies. The VaR results in 1998 were more than 
double that of 1996, with an average MC result of 4.68% in 1998. The differences 
between the VaR approaches are consistent with that of Belgium and Canada. The 
EVT approach shows slightly stronger results as compared to the MC approach. The 
weekly average VaR statistics of the French banks steadily decreased between 1992 
and 1996, moving up from an average weekly VaR statistic of -2.83% to -1.39%. 
However, the weekly VaR in 1997 under the MC approach was -3.36% and more than 
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double that of the previous year. The risk of the French sample of banks continued to 
increase in 1998 with a MC VaR of -4.56% and an EVT VaR in excess of -6%.  
 
Table 12 details the factor coefficients for the sample of German banks. There is a 
positive market risk coefficient, with an average beta of 0.362, with most of the bank 
specific relationships statistically significant. Unlike the market coefficient results of 
Canada and France which increased especially in the years 1997 and 1998, the 
German coefficients for market risk are very consistent across the time period studied. 
This implies one of two things, either German banks were already a key part of the 
stock market, or their exposure to the financial crises through 1997 and 1998 was 
ultimately lower than other countries. However, as per the increase in overall VaR 
through 1997 and 1998, the latter cannot be the case. The interest rate coefficients are 
negative and suggest that German banks’ equity risk is vulnerable to rising rates. The 
average interest rate beta for the German banks is -0.11 but with little evidence of 
statistical significance. The foreign exchange rate betas are more mixed on average 
and exhibit positive but relatively small coefficients.  
 
The VaR results as shown in Table 13 and Figure 12 highlight the consistent theme in 
terms of a large increase in risk for the period 1997 and 1998. Under the MC 
approach, the average weekly VaR of the German bank sample hit a low of -1.47% in 
1996 but then increased to -4.03% by 1998. The historical and parametric approaches 
continue to show lower VaR results as compared to the EVT and MC results, with an 
average difference of 1.7% between the parametric and MC result. 
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In Table 14, the analysis of the Italian bank sample indicates a positive market 
coefficient but lacks any consistency with regard to the statistical significance across 
the period of study. Only in 1998 is there a strong relationship with the general market 
with a beta of 0.45 versus an average coefficient of 0.12 over the period 1992 to 1997. 
In the period 1992 to 1997 the Italian bank sample does not show any sign of 
correlation between bank equity value and foreign exchange rate movements. 
However, in 1998 the bank sample experienced a significant relationship to exchange 
rate movements, which suggests that Italian banks were more exposed to exchange 
rate changes during this timeframe. The VaR results for the Italian bank sample are 
shown in Table 15 and Figure 13. The VaR of Italian banks actually decreases from 
close to -4% in 1992 to nearly -1% in 1995. However, the risk does increase through 
1997 and 1998 with a VaR of over -5% in the last year of the study. 
 
Table 16 details the factor coefficients for the Japanese bank sample. On average, the 
market risk coefficient is positive with the majority of years showing a statistically 
significant relationship. The average market risk beta in 1992 was 0.46 but moved 
down slightly by 1995 to 0.35. However, by 1998 the movement of the Japanese bank 
sample was 0.526 with all but one of the sample showing a strong statistical 
relationship. The interest rate betas were generally mixed, but with some interesting 
results in terms of the years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1997 showing a positive 
relationship between equity values and interest rates. However, for the years 1995 and 
1998 the results were negative across most of the Japanese bank sample. This is not 
surprising considering the financial volatility and problems Japan was experiencing. 
The banking system ultimately dictated the performance of the stock market and other 
industries. During the 1990s, Japan’s economy experienced problems that resulted 
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from a large and rising volume of bad debts associated with the property and stock 
market declines in the late 1980s (Ito, 1992). The foreign exchange betas are on 
average negative, but with more statistically significant occurrences in the period 
1996 to 1998 with an average coefficient of -0.39 highlighting that these banks suffer 
quite significantly during periods of currency depreciation against the US dollar.  
 
The VaR results for Japanese commercial banks are shown in Table 17 and Figure 14. 
The VaR declined slightly between 1992 and 1994. However, the risk of these 
institutions began to increase from 1995 to 1998. In 1996, Japanese banks faced their 
riskiest time based on an average weekly VaR in excess of 11%, with some banks in 
the sample experiencing VaR scores in excess of 20%.  
 
The period 1997 and 1998 was a time of financial crisis that consumed most of Asia, 
raising fears of a worldwide economic slowdown. By the mid-1990s many East Asian 
countries had large private current account deficits and the presence of fixed exchange 
rates encouraged external borrowing and subsequently foreign exchange risk in both 
financial and corporate sectors. However, due to recession in the early 1990s, the US 
raised interest rates in order to curb inflation. The result was a rise in the value of the 
US dollar, against which many East Asian currencies were pegged; this subsequently 
made the exports of these countries less competitive.  The crisis had significant 
macro-level effects, including large reductions in currencies, equity values and other 
asset prices of key Asian countries, with Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand most 
affected. The crisis led to reluctance to lend to developing countries, economic 
slowdowns on a macro-level, and a decline in oil price to sub $10/bbl. The reduction 
in oil revenue had a large impact on key producers such as Russia, which in turn 
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contributed to the Russian financial crisis in 1998. This in turn impacted the financial 
health of one of the largest US hedge funds, Long-Term Capital Management. As a 
result, it is no surprise to expect quite large increases in the weekly average VaR of 
the bank sample being studied across all G-10 countries. 
 
The coefficient results for the Netherlands bank sample are shown in Table 18. The 
sample shows a very high market risk coefficient of close to one across most of the 
years. The relationship between interest rates is mostly negative with a few results 
statistically significant. In regard to the foreign exchange rate betas there are some 
mixed results, but the statistically significant results are positive and suggest that the 
equity values are enhanced in periods of currency appreciation. The VaR results are 
shown in Table 19 and Figure 15. The results are very similar to previous countries in 
terms of a large increase in risk is seen in 1997 and 1998 relative to previous years in 
the period this study examines. The financial landscape in the Netherlands underwent 
a major change in the 1990s. The process of deregulation made large advances as 
universal banks that provided a large number of financial services in commercial and 
investment banking were allowed to emerge.  
 
In Table 20, the factor coefficients for the Swedish bank sample are shown. The 
results are generally mixed for the interest rate and exchange rate coefficients, but are 
on average positive in terms of market risk. In Sweden, banking and insurance have 
traditionally remained separate. In the early 1990s, banks and insurance companies 
were allowed to own shares in each other. In addition, savings banks and cooperative 
banks were permitted to change legal status and become limited liability companies in 
1991. This change had a large impact on the structure of the banking industry, where 
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10 of the larger savings banks transformed into a new banking group with one parent 
holding company. The overall impact was a decrease in the number of large 
institutions down to four.  As shown in Table 21 and Figure 16, the Swedish bank 
VaR results show less risk in the period 1993 to 1996, but demonstrate a larger 
average weekly EVT VaR in 1997 of over 7%. The MC and EVT results continue to 
show much larger risk results compared to the parametric and historical simulation 
approaches.  
 
The factor results for Switzerland are shown in Table 22, where there are no clear 
relationships between bank equity and the three risk factors studied. The Swiss 
banking sector is characterized by a two-tier structure. The first tier is international 
and the large banks are universal with substantial investment banking activities. The 
second tier consists of a large group of domestically focused banks. In the early 
1990s, Switzerland experienced asset deflation in the real estate market that led to a 
period of stagnation and perhaps reduced the risk exposure of these banks. The VaR 
results as per Table 23 and Figure 17 show an increase in risk between 1992 and 1998 
where the average weekly VaR went from -2.11% to -4.06% under the MC approach. 
However, this risk level is quite low as compared to other countries in the sample. 
 
The risk coefficients for the sample of UK banks studied are shown in Table 24. The 
market coefficient continues to be positive with a beta of close to 0.7 in 1998. Most of 
the banks in the sample show a statistically strong relationship with the general 
market movement. This is not surprising considering the domination of the financial 
sector by so few banks. Interestingly, the interest rate coefficient was strongly 
negative in 1992 and 1993. However, the results from 1994 onwards suggest that 
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these banks began to be less exposed to interest rate volatility, have become more 
sophisticated in their risk management practices, and are well hedged against this risk. 
The VaR results as per Table 25 and Figure 18 display the VaR results for each of the 
four methodologies adopted. The risk level of these banks actually declined between 
1992 and 1995. However, the VaR of these banks more than doubled in the years 
1997 and 1998 when compared to the relatively low 1996 numbers. The EVT 
approach yielded -8.32% in 1997, a significant move up versus the -1.51% number for 
the previous year.  
 
Table 26 and Figure 19 display the VaR results for the sample of US banks. The 
factor coefficients are shown in Appendix II. The average weekly VaR under the 
parametric approach is in a very tight and low range with only two years showing an 
average weekly VaR above -0.5%. The historical simulation approach also yields 
relatively low results with an average weekly VaR of -0.9% and gradually 
strengthening to -1.99% in 1997. The largest EVT statistic was in 1997 with a -2.16% 
VaR. The MC results show the VaR moving up from -1.6% in 1992 to -2.14% in 
1998. The MC results on average yield a VaR statistic of over 1% more than the 
parametric approach. There is a similar pattern to other countries in terms of the risk 
increasing in 1997 and 1998. However, the risk only increases by less than 0.5% over 
1997 and 1998 versus the previous timeframe.  
 
With respect to the hypotheses, there is enough evidence to support H5a, H6a and 
H7a. The results showed a significant increase in risk through the time-period studied, 
especially in 1996 and 1997. As banks moved into off-balance-sheet activity and 
away from more traditional sources of income, the equity values of banks were less 
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dependent on interest rate and foreign exchange rate volatility. However, this was 
only seen in countries such as Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. The results 
also showed the parametric approach to consistently understate VaR as compared to 
the other methodologies employed in this study. 
 
II VaR Results by Country Rank 
 
From Table 27 and 4.b.23 the VaR results are averaged by country and ranked 
accordingly. Across all countries the average VaR through the period 1992 to 1996 is 
-2.52%. However, in 1997 there is a significant increase in risk up to -4.31%. The 
VaR results for 1998 continue to increase and move up to -4.67%. In terms of ranking 
the countries, the sample of Japanese banks is ranked number 1 with the highest level 
of risk on a consistent basis with the highest risk ranking in 3 years out of the 7 years 
studied. The second highest risk rating is Sweden with a high risk rating especially in 
the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. The country with the lowest risk ranking is the United 
States with the lowest risk ranking in 3 of the 7 years studied. The US had the lowest 
risk ranking by a very long way with a sum of rank score of 13. The country with the 
second lowest risk ranking was Switzerland with a ranking score of 29. However, 
France and Germany were also very low in the risk ranking with scores of 30.  
 
III VaR Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the risk profile of a sample of commercial banks within 
G-10 countries. All banks are publicly traded companies. The analysis covered a 
period of great financial market volatility - the period 1992 through to 1998 and the 
results indicate the extent to which market risk, interest rate and foreign exchange rate 
impact major commercial banks’ equity values.  
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While the sign of the market beta was consistently positive across banks and 
countries, the interest rate and exchange rate betas were more mixed. The beta 
coefficients were then combined with the historical volatilities of the three risk drivers 
to generate a modified VaR analysis across banks and countries. This study also 
applied four different VaR methodologies in order to ensure a robust risk calculation 
was carried out. The VaR analysis is somewhat unique in that it allows comparisons 
to be made across banks and countries as it shows the percentage a bank's equity 
value could be drawn down over a specific time frame within a certain confidence 
level. The results of this section of the study support the growing body of evidence 
that, when properly constructed, VaR measures can be an effective tool for measuring 
bank risk.  
 
The comparison of betas across countries should be done with caution based on the 
fact that different structures, legislations and stock market integration are not uniform. 
Nevertheless, the sample is diverse and does include countries with resemblance in 
terms of market structure and regulation.  
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Table 6 Three Factor Betas: Belgian Bank Sample 
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Table 7 Weekly VaR Results: Belgium 
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Figure 9 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Belgium 
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Table 8 Three Factor Betas: Canadian Bank Sample 
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Table 9 Weekly VaR Results: Canada 
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Figure 10 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Canada 
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Table 10 Three Factor Betas: French Bank Sample 
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Table 11 Weekly VaR Results: France 
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Figure 11 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: France 
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Table 12 Three Factor Betas: German Bank Sample 
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Table 13 Weekly VaR Results: Germany 
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Figure 12 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Germany 
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Table 14 Three Factor Betas: Italian Bank Sample 
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Table 15 Weekly VaR Results: Italy 
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Figure 13 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Italy 
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Table 16 Three Factor Betas: Japanese Bank Sample 
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Table 17 Weekly VaR Results: Japan 
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Figure 14 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Japan 
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Table 18 Three Factor Betas: The Netherlands Bank Sample 
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Table 19 Weekly VaR Results: The Netherlands 
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Figure 15 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Netherlands 
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Table 20 Three Factor Betas: Sweden Bank Sample 
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Table 21 Weekly VaR Results: Sweden 
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Figure 16 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Sweden 
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Table 22 Three Factor Betas: Switzerland Bank Sample 
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Table 23 Weekly VaR Results: Switzerland 
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Figure 17 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: Switzerland 
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Table 24 Three Factor Betas: United Kingdom Bank Sample 
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Table 25 Weekly VaR Results: United Kingdom 
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Figure 18 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: United Kingdom 
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Table 26 Weekly VaR Results: United States 
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Figure 19 VaR results by Year. Parametric Vs Monte Carlo Results: United States 
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Table 27 Weekly VaR Results: Total Bank Sample 
 
 
Table 28 Weekly VaR Results: Lowest VaR Ranking by Country by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean VaR of Sample Banks by Country (Monte Carlo Simulation Results)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Belgium -2.34% -1.79% -2.02% -1.73% -2.02% -4.84% -4.68%
Canada -2.69% -2.23% -2.82% -2.01% -2.37% -3.39% -5.93%
France -2.83% -1.64% -2.20% -1.80% -1.37% -3.36% -4.56%
Germany -2.09% -1.94% -2.58% -1.94% -1.47% -3.31% -4.03%
Italy -3.39% -1.51% -2.14% -1.23% -2.27% -2.41% -5.16%
Japan -5.72% -3.79% -2.62% -3.42% -4.97% -11.18% -5.96%
Netherlands -1.82% -2.58% -2.15% -2.18% -2.95% -6.03% -6.59%
Sweden -4.26% -4.26% -4.26% -4.26% -4.26% -4.26% -4.26%
Switzerland -2.11% -2.11% -2.11% -2.11% -2.11% -2.11% -2.11%
United Kingdom -4.42% -2.97% -3.20% -2.13% -1.87% -4.63% -5.98%
United States -1.60% -1.79% -1.52% -1.43% -1.44% -1.88% -2.14%
Average -3.02% -2.42% -2.51% -2.20% -2.46% -4.31% -4.67%
 Weekly VaR in percent of a Bank Equity at Risk. 
Country Ranking by Lowest VaR
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Sum of Ranks
Belgium 5 3 2 3 5 9 6 33
Canada 6 7 9 6 8 6 8 50
France 7 2 6 4 1 5 5 30
Germany 3 5 7 5 3 4 3 30
Italy 8 1 4 1 7 3 7 31
Japan 11 10 8 10 11 11 9 70 Highest VaR
Netherlands 2 8 5 9 9 10 11 54
Sweden 9 11 11 11 10 7 4 63 2nd Highest VaR
Switzerland 4 6 3 7 6 2 1 29 2nd Lowest VaR
United Kingdom 10 9 10 8 4 8 10 59
United States 1 4 1 2 2 1 2 13 Lowest VaR
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4.3 Analysis of DEA Bank Efficiency Results 
 
I Introduction 
 
This study uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to investigate the efficiency of the 
G-10 commercial banking industry over the period 1992 to 1998. This study also 
examines the impact of off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities and estimates the efficiency 
of the bank sample with and without an OBS variable to determine if any differences 
exist. Furthermore, Tobit regression is used to explain the efficiency of banks. 
 
The discussion of the empirical results on the efficiency of commercial banks in G-10 
is structured as follows: First, the efficiency of the full sample of banks obtained 
through an input-oriented approach with CRS and VRS, and with and without the 
inclusion of the off-balance sheet variable. Secondly, this study investigates 
determinants of efficiency using Tobit regression.  
 
II First Stage DEA Results 
 
DEA can be implemented by assuming either constant returns to scale (CRS) or 
variable returns to scale (VRS). This study indicates overall technical efficiency (TE) 
of each bank under CRS. Banker et al (1984) suggested the use of VRS that splits 
overall technical efficiency into a product of two components. The first is pure 
technical efficiency (PTE), sometimes referred to as technical efficiency, and relates 
to the ability of management to optimise the bank's given resources. The second is 
scale efficiency (SE) and refers to exploiting scale economies by operating at a point 
where the production frontier exhibits CRS. In several recent papers, DEA models are 
estimated under the assumption of VRS, while arguing CRS is only valid when all 
DMUs are operating at an optimal level. However, CRS allows the comparison 
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between large and small firms (Miller and Noulas, 1996). In the present study, the 
technical efficiency estimates are obtained under both CRS and VRS assumptions. 
 
Figures 20 through to 23 present the results from the four models that correspond to 
input/outputs selected on the basis of the intermediation approach. The average 
technical efficiency obtained by the CRS approach (excl. OBS activity) ranges 
between 0.57 (inefficiency score of 0.43) in 1992 and 0.73 (inefficiency score of 0.27) 
in 1998, with an overall mean over the study period equal to 0.61, as per Table 29. 
The CRS model results when OBS is included as an output variable increase with an 
average efficiency score of 0.72, with a low score of 0.68 (0.32 inefficiency) in 1992 
and the highest efficiency score seen in 1998 with 0.80 (0.20 inefficiency) as shown 
in Table 30. These global frontier results are similar to those of Lozano-Vivas et al 
(2002) who report an average inefficiency score of 0.34, while Weill et al (2004) 
report an average inefficiency score of 0.35. 
 
The corresponding figures for technical efficiency under the VRS approach 
(excluding OBS) ranges between 0.61 in 1992 and efficiency improves up to 0.79 by 
1998, with an overall mean efficiency of 0.67 (represented by the inefficiency score 
of 0.33 per Table 31). The average efficiency score when OBS is incorporated into the 
VRS model ranges between 0.71 and 0.85. The average efficiency score for the period 
of 1992 to 1998 is 0.76.  
 
The efficiency scores increase significantly when off-balance sheet items are 
considered as an additional output, with a mean of 0.72 under the CRS approach, and 
0.76 under the VRS approach. The inclusion of OBS activity as an additional output 
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increases the efficiency score on average by 0.11 under the CRS approach and by 0.09 
under the VRS approach. Under both CRS and VRS, the inclusion of OBS activity as 
an output variable results in a statistically significant result when the mean differences 
are compared. This result supports H8a in terms of OBS activity increasing the overall 
efficiency score of the sample and is consistent with the findings of Clark and Siems 
(2002). Therefore, in the sample period studied, banks could improve technical 
efficiency by 39% under CRS and by 33% under VRS, when excluding OBS activity 
as a variable. However, it is important to incorporate OBS items as an output variable 
(Clark and Siems, 2002) and under this approach, the sample on average could 
improve technical efficiency by 28% under the CRS approach, and by 24% under the 
VRS method. 
 
Figures 20 to 23 allow for the comparison of efficiency scores by country by year. 
The results indicate that in 1992, under the CRS intermediation approach, Belgium 
(inefficiency of 0.14) and Sweden (inefficiency of 0.23) had to highest TE levels in 
1992, whereas Italy was the lowest performer with an average inefficiency score of 
0.6 However, under a CRS approach that includes OBSA, Italy has a less extreme 
level of inefficiency, and although at the low end of the efficiency range, is similar to 
the inefficiency scores of Japan, the Netherlands and the United States. Under the 
VRS approach, Italy and the United States have the highest inefficiency score, 0.59 
and 0.40 respectively. Once again when OBSA variables the results for Italy are less 
extreme in terms of inefficiency levels. However, the United States continues to 
perform poorly in 1992 with an inefficiency score of 0.38. The low efficiency score 
would be expected considering the US was just moving out of a recession. 
(Unfortunately, no data was available for Canadian banks in the year 1992). 
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In 1993, the total efficiency score improves very slightly across all four DEA models, 
by close to 1% when compared to 1992. Italy continues to perform poorly in 1993 
with an average inefficiency score of 0.56 and 0.55 under CRS and VRS models with 
OBS activity, but does improve with the inclusion of OBSA with the inefficiency 
score moving down close to 0.3. When including OBSA Canada and the United States 
continue to be on the high end of the inefficiency scores with Canada scoring 0.30 and 
0.37 for the CRS and VRS approach. The United States reported an inefficiency score 
of 0.32 and 0.31 for CRS and VRS approaches, including OBSA. Belgium and 
Sweden continued to perform well in 1993 with inefficiency scores of sub 0.25 for 
CRS and VRS models without OBS, and below 0.2 when including OBS. 
 
Overall efficiency scores continued to improve in 1994 with efficiency improvements 
of 2% and over 4% in CRS and VRS models. For the models that included OBSA, the 
efficiency level improved by 1% and 4% under CRS and VRS respectively. In terms 
of the analysis by country, a similar theme continued with Italy being at the high end 
of the range of inefficiency scores (0.55) with the Netherlands and France also 
performing relatively poorly with inefficiency scores of above 0.5 under the CRS 
intermediation approach. Along with Italy, France and the United States performed 
relatively poorly under the CRS and VRS approaches the included OBSA. Once again 
Belgium and Sweden performed well through 1994 in terms of efficiency scores 
relative to other countries in the sample. The poor performance of Italy and France 
relative to other countries is consistent with the findings of Allen and Rai (1996) and 
Bikker (2002). Berg et al (1993) found Sweden to perform better other Nordic 
countries in terms of bank efficiency. Bukh et al (1995) also found Sweden to 
outperform Norway, Finland, and Denmark with an average efficiency score of 0.85.  
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For 1995, it is interesting to note that the trend of improving efficiency from 1992 is 
broken and inefficiency increases on average by 2% across all four models. Under TE 
without OBS, Italy, France and the Netherlands have inefficiency scores above 0.5. 
Under CRS with OBS, these countries remain at the high end of the range in terms of 
inefficiency, but with scores closer to 0.4. Under the VRS intermediation approach, 
Italy, France and Canada are the poorest performers. Once OBS is taken into account, 
the overall inefficiency scores improve, but in terms of ranking countries, the results 
remain the same with Belgium and Sweden shows the greatest level of efficiency, 
whereas, Italy, France and Canada continue to underperform. The results for Canada 
are somewhat conflicting with previous evidence: Bikker (2002) finds relatively high 
efficiency levels in Germany, Sweden and Canada.  
 
In 1996, the results show an overall improvement in efficiency scores, with the CRS 
and VRS results improving by over 1.5% and close to 5% respectively. When OBS is 
included the efficiency score improve by nearly 1% and 2% respectively under CRS 
and VRS. France, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands continue to under-perform with 
inefficiency scores of close to 0.5 (CRS). Under VRS, the Netherlands is more 
efficient, however, France, Canada and Italy have inefficiency scores above 0.4. The 
countries that do not perform well under CRS continue to hold a low efficiency 
ranking when considered under VRS and VRS_OBS. In 1996, Belgium, Sweden and 
Switzerland perform well with inefficiency scores of sub 0.3.  
 
Based on how volatile the financial markets were through 1997 the expectation would 
be for inefficiency levels to increase quite dramatically. However, the technical 
efficiency score continues to improve through time could argue that there is a time 
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trend variable in the efficiency results.  The theme continues with Belgium and the 
Nordic countries of Sweden and Switzerland show strong efficiency results as 
compared to other countries. Italy, France and Canada under-perform in all four 
efficiency models.  
 
One interesting result is the change in efficiency levels through time by country. 
Canadian inefficiency generally increases under the CRS model, whereas it improves 
slightly under the VRS model. France has a very consistent inefficiency score of close 
to 0.4 until 1998 when efficiency scores improve dramatically along with other 
countries. The efficiency scores of German banks improved through the study period 
and generally performed well with scores of less than 0.3. Italy was one of the lowest 
ranked countries on a consistent basis with inefficiency scores in excess of 0.5 for 
many of the years when not including OBS. This result is consistent with Bikker 
(2002). When including OBS, Italy struggled to get an inefficiency score below 0.4. 
The results for Japan were interesting in that efficiency scores on average were quite 
strong considering the level of volatility this country had through the latter part of the 
1990s. The average inefficiency score was 0.31 across all years and models. 1995 did 
see a move up in the inefficiency score, but on average Japan performed quite well 
versus other countries in the sample. The Netherlands did perform quite poorly 
through the study period with an average inefficiency score of 0.32, but as high as 
0.48 under the CRS approach. The trend was similar to others in terms of a general 
efficiency improvement through time. Sweden and Switzerland were consistently on 
the high end of the efficiency range with Sweden having an average inefficiency score 
of 0.19 and Switzerland with 0.26. The United Kingdom performed quite well 
through the study period with an inefficiency score of 0.3 across all four DEA 
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approaches. As per the other countries, the United Kingdom banks saw an increase in 
overall efficiency through 1997 and 1998. The United States was one of countries that 
showed a clear trend in improvement through the period of study with an inefficiency 
score of 0.44 in 1992 (CRS) and improving to 0.31 by 1998. There was a strong 
change in efficiency scores to the upside from 1996 through to 1998. On average the 
US bank sample had an average inefficiency score of 0.32, which is similar to the 
findings of Aly et al (1990) and Berger (1995) who find inefficiency scores of 0.35 
and 0.39 respectively.  
 
III Stock Performance and DEA scores 
 
Table 32 details the results of regressing bank efficiency scores on the stock 
performance of each bank. Based on the results, H9a is rejected as no statistically 
significant relationship is found.  This is in contrast to the findings of Beccalli, Casu, 
and Girardone (2006), whose results suggest that percentage change in stock prices 
reflect percentage change in cost efficiency, particularly those derived from DEA. 
However, other studies have indicated significant results when examining the 
percentage change in stock prices against the percentage change in efficiency levels. 
The expectation would be for efficient banks to be more profitable and therefore 
generate higher shareholder returns. A small amount of studies have examined the 
relationship between efficiency and share performance, especially on a cross-country 
sample. Adenso-Diez and Gascon (1997) establish a link between stock performance 
in Spanish banks and efficiency. However, the main findings suggest that the most 
influential variable in determining stock performance is bank specific risk. Beccalli, 
Casu, and Girardone (2006) investigate bank stock performance against the yearly 
change in efficiency. However, instead of using annual returns, the study looks at 
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yearly returns by using the sum of daily returns for the period of investigation, due to 
daily returns having a smaller volatility. The results of Beccalli, Casu, and Girardone 
(2006) suggest that changes in stock performance reflect changes in bank efficiency. 
This thesis regressed annual returns against bank efficiency and may be why 
insignificant results were found for this relationship.  
 
IV Second Stage DEA Results 
 
In order to investigate the determinants of efficiency this study constructs an 
econometric model with technical efficiency as the dependent variable. As in previous 
studies, due to the limited nature of the efficiency measure (i.e. 0 and 1) Tobit 
analysis is employed. This study examines the influence of the external environment 
of each country to determine the impact on efficiency. The other variables that are 
regressed against efficiency are the VaR results and also a dummy variable for when 
the 1996 Market Risk Amendment was introduced.  
 
Table 33 presents the Tobit regression results for the CRS and CRS_OBS approaches. 
Table 34 presents the Tobit regression results for the VRS and VRS_OBS approaches. 
The results shown in Tables 33 and 34 are for the total sample of banks across all G-
10 countries. The results by country are shown in the Appendices III to XII for 
reference.  
 
Bos and Kool (2006) stated that this second-stage approach allows for tests of 
significance of each environmental variable as well as the combined impact of all 
these variables on efficiency. This study regresses GDP, CPI, unemployment rates, 
and industrial production on the efficiency scores. Industrial production has a 
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negative, but weak, statistical relationship with inefficiency. The sample results also 
show that inflation (CPI) is positively related with inefficiency. Lensink et al, (2007) 
find that inflation has a negative impact on profit efficiency and the growth of GDP is 
positively correlated with profit efficiency. The argument being that in countries that 
are more prosperous, banks have better access to new technology and capital which 
ultimately have positive influence on efficiency levels. In terms of inflation, stable 
macroeconomic conditions and financial development contribute to higher efficiency, 
and a higher degree of market competition (Flamini, McDonald, and Schumacher, 
2008). Inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic stability, and is directly related to 
the interest rate levels and, thus, interest expense and revenue of financial institutions. 
As a result, macroeconomic instability would, in general, have an adverse impact on 
banking sector performance. Claessens and Laeven (2004) show that a higher 
inflation level tends to lower bank efficiency. A bank’s ability to manage interest rate 
risk under inflationary conditions can also affect its cost structure and would be an 
interesting avenue for future research.  
 
This set of results for the macro-economic variables does suggest efficiency scores are 
dependent on non-bank specific factors. The results from the Tobit regression support 
H10a based on the strength of the relationship between efficiency and inflation and to 
a certain degree, industrial production. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) note that 
under favourable economic conditions, such as strong GDP and industrial production, 
will positively affect the demand for bank services, and improve bank efficiency. In 
terms of inflation, Kasman and Yildirim (2006) argue that high inflation may affect 
bank behaviour and induce banks to compete excessively to improve margins, but end 
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up impacting overall efficiency. The findings of this study support Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006). 
 
One key finding is the relationship between inefficiency and VaR. Table 34 shows a 
statistically significant relationship, which is positive. Due to the fact that the VaR 
measure is inherently negative, this relationship suggests that as risk declines, i.e. 
VaR trends towards zero, the level of inefficiency (efficiency) increases (declines). It 
has been argued that the incorporation of risk is very important in studies of banking 
efficiency and failure to account for risk can have a significant impact on relative 
efficiency scores (Drake and Simper, 2003). DEA measures of efficiency are based on 
estimates of the degree to which the bank under analysis could have produced more 
outputs relative to its input levels or to the degree that the bank could have used less 
input for its overall output level. In terms of profitability and return a certain level of 
risk needs to be taken. As risk is increased within the institution, either through 
trading or diversifying the business, the expectation would be for the level of 
performance to subsequently increase and hence the expectation of a statistical 
relationship between a bank’s VaR and level of efficiency. Furthermore, Barth, et al 
(2004) found that restrictions on banking activities tend to reduce banking sector 
efficiency. Given a bank’s ability to produce, the amount of risk it takes on can 
change the efficiency results significantly. This result supports H11a and indicates 
that one of the key determinants of efficiency is risk. 
 
The Tobit results indicate that the higher capital stringency from the Market Risk 
Amendment increases (decreases) bank (in)efficiency based on the negative 
coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence, and 
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supports H12a. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies on bank 
performance and efficiency in terms of regulation enhancing private monitoring and 
subsequently technical efficiency (Levine, 2004).  
 
V DEA Results Conclusion 
 
A vast majority of bank efficiency studies focus on individual countries, and mainly 
the United States. Although in recent years a growing number of studies examine 
cross-country samples. Many of these studies recognise the importance of considering 
environmental variables when estimating efficiency. This study employs DEA and 
Tobit regression to examine the impact of regulations, risk and macro-economic 
variables on commercial banks’ efficiency.  
 
The results of DEA indicate that the average bank in sample could improve its overall 
technical efficiency by 0.39 under CRS and 0.33 under VRS. The inclusion of an 
OBSA variable improves the efficiency score significantly.  
 
The results from the Tobit model suggests inflation has a strong negative impact on 
efficiency, whereas, there is a somewhat positive relationship with industrial 
production. The results provide evidence in favour of the 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment and the impact on efficiency. Finally, the findings support the inclusion 
of a risk variable to explain efficiency levels, and VaR has a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. 
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Figure 20 Average DEA Score by Year by Country (CRS Model excluding OBSA) 
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Figure 21 Average DEA Score by Year by Country (CRS Model including OBSA) 
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Figure 22 Average DEA Score by Year by Country (VRS Model excluding OBSA) 
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Figure 23 Average DEA Score by Year by Country (VRS Model including OBSA) 
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Figure 24 Total Sample Results 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.39 0.28 0.33 0.24 2.36 1.85 0.68 6.65 -0.004
 Median 0.41 0.30 0.34 0.25 2.53 1.74 0.47 6.10 -0.001
 Maximum 0.83 0.57 0.82 0.56 15.53 6.63 13.02 12.08 0.349
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.08 -2.31 -6.87 2.15 -0.339
 Std. Dev. 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.14 1.84 1.45 3.10 2.93 0.066
 Skewness -0.47 -0.61 -0.07 -0.18 0.98 0.40 -0.08 0.31 -0.653
 Kurtosis 3.34 3.31 2.62 2.35 12.29 4.42 5.37 1.89 7.587
 Jarque-Bera 20.93 33.57 3.50 11.69 1920.62 56.65 120.49 34.56 484.210
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000
 Sum 198.95 144.35 166.31 120.64 1206.01 946.67 346.21 3399.03 -1.836
 Sum Sq. Dev. 14.66 7.47 17.88 9.81 1732.82 1075.42 4900.58 4392.89 2.205
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Table 29 Tests for Equality of Means: CRS model with and without OBS activity 
 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series df Value Probability
t-test 1020 11.594 0.00
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 922.6155 11.594 0.00
Anova F-test (1, 1020) 134.422 0.00
Welch F-test* (1, 922.616) 134.422 0.00
*Test allows for unequal cell variances
Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 1 2.917 2.917
Within 1020 22.137 0.022
Total 1021 25.054 0.025
Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DEA__UNDER_CRS 511 0.38934 0.169568 0.007501
CRS_OBS 511 0.282486 0.121044 0.005355
All 1022 0.335913 0.156648 0.0049  
 
Table 30 Tests for Equality of Means: VRS model with and without OBS activity 
 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series df Value Probability
t-test 1020 8.669 0
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 940.2346 8.669 0
Anova F-test (1, 1020) 75.148 0
Welch F-test* (1, 940.235) 75.148 0
*Test allows for unequal cell variances
Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 1 2.041 2.041
Within 1020 27.697 0.027
Total 1021 29.737 0.029
Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
VRS 511 0.325458 0.187251 0.008283
VRS_OBS 511 0.23609 0.138726 0.006137
All 1022 0.280774 0.170663 0.005338  
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Table 31 Stock Performance and Bank Efficiency Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.007065 0.007295 -0.96838 0.333
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.008919 0.017182 0.519063 0.604
R-squared 0.000529     Mean dependent var -0.004
Adjusted R-squared -0.001435     S.D. dependent var 0.066
S.E. of regression 0.065796     Akaike info criterion -2.601
Sum squared resid 2.203534     Schwarz criterion -2.584
Log likelihood 666.4538     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.594
F-statistic 0.269427     Durbin-Watson stat 1.116
Prob(F-statistic) 0.603942
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.007144 0.007669 -0.93147 0.35
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.00923 0.015545 0.593773 0.55
AR(1) 0.442045 0.039863 11.08918 0.00
R-squared 0.195772     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.192599     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.059137     Akaike info criterion -2.81
Sum squared resid 1.773072     Schwarz criterion -2.79
Log likelihood 720.0741     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.80
F-statistic 61.70906     Durbin-Watson stat 2.01
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Inverted AR Roots 0.44
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.009144 0.007393 -1.23677 0.217
CRS_OBS 0.019652 0.02406 0.816776 0.414
R-squared 0.001309     Mean dependent var -0.004
Adjusted R-squared -0.000653     S.D. dependent var 0.066
S.E. of regression 0.065771     Akaike info criterion -2.601
Sum squared resid 2.201815     Schwarz criterion -2.585
Log likelihood 666.6533     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.595
F-statistic 0.667123     Durbin-Watson stat 1.116
Prob(F-statistic) 0.414438
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.008561 0.007661 -1.11745 0.26
CRS_OBS 0.01774 0.021411 0.828566 0.41
AR(1) 0.441945 0.039869 11.08502 0.00
R-squared 0.196302     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.193131     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.059118     Akaike info criterion -2.81
Sum squared resid 1.771904     Schwarz criterion -2.79
Log likelihood 720.2421     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.80
F-statistic 61.91682     Durbin-Watson stat 2.01
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Inverted AR Roots 0.44  
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Table 32 Tobit Regression Results. CRS and CRS_OBS Model Results. Total Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.394922 0.026532 14.88487 0.000
GDP -0.000783 0.004315 -0.181475 0.856
CPI 0.011087 0.005145 2.154837 0.031
INDP -0.004597 0.002567 -1.790873 0.073
UNE 0.002297 0.002636 0.871223 0.384
VAR 0.449658 0.313341 1.435042 0.151
MRA -0.075961 0.017189 -4.419158 0.000
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.161736 0.005059 31.96874 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.38934     S.D. dependent var 0.170
S.E. of regression 0.163017     Akaike info criterion -0.774
Sum squared resid 13.36696     Schwarz criterion -0.708
Log likelihood 205.8579     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.748
Avg. log likelihood 0.402853
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 511      Total obs 511
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.279244 0.018873 14.79593 0.000
GDP 0.00019 0.003069 0.061797 0.951
CPI 0.010385 0.00366 2.837664 0.005
INDP -0.003008 0.001826 -1.647525 0.100
UNE 0.001455 0.001875 0.775845 0.438
VAR 0.226302 0.222891 1.015303 0.310
MRA -0.057428 0.012227 -4.696735 0.000
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.115049 0.003599 31.96874 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.282486     S.D. dependent var 0.121
S.E. of regression 0.11596     Akaike info criterion -1.456
Sum squared resid 6.763689     Schwarz criterion -1.389
Log likelihood 379.9091     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.430
Avg. log likelihood 0.743462
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 511      Total obs 511  
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Table 33 Tobit Regression Results. VRS and VRS_OBS Model Results. Total Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.326348 0.028966 11.26657 0.000
GDP -0.001865 0.004711 -0.395962 0.692
CPI 0.012489 0.005617 2.223458 0.026
INDP -0.005359 0.002802 -1.912272 0.056
UNE 0.004753 0.002878 1.651316 0.099
VAR 0.740484 0.34209 2.164588 0.030
MRA -0.0837 0.018766 -4.460191 0.000
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.176575 0.005523 31.96874 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.325458     S.D. dependent var 0.187
S.E. of regression 0.177973     Akaike info criterion -0.599
Sum squared resid 15.9323     Schwarz criterion -0.533
Log likelihood 161.0018     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.573
Avg. log likelihood 0.315072
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 511      Total obs 511
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.239531 0.021511 11.13526 0.000
GDP 0.000377 0.003498 0.10775 0.914
CPI 0.012287 0.004171 2.945613 0.003
INDP -0.003642 0.002081 -1.749924 0.080
UNE 0.001443 0.002137 0.675065 0.500
VAR 0.540575 0.254046 2.127858 0.033
MRA -0.05933 0.013936 -4.257221 0.000
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.13113 0.004102 31.96874 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.23609     S.D. dependent var 0.139
S.E. of regression 0.132169     Akaike info criterion -1.194
Sum squared resid 8.78667     Schwarz criterion -1.128
Log likelihood 313.0531     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.168
Avg. log likelihood 0.612628
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 511      Total obs 511  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis set out to examine the impact of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
(MRA) on the equity returns of commercial bank shareholders within G-10. The 
changing nature of bank risk and efficiency levels through the period 1992 to 1998 
was also considered. Furthermore, the determinants of bank efficiency were 
evaluated. 
 
The first objective of this thesis was to evaluate the 4 key announcements made by the 
Basle Committee that ultimately led to the passage of the MRA. This was achieved 
via measuring the impact on equity returns using event-study analysis.  
 
The first announcement suggested that banks use a standardized VaR approach to 
allocate market risk capital. However, this method appeared restrictive and dated 
when compared with the risk measurement systems already utilized by the majority of 
large successful banks. The findings for the reaction to the first announcement period 
show that equity returns in Germany and the US were significantly negatively 
affected. At this point, US banks had the largest derivative exposure in addition to the 
most sophisticated risk management systems, therefore, a negative reaction was to be 
expected because a standardized approach would result in increased capital allocation 
and lessen their competitive edge in risk measurement. On the other hand, the 
Japanese bank sample showed a significant positive reaction to the first 
announcement. A possible reason for this is that the Japanese financial system was in 
a state of crisis at the time due to a series of bad debts and inflationary pressures. The 
MRA would likely increase the transparency and safety of these banks, hence their 
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positive reaction. There were no other notable reactions following the first 
announcement.  
 
The second announcement allowed banks to use their own internal models approach 
to calculate market risk. The results of the analysis show that banks responded 
favourably to this announcement, as would be expected due to the freedom and 
flexibility such a proposal would provide. Commercial banks in France, Italy, 
Switzerland, and the United States experienced the most significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns around this event.  
 
The third announcement was a joint proposal by Basle and IOSCO that aimed to 
increase the level of transparency within the financial industry by providing a series 
of mechanisms for measuring and reporting market risk. This time the overall reaction 
was mixed with banks in Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United States showing 
significant positive returns over the even period. Significant negative returns were 
noted for the sample of banks in Canada, France, and Italy.  The positive trend 
continued for Japan where regulatory changes that served to increase overall 
transparency and allocate additional capital were needed and consequently, well 
received.  
 
The fourth announcement was the final proposal that led to the implementation of the 
MRA. It allowed banks to use their own internal risk models to calculate market risk, 
but applied strict rules for calculating market risk, and required a somewhat arbitrary 
multiplication factor of three, to take into account event risk. Once again the results 
were conflicting, with significant negative returns for commercial banks in Canada, 
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Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, whereas the sample of banks in 
Germany, France, and Japan experienced significant positive abnormal returns over 
the last event period. Again, there appears to be a common theme, whereby banks 
within the US and Canada experience significant negative abnormal returns as 
reaction to potentially more restrictive regulation, whereas Japan consistently reacted 
in a positive manner to the prospect of market risk regulation.  
 
Based on the findings above, this study differs from existing literature in several 
ways: First, it considers a sample of large commercial banks in eleven developed 
countries as opposed to being limited to one specific country. Second, it examines 
four major announcements leading up to the formation of the 1996 MRA. Third, this 
thesis examines the financial impact of a key change in bank capital regulation, which 
enhances our understanding of the potential impact of future regulatory changes.  
 
The second objective of this thesis was to investigate the risk profile of G-10 
commercial banks. This objective was achieved by employing a three-factor multi-
index model and then applying the factor coefficients to four different VaR 
methodologies. The analysis covered the period 1992 to 1998 and results highlight the 
extent to which market risk, interest and foreign exchange rate changes impact bank 
VaR.  
 
In order to mitigate some of the weaknesses inherent in VaR, this study employed 
four VaR methodologies to estimate each bank’s average weekly VaR. The four 
approaches were parametric, historical simulation (HS), Monte Carlo (MC), and 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT). The results indicate that the parametric and HS 
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approaches consistently underestimate VaR as compared to MC and EVT. This result 
is consistent with previous literature. The VaR results were displayed in weekly 
average VaR as a percentage of equity at risk, enabling comparisons to be made 
across countries. For the entire sample, the average Monte Carlo (MC) VaR through 
the period 1992 to 1996 was -2.52%. However, 1997 saw a significant increase in risk 
up to an overall average weekly VaR of -4.31%. The VaR results for 1998 continued 
to increase and moved up to -4.67%. In terms of ranking the countries by risk level, 
the sample of Japanese banks ranked highest. The second highest risk rating was 
Sweden, particularly during the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. The US by far had the 
lowest risk ranking, and Sweden ranked second lowest. The sample of banks in 
France and Germany also held relatively low risk. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
the movement by banks into non-traditional activities would result in increased risk, 
the results show that risk increased throughout the study period and peaked in the 
years 1997 and 1998. However, this period also coincided with a time of high 
financial volatility, which may also have impacted risk levels. In addition, the results 
showed that the equity values of banks were less dependent on interest rate and 
foreign exchange rate volatility than at the start of the study period, again supporting 
the hypothesis that banks have become less dependent on traditional methods for 
achieving returns.  
 
In sum, the key contribution of this thesis in regard to measuring risk is that the 
analysis employed four different VaR methodologies to measure risk. This allowed 
for comparisons to be made across time, country and bank if required. However, the 
results highlight the fact that comparison of risk cannot be made across institutions 
unless there is a common approach to measurement of VaR.  
 190
Given the more competitive banking environment and volatility within financial 
markets, there has been an incentive for banks to focus on improving efficiency in 
addition to rigorously monitoring their risk profile and exposure. This third objective 
of this thesis was to estimate commercial bank efficiency by applying Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to bank-level data for commercial banks in G-10 
countries. This study also examines the impact of off-balance-sheet activities (OBS) 
and estimates efficiency levels with and without this variable.  
 
The analysis was carried out over the period 1992 to 1998. Results indicate that the 
mean technical inefficiency under the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and (VRS) is 
39% and 33% respectively: a result that is broadly in line with the main literature on 
bank efficiency, where the average inefficiency score is 0.30 (Goddard et al., 2007).  
Inefficiency results are significantly lower when an OBS variable is incorporated, 
with a CRS_OBS and VRS_OBS inefficiency score of 0.28 and 0.24 respectively; 
with the mean differences for both CRS and VRS models significantly different with 
the inclusion of the OBS output variable. The results indicate efficiency models that 
do not incorporate an OBS output variable will result in an underestimation of bank 
efficiency levels.  
 
Finally, the last objective of the thesis was to explain the variation in calculated 
efficiency scores by considering explanatory variables such as macro-economic 
indicators, VaR, and regulatory change through a Tobit regression approach. The 
overall sample results show that inflation (CPI) is positively related with inefficiency. 
Industrial production has a negative, but weak, statistical relationship with 
inefficiency and is consistent with the findings of Kasman and Yildirim (2006). One 
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key finding is the positive impact of the MRA dummy variable on efficiency. This 
result is consistent with the findings of previous studies on bank performance and 
efficiency in terms of regulation enhancing private monitoring and subsequently 
technical efficiency (Barth et al, 2004, Levine, 2004). This study finds that VaR is 
negatively correlated with inefficiency, indicating that inefficient banks appear to take 
on less risk. It is apparent that there are large differences in risk and efficiency within 
the commercial banks of the US, Japan, Canada and the EU.  
 
This study adds to the efficiency literature by evaluating bank efficiency levels in 
commercial banks within G-10 while taking into account OBS activity. Furthermore, 
this thesis attempts to expand the established literature on the determinants of bank 
efficiency by considering macro-economic variables, each bank’s VaR, in addition to 
incorporating a dummy variable for the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. The Tobit 
regression results show that inflation, VaR, and bank capital regulation are key 
determinants of bank efficiency. These results suggest the need to incorporate similar 
explanatory variables when attempting to evaluate the determinants of efficiency 
scores.  
 
Understanding the impact of bank capital regulation, the changing risk profile of 
banks and the determinants of efficiency should assist investors and regulators when 
monitoring future changes in the banking industry. In terms of direction for future 
research, it would be interesting to examine the changes in banks’ market risk since 
the inception of the MRA. Furthermore, a future study might consider the VaR of 
specific banks that have certain levels of capitalisation, large derivative exposure and 
how this relates to bank efficiency levels.  
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This findings of this thesis have been significant regarding the relationships between 
bank capital regulation, risk and bank efficiency. However, it is important to note the 
limitations of the US bank sample that are likely to have implications for the analysis. 
Whereby the analysis may suffer from sample-selection bias resulting from the fact 
that some of the banks are poorly represented, specifically within the US bank sample 
with many of these banks falling under the ‘commercial bank’ category, but some of 
which operate as trading or investment banks.  
 
By acknowledging the presence of the problems the aim is to provide a strong 
framework for analyzing bank efficiency and risk by, among other analysis, 
determining potential problems as the results are analysed. With these caveats in mind 
the results of the US bank sample are concerning and may be due to the following and 
would be worthy of future research. The level of capital held in US banks was 
relatively high in the early 1990s and as a result places less risk on both the 
shareholders and the government safety net. Furthermore, (Hansel and Krahnen, 
2007) find that countries, such as the US, that are considered to be market-based 
economies, the systematic risk may be significantly smaller and as a result have a 
material impact on the VaR calculations. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I Event-Study Interest Rate Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Interest-Rate Sensitivity Over the Estimation Period Prior to Each Event
Interest-rate sensitivities over each estimation period using the methodology
described in equation (1) of Chapter 3. 
For each announcement, each banksÕ interest-rate sensitivity is calculated as the coefficient 
from a two-factor model of returns. The below states the mean for the country specific sample
1st Event 2nd Event 3rd Event 4th Event
Belgium -0.024 -0.027 0.052 -0.007
Canada -0.128 -0.261 -0.448 -0.279
France -0.052 -0.084 -0.044 -0.082
Germany -0.399 0.045 -0.029 0.005
Italy -0.036 -0.124 -0.156 -0.131
Japan -0.023 0.036 -0.007 -0.002
Netherlands 0.002 -0.219 -0.034 -0.198
Sweden -0.127 -1.172 -1.224 -1.308
Switzerland -0.036 -0.047 -0.048 -0.021
United Kingdom 0.021 -0.079 0.006 0.008
United States 0.0288 0.0829 0.0219 0.0527
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Appendix II Three Factor Betas: United States Sample Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Betas by Bank by Year Market Beta Interest Rate Beta Foreign Exchange Beta
1992
Associated Bank 0.243 1.77 0.074 0.53 -0.098 -0.70
Bancorp South -0.075 -0.53 0.405 3.13** -0.102 -0.73
Bank of America 0.143 1.02 0.126 0.90 -0.245 -1.79
Bank of New York 0.010 0.07 -0.086 -0.61 -0.111 -0.79
BB&T -0.052 -0.37 -0.015 -0.11 0.121 0.86
BOK Financial 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Charles Schwab 0.109 0.77 -0.031 -0.22 -0.025 -0.17
Colonial Bancorp -0.062 -0.44 -0.152 -1.08 -0.105 -0.75
Comerica 0.152 1.09 -0.068 -0.48 0.077 0.55
Commerce Bancorp -0.022 -0.15 0.168 1.21 -0.124 -0.88
Commerce Bankshares -0.015 -0.11 0.163 1.17 -0.093 -0.66
Compass Bankshares 0.039 0.28 0.068 0.48 -0.025 -0.17
Countrywide 0.197 1.42 0.049 0.35 -0.089 -0.63
Downey Financial 0.032 0.23 0.020 0.14 0.107 0.76
Fifth Third 0.205 1.48 -0.115 -0.82 0.102 0.72
First Horizon -0.093 -0.66 0.119 0.85 -0.140 -1.00
Fulton Financial -0.142 -1.02 0.010 0.07 -0.020 -0.14
Huntington Bankshares -0.150 -1.07 -0.146 -1.05 0.087 0.62
Keycorp Financial 0.044 0.31 0.043 0.31 -0.002 -0.01
Marshall and Iisley 0.051 0.36 -0.053 -0.38 0.115 0.82
Merrill Lynch -0.092 -0.65 -0.120 -0.85 -0.119 -0.85
National City 0.111 0.79 0.034 0.24 -0.059 -0.42
Northern Trust 0.069 0.49 0.042 0.30 0.016 0.12
PnC FinServices -0.110 -0.78 0.058 0.41 0.132 0.94
Popular Inc 0.071 0.50 0.181 1.30 -0.099 -0.71
Regions Financial 0.071 0.50 -0.196 -1.41 -0.110 -0.78
Sovereign Bancorp 0.223 1.62 0.100 0.71 -0.315 -2.35**
State Street 0.028 0.20 0.036 0.25 -0.064 -0.46
Suntrust Bank 0.185 1.33 -0.060 -0.42 0.209 1.51
Synovus Bank -0.185 -1.33 -0.048 -0.34 -0.168 -1.20
TCF Financial 0.027 0.19 -0.136 -0.97 0.144 1.03
US Bancorp 0.249 1.81 -0.077 -0.55 0.016 0.11
Wachovia 0.193 1.39 0.174 1.25 -0.107 -0.76
Washington Mutual -0.082 -0.58 -0.040 -0.28 0.003 0.02
Wells Fargo 0.206 1.49 0.152 1.09 -0.248 -1.81
Zion Corp 0.139 0.99 0.084 0.60 0.046 0.33
Estimation of Three Factor Capital Asset Pricing Model
  
itR = itα + mtβ mjtR + rtβ rjtR xt+β xjtR + itu
 195
3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993
Associated Bank -0.196 -1.42 0.070 0.49 -0.247 -1.81
Bancorp South 0.043 0.30 0.018 0.13 -0.070 -0.50
Bank of America 0.180 1.29 -0.052 -0.37 -0.180 -1.29
Bank of New York -0.078 -0.55 -0.028 -0.20 0.054 0.38
BB&T -0.047 -0.33 0.114 0.81 -0.219 -1.59
BOK Financial 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Charles Schwab 0.140 1.00 -0.174 -1.25 -0.099 -0.70
Colonial Bancorp -0.084 -0.60 -0.012 -0.08 -0.226 -1.64
Comerica 0.028 0.20 0.036 0.25 -0.153 -1.10
Commerce Bancorp -0.061 -0.43 -0.229 -1.66 -0.046 -0.33
Commerce Bankshares 0.261 1.91 0.031 0.22 -0.114 -0.81
Compass Bankshares -0.081 -0.57 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.01
Countrywide 0.305 2.26** -0.247 -1.80 0.054 0.38
Downey Financial -0.007 -0.05 -0.046 -0.32 -0.012 -0.08
Fifth Third -0.218 -1.58 0.160 1.15 -0.300 -2.22**
First Horizon -0.037 -0.26 -0.010 -0.07 0.054 0.38
Fulton Financial 0.184 1.32 -0.132 -0.94 0.025 0.18
Huntington Bankshares -0.111 -0.79 -0.034 -0.24 0.087 0.62
Keycorp Financial -0.225 -1.64 0.010 0.07 -0.033 -0.23
Marshall and Iisley 0.082 0.58 -0.191 -1.38 -0.104 -0.74
Merrill Lynch -0.106 -0.75 -0.136 -0.97 0.050 0.36
National City 0.009 0.06 0.144 1.03 0.010 0.07
Northern Trust 0.126 0.90 0.028 0.20 -0.263 -1.93
PnC FinServices -0.085 -0.61 0.072 0.51 -0.158 -1.13
Popular Inc -0.065 -0.46 0.058 0.41 -0.096 -0.68
Regions Financial 0.180 1.29 0.209 1.51 -0.194 -1.40
Sovereign Bancorp 0.054 0.38 -0.110 -0.78 -0.047 -0.34
State Street 0.042 0.30 0.125 0.89 -0.156 -1.11
Suntrust Bank 0.111 0.79 0.010 0.07 -0.074 -0.53
Synovus Bank -0.120 -0.86 -0.159 -1.14 0.042 0.30
TCF Financial 0.060 0.42 -0.034 -0.24 0.059 0.42
US Bancorp 0.143 1.03 0.004 0.03 -0.200 -1.44
Wachovia 0.297 2.20** -0.034 -0.24 -0.379 -2.90**
Washington Mutual 0.069 0.49 0.061 0.43 -0.023 -0.16
Wells Fargo -0.150 -1.08 -0.170 -1.22 -0.234 -1.71
Zion Corp 0.227 1.65 -0.161 -1.16 -0.070 -0.50
Market Beta Interest Rate Beta Foreign Exchange Beta
 196
3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1994
Associated Bank 0.119 0.85 0.100 0.71 0.063 0.45
Bancorp South -0.134 -0.95 -0.039 -0.28 -0.046 -0.33
Bank of America -0.158 -1.13 0.217 1.57 -0.034 -0.24
Bank of New York -0.021 -0.15 -0.172 -1.23 0.011 0.08
BB&T 0.087 0.62 0.073 0.52 -0.181 -1.30
BOK Financial -0.092 -0.65 0.110 0.78 0.028 0.20
Charles Schwab -0.283 -2.09** 0.286 2.11** -0.103 -0.73
Colonial Bancorp -0.120 -0.86 0.127 0.90 -0.008 -0.06
Comerica 0.218 1.58 0.071 0.50 0.001 0.01
Commerce Bancorp 0.198 1.43 -0.175 -1.26 -0.063 -0.45
Commerce Bankshares -0.176 -1.26 0.062 0.44 0.123 0.88
Compass Bankshares -0.041 -0.29 -0.106 -0.76 -0.054 -0.38
Countrywide -0.246 -1.79 0.003 0.02 -0.154 -1.10
Downey Financial 0.302 2.24** -0.123 -0.88 -0.242 -1.76
Fifth Third 0.047 0.33 -0.093 -0.66 0.135 0.96
First Horizon 0.331 2.48** -0.074 -0.52 0.194 1.40
Fulton Financial -0.160 -1.15 0.147 1.05 -0.240 -1.75
Huntington Bankshares 0.183 1.31 -0.088 -0.62 -0.277 -2.04**
Keycorp Financial 0.070 0.50 0.082 0.58 -0.009 -0.06
Marshall and Iisley -0.125 -0.89 0.107 0.76 -0.094 -0.67
Merrill Lynch 0.227 1.65 -0.086 -0.61 -0.144 -1.03
National City -0.307 -2.28** 0.235 1.71 -0.208 -1.51
Northern Trust 0.204 1.47 -0.080 -0.57 -0.124 -0.89
PnC FinServices 0.043 0.30 0.040 0.28 -0.159 -1.14
Popular Inc -0.257 -1.88 0.111 0.79 0.002 0.01
Regions Financial -0.153 -1.09 0.104 0.74 -0.113 -0.80
Sovereign Bancorp -0.258 -1.89 0.217 1.57 -0.147 -1.05
State Street 0.021 0.15 -0.030 -0.21 -0.038 -0.27
Suntrust Bank 0.061 0.43 -0.023 -0.16 0.173 1.24
Synovus Bank -0.048 -0.34 0.101 0.72 0.163 1.17
TCF Financial 0.025 0.18 0.054 0.38 0.133 0.95
US Bancorp -0.240 -1.75 0.200 1.45 -0.236 -1.72
Wachovia -0.173 -1.24 0.225 1.63 -0.191 -1.37
Washington Mutual 0.056 0.39 -0.065 -0.46 -0.213 -1.54
Wells Fargo -0.153 -1.10 0.334 2.51** -0.126 -0.90
Zion Corp -0.265 -1.95 0.079 0.56 -0.157 -1.13
Market Beta Interest Rate Beta Foreign Exchange Beta
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3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995
Associated Bank 0.212 1.53 0.015 0.11 -0.042 -0.29
Bancorp South 0.109 0.77 -0.214 -1.55 -0.278 -2.05**
Bank of America 0.178 1.28 -0.090 -0.64 -0.117 -0.83
Bank of New York 0.160 1.15 0.005 0.04 -0.160 -1.14
BB&T 0.127 0.91 -0.048 -0.34 -0.186 -1.34
BOK Financial 0.043 0.30 0.026 0.18 0.045 0.32
Charles Schwab -0.242 -1.77 0.076 0.54 0.115 0.82
Colonial Bancorp 0.089 0.63 -0.336 -2.52** -0.269 -1.98
Comerica 0.032 0.22 -0.115 -0.82 -0.061 -0.43
Commerce Bancorp -0.184 -1.33 0.232 1.68 -0.219 -1.59
Commerce Bankshares 0.009 0.06 -0.090 -0.64 -0.082 -0.58
Compass Bankshares -0.096 -0.68 0.071 0.50 -0.124 -0.89
Countrywide 0.040 0.29 -0.204 -1.47 0.007 0.05
Downey Financial 0.096 0.68 -0.192 -1.38 -0.009 -0.06
Fifth Third -0.042 -0.30 -0.020 -0.14 0.121 0.86
First Horizon 0.126 0.90 0.013 0.09 -0.042 -0.30
Fulton Financial -0.156 -1.12 0.220 1.60 -0.131 -0.93
Huntington Bankshares -0.164 -1.17 -0.005 -0.04 -0.090 -0.64
Keycorp Financial -0.115 -0.82 0.168 1.21 -0.073 -0.52
Marshall and Iisley 0.036 0.26 0.163 1.17 -0.107 -0.76
Merrill Lynch 0.256 1.88 -0.061 -0.43 -0.240 -1.75
National City 0.104 0.74 -0.098 -0.69 0.130 0.93
Northern Trust -0.173 -1.24 -0.004 -0.03 0.062 0.44
PnC FinServices 0.030 0.21 0.054 0.38 -0.195 -1.41
Popular Inc -0.136 -0.97 0.184 1.32 -0.199 -1.43
Regions Financial 0.103 0.74 -0.028 -0.20 -0.134 -0.96
Sovereign Bancorp 0.155 1.11 -0.030 -0.21 -0.245 -1.79
State Street 0.012 0.08 0.090 0.64 -0.163 -1.16
Suntrust Bank -0.116 -0.82 0.062 0.44 -0.064 -0.46
Synovus Bank 0.147 1.05 -0.113 -0.80 -0.172 -1.23
TCF Financial 0.113 0.80 0.117 0.83 -0.071 -0.50
US Bancorp -0.041 -0.29 0.158 1.13 -0.130 -0.93
Wachovia -0.132 -0.94 0.171 1.23 0.002 0.01
Washington Mutual 0.120 0.85 -0.125 -0.89 -0.025 -0.18
Wells Fargo 0.030 0.21 0.062 0.44 -0.085 -0.60
Zion Corp -0.001 -0.01 0.088 0.63 0.135 0.96
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3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996
Associated Bank 0.220 1.59 -0.151 -1.08 -0.301 -2.23**
Bancorp South -0.020 -0.14 -0.074 -0.53 -0.162 -1.16
Bank of America 0.149 1.06 -0.128 -0.91 -0.170 -1.22
Bank of New York 0.014 0.10 0.022 0.15 0.086 0.61
BB&T 0.119 0.85 0.056 0.40 0.061 0.43
BOK Financial 0.279 2.05** -0.053 -0.38 0.020 0.14
Charles Schwab 0.106 0.75 -0.177 -1.27 0.001 0.00
Colonial Bancorp 0.161 1.16 -0.138 -0.98 0.420 3.27**
Comerica 0.092 0.65 0.027 0.19 0.032 0.22
Commerce Bancorp 0.022 0.16 0.049 0.34 -0.106 -0.75
Commerce Bankshares 0.005 0.04 -0.161 -1.15 0.221 1.60
Compass Bankshares 0.083 0.59 0.078 0.55 -0.060 -0.42
Countrywide -0.173 -1.25 0.008 0.06 -0.004 -0.03
Downey Financial 0.035 0.25 -0.034 -0.24 -0.149 -1.07
Fifth Third 0.068 0.48 0.062 0.44 0.049 0.35
First Horizon -0.143 -1.02 0.143 1.02 0.029 0.21
Fulton Financial 0.308 2.29** -0.281 -2.07** 0.252 1.84
Huntington Bankshares 0.078 0.55 0.015 0.11 -0.305 -2.27**
Keycorp Financial -0.039 -0.27 0.168 1.20 -0.157 -1.13
Marshall and Iisley 0.062 0.44 -0.064 -0.45 0.113 0.80
Merrill Lynch -0.044 -0.31 0.189 1.36 -0.093 -0.66
National City -0.077 -0.54 -0.180 -1.30 0.000 0.00
Northern Trust -0.116 -0.83 0.206 1.49 0.063 0.45
PnC FinServices -0.018 -0.13 0.181 1.30 -0.056 -0.40
Popular Inc -0.108 -0.77 -0.004 -0.03 -0.015 -0.11
Regions Financial 0.059 0.42 -0.163 -1.17 0.084 0.60
Sovereign Bancorp 0.001 0.01 -0.173 -1.24 -0.005 -0.04
State Street -0.128 -0.92 0.106 0.75 -0.066 -0.47
Suntrust Bank -0.088 -0.62 0.175 1.26 -0.089 -0.63
Synovus Bank -0.256 -1.87 0.043 0.31 -0.238 -1.73
TCF Financial 0.063 0.45 0.105 0.75 -0.014 -0.10
US Bancorp 0.005 0.04 -0.068 -0.48 -0.043 -0.30
Wachovia 0.101 0.72 -0.194 -1.40 -0.013 -0.09
Washington Mutual 0.235 1.71 -0.072 -0.51 -0.063 -0.45
Wells Fargo 0.058 0.41 -0.331 -2.48** -0.136 -0.97
Zion Corp 0.020 0.14 0.063 0.45 0.090 0.64
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3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997
Associated Bank 0.063 0.45 -0.143 -1.02 0.048 0.34
Bancorp South -0.095 -0.68 -0.146 -1.04 0.059 0.42
Bank of America -0.099 -0.70 0.010 0.07 0.053 0.38
Bank of New York -0.100 -0.71 -0.284 -2.10** 0.129 0.92
BB&T 0.059 0.42 -0.387 -2.97** 0.030 0.21
BOK Financial 0.169 1.21 -0.004 -0.03 -0.008 -0.06
Charles Schwab 0.010 0.07 0.050 0.35 -0.190 -1.37
Colonial Bancorp -0.013 -0.09 -0.262 -1.92 0.173 1.24
Comerica -0.167 -1.20 -0.190 -1.37 0.154 1.10
Commerce Bancorp -0.204 -1.47 -0.181 -1.30 0.129 0.92
Commerce Bankshares -0.191 -1.38 -0.084 -0.60 -0.103 -0.73
Compass Bankshares -0.163 -1.17 -0.111 -0.79 0.079 0.56
Countrywide -0.140 -1.00 0.115 0.82 0.176 1.27
Downey Financial -0.261 -1.91 -0.159 -1.14 0.025 0.17
Fifth Third -0.229 -1.66 -0.003 -0.02 0.051 0.36
First Horizon -0.082 -0.58 -0.147 -1.05 0.036 0.26
Fulton Financial -0.179 -1.29 -0.017 -0.12 0.093 0.66
Huntington Bankshares -0.016 -0.11 -0.286 -2.11** 0.194 1.40
Keycorp Financial 0.137 0.98 0.083 0.59 0.168 1.20
Marshall and Iisley 0.104 0.74 -0.070 -0.50 0.002 0.02
Merrill Lynch 0.202 1.46 -0.352 -2.66** 0.154 1.10
National City -0.010 -0.07 -0.073 -0.52 0.069 0.49
Northern Trust 0.121 0.86 -0.290 -2.14** 0.174 1.25
PnC FinServices 0.045 0.32 -0.427 -3.34** 0.055 0.39
Popular Inc -0.062 -0.44 0.081 0.58 0.109 0.77
Regions Financial 0.056 0.40 -0.054 -0.38 -0.119 -0.85
Sovereign Bancorp -0.090 -0.64 -0.096 -0.68 -0.103 -0.73
State Street 0.188 1.35 -0.328 -2.45** 0.163 1.17
Suntrust Bank 0.046 0.33 -0.333 -2.50** 0.169 1.21
Synovus Bank 0.080 0.57 -0.187 -1.34 0.163 1.17
TCF Financial -0.065 -0.46 0.132 0.94 0.099 0.70
US Bancorp -0.061 -0.43 -0.103 -0.73 0.096 0.68
Wachovia -0.031 -0.22 -0.040 -0.28 0.026 0.19
Washington Mutual -0.207 -1.50 -0.058 -0.41 0.152 1.08
Wells Fargo -0.014 -0.10 0.112 0.80 0.024 0.17
Zion Corp 0.177 1.27 -0.343 -2.58** 0.171 1.23
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3 Factor Betas: United States Bank Sample (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998
Associated Bank -0.041 -0.24 0.125 0.75 -0.169 -1.02
Bancorp South -0.073 -0.43 0.063 0.37 0.318 1.99
Bank of America 0.311 1.93 0.149 0.89 -0.126 -0.75
Bank of New York 0.039 0.23 -0.001 0.00 0.093 0.55
BB&T -0.094 -0.56 0.149 0.89 0.178 1.07
BOK Financial -0.065 -0.39 0.109 0.65 -0.082 -0.49
Charles Schwab 0.144 0.86 0.203 1.22 0.042 0.25
Colonial Bancorp 0.034 0.20 -0.038 -0.22 -0.020 -0.12
Comerica 0.030 0.17 0.246 1.50 0.102 0.61
Commerce Bancorp 0.109 0.65 -0.258 -1.58 0.096 0.57
Commerce Bankshares -0.052 -0.31 0.228 1.38 -0.080 -0.48
Compass Bankshares -0.060 -0.36 0.099 0.59 0.159 0.95
Countrywide 0.311 1.93 0.106 0.63 -0.083 -0.49
Downey Financial -0.054 -0.32 0.030 0.17 0.314 1.95
Fifth Third -0.007 -0.04 -0.242 -1.48 0.218 1.32
First Horizon 0.074 0.44 0.015 0.09 0.109 0.65
Fulton Financial -0.021 -0.12 -0.097 -0.58 0.120 0.72
Huntington Bankshares 0.018 0.11 -0.005 -0.03 0.246 1.50
Keycorp Financial 0.034 0.20 -0.088 -0.52 0.205 1.24
Marshall and Iisley -0.014 -0.08 -0.004 -0.02 -0.109 -0.65
Merrill Lynch -0.111 -0.66 -0.121 -0.72 0.108 0.64
National City 0.127 0.76 -0.084 -0.50 -0.152 -0.91
Northern Trust 0.124 0.74 -0.150 -0.90 0.176 1.06
PnC FinServices 0.009 0.05 -0.088 -0.52 0.345 2.18**
Popular Inc 0.032 0.19 0.021 0.12 -0.052 -0.31
Regions Financial 0.198 1.19 0.067 0.40 -0.178 -1.07
Sovereign Bancorp 0.041 0.24 -0.081 -0.48 -0.211 -1.28
State Street 0.039 0.23 -0.074 -0.44 0.172 1.03
Suntrust Bank 0.048 0.28 -0.064 -0.38 0.324 2.03**
Synovus Bank 0.040 0.24 -0.265 -1.63 0.001 0.01
TCF Financial -0.183 -1.10 -0.078 -0.46 0.092 0.55
US Bancorp -0.023 -0.13 0.107 0.63 -0.145 -0.87
Wachovia 0.018 0.11 0.031 0.18 -0.119 -0.71
Washington Mutual -0.008 -0.04 0.192 1.15 0.129 0.77
Wells Fargo 0.077 0.46 -0.082 -0.49 -0.011 -0.06
Zion Corp 0.160 0.96 -0.118 -0.70 -0.026 -0.16
** sig at the 95% confidence interval
 is the return on bank stock i  during time period t *** sig. at the 99% confidence interval
 is the market beta and the return on the market index in country j  at time t
 is the interest rate beta and the return on short-term government securities in country j  at time t
 is the foreign exchange beta and the return on a foreign exchange index for country j  at time t
 is the bank specific constant and randon error terms, respectively
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Appendix III Efficiency Results: Belgium 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.15 3.18 0.15 1.53 8.98 0.008
 Median 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.14 1.70 0.15 1.97 9.34 0.015
 Maximum 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.22 15.53 0.22 6.81 9.76 0.080
 Minimum 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.08 -1.00 0.05 -5.11 7.09 -0.123
 Std. Dev. 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 4.59 0.06 3.68 0.92 0.043
 Skewness 0.32 -0.23 0.47 -0.12 2.06 -0.31 -0.54 -1.30 -1.313
 Kurtosis 1.70 2.49 2.31 2.25 6.24 1.71 2.50 3.32 5.831
 Jarque-Bera 1.68 0.38 1.09 0.49 21.77 1.62 1.14 5.47 11.804
 Probability 0.43 0.83 0.58 0.78 0.00 0.44 0.57 0.06 0.003
 Sum 3.80 3.32 3.72 2.86 60.48 2.82 29.01 170.57 0.149
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.03 379.88 0.07 243.21 15.09 0.033
 Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
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Stock Performance and Bank Efficiency Regression Results: Belgium 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.031611 0.031718 0.996615 0.333
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.118721 0.150512 -0.78878 0.441
R-squared 0.035306     Mean dependent var 0.008
Adjusted R-squared -0.02144     S.D. dependent var 0.043
S.E. of regression 0.043523     Akaike info criterion -3.332
Sum squared resid 0.032202     Schwarz criterion -3.232
Log likelihood 33.65169     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.315
F-statistic 0.622172     Durbin-Watson stat 2.102
Prob(F-statistic) 0.441103
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.035469 0.03473 1.021298 0.32
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.132541 0.163289 -0.8117 0.43
AR(1) -0.072385 0.262865 -0.27537 0.79
R-squared 0.050366     Mean dependent var 0.01
Adjusted R-squared -0.076252     S.D. dependent var 0.04
S.E. of regression 0.045806     Akaike info criterion -3.18
Sum squared resid 0.031472     Schwarz criterion -3.03
Log likelihood 31.60024     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.16
F-statistic 0.397782     Durbin-Watson stat 1.87
Prob(F-statistic) 0.678689
Inverted AR Roots -0.07
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.043437 0.043366 1.001635 0.331
CRS_OBS -0.20383 0.241843 -0.84282 0.411
R-squared 0.040109     Mean dependent var 0.008
Adjusted R-squared -0.016355     S.D. dependent var 0.043
S.E. of regression 0.043414     Akaike info criterion -3.337
Sum squared resid 0.032042     Schwarz criterion -3.237
Log likelihood 33.69911     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.320
F-statistic 0.710348     Durbin-Watson stat 2.284
Prob(F-statistic) 0.41103
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.054814 0.04341 1.262715 0.23
CRS_OBS -0.265492 0.242912 -1.09295 0.29
AR(1) -0.183875 0.257467 -0.71417 0.49
R-squared 0.072969     Mean dependent var 0.01
Adjusted R-squared -0.050635     S.D. dependent var 0.04
S.E. of regression 0.045257     Akaike info criterion -3.20
Sum squared resid 0.030723     Schwarz criterion -3.05
Log likelihood 31.81705     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.18
F-statistic 0.590348     Durbin-Watson stat 2.01
Prob(F-statistic) 0.566507
Inverted AR Roots -0.18  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model Results. Belgium 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.088502 0.169738 0.521401 0.602
GDP 0.011042 0.004751 2.324003 0.020
CPI 0.040703 0.489515 0.083149 0.934
INDP -0.020175 0.007179 -2.810171 0.005
UNE 0.012476 0.012743 0.979035 0.328
VAR 2.953433 1.289197 2.290908 0.022
MRA 0.237039 0.065873 3.598413 0.000
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.041249 0.006691 6.164414 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.20002     S.D. dependent var 0.068
S.E. of regression 0.054212     Akaike info criterion -2.696
Sum squared resid 0.032328     Schwarz criterion -2.299
Log likelihood 33.61463     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.629
Avg. log likelihood 1.769191
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 19      Total obs 19
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.221608 0.123176 1.799118 0.072
GDP -0.004914 0.003448 -1.425174 0.154
CPI -0.407473 0.355232 -1.147063 0.251
INDP 0.003047 0.00521 0.584799 0.559
UNE 0.006955 0.009248 0.752127 0.452
VAR 1.583223 0.935546 1.692299 0.091
MRA 0.024811 0.047803 0.519023 0.604
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.029934 0.004856 6.164414 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.174522     S.D. dependent var 0.042
S.E. of regression 0.03934     Akaike info criterion -3.338
Sum squared resid 0.017024     Schwarz criterion -2.940
Log likelihood 39.70689     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.270
Avg. log likelihood 2.089836
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 19      Total obs 19  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model Results. Belgium 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.336777 0.19233 1.751041 0.080
GDP 0.002239 0.005384 0.415891 0.678
CPI 0.224352 0.554667 0.404481 0.686
INDP 0.000514 0.008135 0.063177 0.950
UNE -0.018655 0.01444 -1.291966 0.196
VAR 0.963135 1.460783 0.659328 0.510
MRA 0.041305 0.074641 0.55339 0.580
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.046739 0.007582 6.164414 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.195575     S.D. dependent var 0.052
S.E. of regression 0.061427     Akaike info criterion -2.446
Sum squared resid 0.041506     Schwarz criterion -2.049
Log likelihood 31.24053     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.379
Avg. log likelihood 1.644239
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 19      Total obs 19
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.165869 0.151134 1.097494 0.272
GDP 0.001236 0.00423 0.292078 0.770
CPI 0.115537 0.435863 0.265078 0.791
INDP -0.002453 0.006392 -0.383739 0.701
UNE -0.007206 0.011347 -0.635055 0.525
VAR -1.050179 1.147897 -0.914872 0.360
MRA 0.005165 0.058653 0.088059 0.930
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.036728 0.005958 6.164414 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.150612     S.D. dependent var 0.040
S.E. of regression 0.04827     Akaike info criterion -2.928
Sum squared resid 0.02563     Schwarz criterion -2.531
Log likelihood 35.8203     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.861
Avg. log likelihood 1.885279
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 19      Total obs 19  
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Appendix IV Efficiency Results: Canada 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.42 0.31 0.36 0.28 4.57 1.40 0.23 9.72 0.024
 Median 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.29 4.45 1.61 0.17 9.57 0.033
 Maximum 0.51 0.40 0.50 0.43 6.00 2.15 0.66 11.38 0.106
 Minimum 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.11 3.30 0.16 -0.01 8.30 -0.061
 Std. Dev. 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.07 1.03 0.67 0.24 0.99 0.046
 Skewness -1.08 -0.88 -0.76 -0.53 0.12 -0.85 0.72 0.33 -0.200
 Kurtosis 3.20 3.05 2.88 3.12 1.35 2.50 2.22 2.25 1.982
 Jarque-Bera 5.92 3.92 2.89 1.44 3.46 3.92 3.34 1.23 1.495
 Probability 0.05 0.14 0.24 0.49 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.54 0.474
 Sum 12.48 9.21 10.83 8.37 137.00 42.04 6.78 291.46 0.715
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.16 30.77 12.91 1.64 28.19 0.060
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Stock Performance and Bank Efficiency Regression Results: Canada 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.095216 0.043382 -2.19484 0.037
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.286067 0.102682 2.785965 0.010
R-squared 0.217037     Mean dependent var 0.024
Adjusted R-squared 0.189074     S.D. dependent var 0.046
S.E. of regression 0.041053     Akaike info criterion -3.484
Sum squared resid 0.04719     Schwarz criterion -3.390
Log likelihood 54.25342     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.454
F-statistic 7.7616     Durbin-Watson stat 0.657
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00947
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.083968 0.042055 -1.99663 0.06
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.258623 0.095447 2.709614 0.01
AR(1) 0.674168 0.145051 4.647809 0.00
R-squared 0.569782     Mean dependent var 0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.536688     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.031516     Akaike info criterion -3.98
Sum squared resid 0.025825     Schwarz criterion -3.84
Log likelihood 60.69453     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.93
F-statistic 17.21721     Durbin-Watson stat 1.87
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000017
Inverted AR Roots 0.67
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.097917 0.043932 -2.22881 0.034
CRS_OBS 0.396716 0.141069 2.812213 0.009
R-squared 0.220241     Mean dependent var 0.024
Adjusted R-squared 0.192393     S.D. dependent var 0.046
S.E. of regression 0.040969     Akaike info criterion -3.488
Sum squared resid 0.046997     Schwarz criterion -3.394
Log likelihood 54.31493     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.458
F-statistic 7.90854     Durbin-Watson stat 0.471
Prob(F-statistic) 0.008889
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.143552 0.039371 -3.64613 0.00
CRS_OBS 0.522059 0.110962 4.704842 0.00
AR(1) 0.747348 0.119852 6.235597 0.00
R-squared 0.699617     Mean dependent var 0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.67651     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.026335     Akaike info criterion -4.34
Sum squared resid 0.018031     Schwarz criterion -4.20
Log likelihood 65.90341     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.29
F-statistic 30.27803     Durbin-Watson stat 1.95
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Inverted AR Roots 0.75  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model Results. Canada 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.117751 0.257898 -0.456581 0.648
GDP 0.11378 0.025458 4.46934 0.000
CPI 0.012539 0.014632 0.856957 0.392
INDP -0.496115 0.126513 -3.921467 0.000
UNE 0.014977 0.014363 1.042802 0.297
VAR -1.135262 1.958132 -0.579768 0.562
MRA -0.2162 0.063061 -3.428453 0.001
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.0321 0.004144 7.746102 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.416136     S.D. dependent var 0.074
S.E. of regression 0.037485     Akaike info criterion -3.507
Sum squared resid 0.030913     Schwarz criterion -3.133
Log likelihood 60.59844     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.387
Avg. log likelihood 2.019948
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 30      Total obs 30
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.017918 0.225455 0.079473 0.937
GDP 0.067497 0.022255 3.032814 0.002
CPI 0.007119 0.012791 0.556565 0.578
INDP -0.294735 0.110598 -2.664931 0.008
UNE 0.008106 0.012556 0.645578 0.519
VAR 0.025433 1.711805 0.014858 0.988
MRA -0.121692 0.055128 -2.20746 0.027
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.028062 0.003623 7.746102 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.306878     S.D. dependent var 0.054
S.E. of regression 0.03277     Akaike info criterion -3.775
Sum squared resid 0.023625     Schwarz criterion -3.402
Log likelihood 64.63171     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.656
Avg. log likelihood 2.15439
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 30      Total obs 30  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model Results. Canada 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.161339 0.43575 -0.370255 0.711
GDP 0.063929 0.043014 1.48623 0.137
CPI 0.047802 0.024722 1.933565 0.053
INDP -0.315059 0.213758 -1.473902 0.141
UNE 0.02986 0.024268 1.230436 0.219
VAR 0.394249 3.308503 0.119162 0.905
MRA -0.129056 0.106548 -1.211239 0.226
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.054238 0.007002 7.746102 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.361121     S.D. dependent var 0.094
S.E. of regression 0.063336     Akaike info criterion -2.458
Sum squared resid 0.088251     Schwarz criterion -2.084
Log likelihood 44.86328     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.338
Avg. log likelihood 1.495443
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 30      Total obs 30
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.292899 0.267699 -1.094135 0.274
GDP 0.024579 0.026425 0.930119 0.352
CPI 0.047442 0.015188 3.123685 0.002
INDP -0.134561 0.13132 -1.024674 0.306
UNE 0.046461 0.014909 3.116383 0.002
VAR 0.505273 2.032547 0.248591 0.804
MRA -0.036145 0.065457 -0.55219 0.581
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.03332 0.004302 7.746102 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.278957     S.D. dependent var 0.074
S.E. of regression 0.03891     Akaike info criterion -3.432
Sum squared resid 0.033307     Schwarz criterion -3.058
Log likelihood 59.47947     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.312
Avg. log likelihood 1.982649
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 30      Total obs 30  
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Appendix V Efficiency Results: France 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.46 0.33 0.36 0.23 1.69 1.68 1.27 11.57 -0.005
 Median 0.50 0.36 0.37 0.23 2.23 1.78 2.26 11.59 -0.005
 Maximum 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.50 3.53 2.38 4.52 12.08 0.132
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.63 -4.03 10.27 -0.160
 Std. Dev. 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.19 1.27 0.56 3.10 0.61 0.062
 Skewness -0.66 -0.77 -0.11 0.08 -0.66 -0.65 -0.48 -1.23 -0.128
 Kurtosis 2.55 2.69 1.70 1.54 2.90 2.32 1.77 3.46 3.155
 Jarque-Bera 3.44 4.28 3.03 3.76 3.04 3.80 4.23 10.98 0.157
 Probability 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.925
 Sum 19.26 13.80 15.02 9.76 71.10 70.35 53.15 486.05 -0.190
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.79 0.88 2.71 1.47 66.18 12.97 394.48 15.04 0.155
 Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results: France 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.010987 0.023246 0.472645 0.639
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.033804 0.04622 -0.73138 0.469
R-squared 0.013196     Mean dependent var -0.005
Adjusted R-squared -0.011474     S.D. dependent var 0.062
S.E. of regression 0.061913     Akaike info criterion -2.680
Sum squared resid 0.15333     Schwarz criterion -2.597
Log likelihood 58.27408     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.649
F-statistic 0.534915     Durbin-Watson stat 1.326
Prob(F-statistic) 0.468811
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.009148 0.025745 0.35535 0.72
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.026817 0.046084 -0.58192 0.56
AR(1) 0.335131 0.152755 2.193911 0.03
R-squared 0.12956     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.083748     S.D. dependent var 0.06
S.E. of regression 0.059511     Akaike info criterion -2.73
Sum squared resid 0.134581     Schwarz criterion -2.61
Log likelihood 59.06627     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.69
F-statistic 2.82805     Durbin-Watson stat 2.07
Prob(F-statistic) 0.07162
Inverted AR Roots 0.34
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.012397 0.023694 0.523195 0.604
CRS_OBS -0.05148 0.066026 -0.7797 0.440
R-squared 0.014971     Mean dependent var -0.005
Adjusted R-squared -0.009655     S.D. dependent var 0.062
S.E. of regression 0.061858     Akaike info criterion -2.682
Sum squared resid 0.153054     Schwarz criterion -2.599
Log likelihood 58.31188     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.651
F-statistic 0.60793     Durbin-Watson stat 1.329
Prob(F-statistic) 0.440158
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.010574 0.026444 0.399864 0.69
CRS_OBS -0.041681 0.06688 -0.62322 0.54
AR(1) 0.333261 0.152863 2.18013 0.04
R-squared 0.130654     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.084899     S.D. dependent var 0.06
S.E. of regression 0.059474     Akaike info criterion -2.74
Sum squared resid 0.134412     Schwarz criterion -2.61
Log likelihood 59.09205     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.69
F-statistic 2.855517     Durbin-Watson stat 2.07
Prob(F-statistic) 0.069929
Inverted AR Roots 0.33  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. France 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.533094 1.443474 0.369313 0.712
GDP -0.112911 0.08375 -1.348196 0.178
CPI 0.186017 0.178725 1.0408 0.298
INDP 0.055123 0.030376 1.814723 0.070
UNE -0.02079 0.094509 -0.219985 0.826
VAR 1.029269 2.53144 0.406594 0.684
MRA 0.006771 0.150524 0.044986 0.964
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.169235 0.018465 9.16531 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.458512     S.D. dependent var 0.209
S.E. of regression 0.188085     Akaike info criterion -0.334
Sum squared resid 1.202789     Schwarz criterion -0.003
Log likelihood 15.01623     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.213
Avg. log likelihood 0.357529
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 42      Total obs 42
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.370733 1.001167 0.3703 0.711
GDP -0.079597 0.058087 -1.3703 0.171
CPI 0.133084 0.12396 1.073603 0.283
INDP 0.038784 0.021068 1.840908 0.066
UNE -0.013999 0.06555 -0.213563 0.831
VAR 0.765159 1.75576 0.435799 0.663
MRA 0.006634 0.104401 0.063543 0.949
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.117378 0.012807 9.16531 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.328463     S.D. dependent var 0.146
S.E. of regression 0.130459     Akaike info criterion -1.066
Sum squared resid 0.578661     Schwarz criterion -0.735
Log likelihood 30.38345     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.945
Avg. log likelihood 0.723415
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 42      Total obs 42  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. France 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.9727 1.853644 -0.52475 0.600
GDP -0.088207 0.107548 -0.820161 0.412
CPI 0.356566 0.229511 1.553594 0.120
INDP 0.048486 0.039007 1.24301 0.214
UNE 0.061575 0.121364 0.507358 0.612
VAR -3.521527 3.250761 -1.083293 0.279
MRA 0.067112 0.193296 0.347197 0.728
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.217324 0.023712 9.16531 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.357674     S.D. dependent var 0.257
S.E. of regression 0.241545     Akaike info criterion 0.166
Sum squared resid 1.983688     Schwarz criterion 0.497
Log likelihood 4.511994     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.287
Avg. log likelihood 0.107428
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 42      Total obs 42
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.67687 1.407143 -0.481024 0.631
GDP -0.075781 0.081642 -0.928216 0.353
CPI 0.19983 0.174227 1.146954 0.251
INDP 0.032038 0.029611 1.081974 0.279
UNE 0.050732 0.09213 0.550653 0.582
VAR -2.526898 2.467726 -1.023979 0.306
MRA 0.038383 0.146735 0.261582 0.794
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.164975 0.018 9.16531 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.232268     S.D. dependent var 0.189
S.E. of regression 0.18336     Akaike info criterion -0.385
Sum squared resid 1.143109     Schwarz criterion -0.054
Log likelihood 16.08686     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.264
Avg. log likelihood 0.38302
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 42      Total obs 42  
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Appendix VI Efficiency Results: Germany 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.37 0.27 0.29 0.20 1.49 2.61 0.18 9.81 0.004
 Median 0.35 0.33 0.19 0.10 1.85 1.91 0.33 9.60 -0.003
 Maximum 0.83 0.57 0.78 0.54 2.70 5.08 3.66 11.48 0.094
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.94 -6.61 7.72 -0.077
 Std. Dev. 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.21 1.05 1.48 3.31 1.21 0.045
 Skewness 0.17 0.06 0.51 0.48 -1.29 0.65 -0.98 -0.25 0.515
 Kurtosis 1.69 1.65 1.71 1.56 3.67 1.87 3.01 2.10 2.567
 Jarque-Bera 2.67 2.69 3.95 4.39 10.42 4.33 5.58 1.54 1.823
 Probability 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.46 0.402
 Sum 13.00 9.39 10.20 6.84 52.25 91.29 6.29 343.25 0.127
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.53 1.20 2.86 1.50 37.75 74.43 371.83 50.10 0.069
 Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results: Germany 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.010939 0.013049 0.838303 0.408
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.019721 0.028462 -0.69289 0.493
R-squared 0.01434     Mean dependent var 0.004
Adjusted R-squared -0.015529     S.D. dependent var 0.045
S.E. of regression 0.045273     Akaike info criterion -3.297
Sum squared resid 0.067639     Schwarz criterion -3.208
Log likelihood 59.69318     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.266
F-statistic 0.4801     Durbin-Watson stat 0.877
Prob(F-statistic) 0.493225
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.009778 0.017126 0.570947 0.57
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.010564 0.023846 -0.44301 0.66
AR(1) 0.558875 0.147574 3.787088 0.00
R-squared 0.322054     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.278316     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.038423     Akaike info criterion -3.60
Sum squared resid 0.045767     Schwarz criterion -3.46
Log likelihood 64.13557     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.55
F-statistic 7.363181     Durbin-Watson stat 1.82
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002418
Inverted AR Roots 0.56
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.013175 0.013398 0.98336 0.333
CRS_OBS -0.035647 0.041089 -0.86756 0.392
R-squared 0.022299     Mean dependent var 0.004
Adjusted R-squared -0.007328     S.D. dependent var 0.045
S.E. of regression 0.04509     Akaike info criterion -3.305
Sum squared resid 0.067093     Schwarz criterion -3.216
Log likelihood 59.83507     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.274
F-statistic 0.752659     Durbin-Watson stat 0.874
Prob(F-statistic) 0.391901
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.012113 0.017326 0.69911 0.49
CRS_OBS -0.023756 0.034661 -0.68538 0.50
AR(1) 0.560143 0.147561 3.796011 0.00
R-squared 0.327945     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.284586     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.038256     Akaike info criterion -3.60
Sum squared resid 0.045369     Schwarz criterion -3.47
Log likelihood 64.28393     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.56
F-statistic 7.56358     Durbin-Watson stat 1.81
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002112
Inverted AR Roots 0.56  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Germany 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.763499 1.70672 -1.033267 0.302
GDP 0.239074 0.224309 1.065825 0.287
CPI 0.072705 0.071637 1.014914 0.310
INDP -0.084132 0.085729 -0.981372 0.326
UNE 0.170332 0.14017 1.21518 0.224
VAR -0.122554 4.253668 -0.028811 0.977
MRA -0.245288 0.194361 -1.262021 0.207
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.245597 0.029352 8.367211 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.371347     S.D. dependent var 0.273
S.E. of regression 0.279624     Akaike info criterion 0.487
Sum squared resid 2.111113     Schwarz criterion 0.842
Log likelihood -0.520623     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.610
Avg. log likelihood -0.014875
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 35      Total obs 35
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.083447 1.167745 -0.927812 0.354
GDP 0.162741 0.153473 1.060388 0.289
CPI 0.048824 0.049014 0.996132 0.319
INDP -0.056135 0.058656 -0.957012 0.339
UNE 0.107014 0.095905 1.115833 0.265
VAR 0.610957 2.910377 0.209924 0.834
MRA -0.150286 0.132983 -1.130116 0.258
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.168038 0.020083 8.367211 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.268163     S.D. dependent var 0.188
S.E. of regression 0.19132     Akaike info criterion -0.272
Sum squared resid 0.988291     Schwarz criterion 0.083
Log likelihood 12.76185     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.149
Avg. log likelihood 0.364624
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 35      Total obs 35  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. Germany 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.174584 1.853275 -0.633788 0.526
GDP 0.160349 0.24357 0.658329 0.510
CPI 0.066055 0.077788 0.849166 0.396
INDP -0.063466 0.093091 -0.681768 0.495
UNE 0.115104 0.152206 0.756237 0.450
VAR 1.065128 4.618926 0.230601 0.818
MRA -0.127836 0.211051 -0.605709 0.545
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.266686 0.031873 8.367211 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.291566     S.D. dependent var 0.290
S.E. of regression 0.303628     Akaike info criterion 0.652
Sum squared resid 2.489134     Schwarz criterion 1.007
Log likelihood -3.403941     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.774
Avg. log likelihood -0.097255
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 35      Total obs 35
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.426483 1.34136 -0.317948 0.751
GDP 0.05777 0.17629 0.327699 0.743
CPI 0.047656 0.056301 0.846451 0.397
INDP -0.023548 0.067377 -0.349501 0.727
UNE 0.047727 0.110164 0.433241 0.665
VAR 1.47846 3.343079 0.442245 0.658
MRA -0.055287 0.152754 -0.361931 0.717
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.193016 0.02307 8.3666 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.195417     S.D. dependent var 0.210
S.E. of regression 0.219758     Akaike info criterion 0.005
Sum squared resid 1.30393     Schwarz criterion 0.361
Log likelihood 7.91153     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.128
Avg. log likelihood 0.226044
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 35      Total obs 35  
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Appendix VII Efficiency Results: Italy 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.49 0.33 0.48 0.32 1.26 1.81 1.90 10.59 0.006
 Median 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.35 1.30 0.98 1.89 11.16 -0.020
 Maximum 0.65 0.46 0.65 0.46 2.90 6.63 5.81 11.34 0.222
 Minimum 0.24 0.00 0.23 0.00 -0.90 -2.31 -2.00 8.90 -0.098
 Std. Dev. 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 1.20 3.66 3.02 0.89 0.072
 Skewness -0.67 -1.52 -0.63 -1.41 -0.41 0.21 0.10 -0.98 1.039
 Kurtosis 2.63 4.93 2.53 4.64 2.25 1.34 1.46 2.39 4.003
 Jarque-Bera 2.24 15.09 2.09 12.45 1.44 3.43 2.83 4.92 6.208
 Probability 0.33 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.49 0.18 0.24 0.09 0.045
 Sum 13.78 9.15 13.40 8.89 35.40 50.70 53.33 296.64 0.157
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.37 39.17 361.46 245.96 21.20 0.141
 Observations 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results: Italy 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.160268 0.054888 2.91989 0.007
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.31418 0.108756 -2.88887 0.008
R-squared 0.242988     Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared 0.213872     S.D. dependent var 0.072
S.E. of regression 0.06396     Akaike info criterion -2.592
Sum squared resid 0.106362     Schwarz criterion -2.497
Log likelihood 38.29323     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.563
F-statistic 8.345539     Durbin-Watson stat 1.496
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007695
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.029658 0.072588 -0.40858 0.69
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.106638 0.139259 0.765751 0.45
AR(1) 0.71318 0.161616 4.412812 0.00
R-squared 0.384808     Mean dependent var 0.01
Adjusted R-squared 0.333542     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.059607     Akaike info criterion -2.70
Sum squared resid 0.085273     Schwarz criterion -2.55
Log likelihood 39.41803     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.65
F-statistic 7.506091     Durbin-Watson stat 2.15
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002939
Inverted AR Roots 0.71
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.018386 0.041524 0.442789 0.662
CRS_OBS -0.039148 0.119796 -0.32679 0.746
R-squared 0.004091     Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared -0.034214     S.D. dependent var 0.072
S.E. of regression 0.073361     Akaike info criterion -2.318
Sum squared resid 0.139928     Schwarz criterion -2.223
Log likelihood 34.45335     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.289
F-statistic 0.10679     Durbin-Watson stat 0.821
Prob(F-statistic) 0.746445
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.015154 0.042506 -0.3565 0.72
CRS_OBS 0.1062 0.074455 1.426363 0.17
AR(1) 0.687315 0.158003 4.350024 0.00
R-squared 0.421796     Mean dependent var 0.01
Adjusted R-squared 0.373613     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.057788     Akaike info criterion -2.76
Sum squared resid 0.080146     Schwarz criterion -2.62
Log likelihood 40.25515     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.72
F-statistic 8.753932     Durbin-Watson stat 2.20
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001396
Inverted AR Roots 0.69  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Italy 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.405991 0.168874 8.325704 0.000
GDP 0.059414 0.032476 1.829444 0.067
CPI 0.077275 0.029457 2.623353 0.009
INDP -0.105166 0.042488 -2.475211 0.013
UNE -0.082516 0.016461 -5.012715 0.000
VAR 1.451525 0.881434 1.646776 0.100
MRA -0.065982 0.03224 -2.046569 0.041
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.051785 0.00692 7.483327 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.492304     S.D. dependent var 0.113
S.E. of regression 0.061273     Akaike info criterion -2.512
Sum squared resid 0.075087     Schwarz criterion -2.131
Log likelihood 43.16819     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.396
Avg. log likelihood 1.541721
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 28      Total obs 28
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.24191 0.330729 0.731444 0.465
GDP 0.055778 0.063603 0.876963 0.381
CPI 0.090881 0.057689 1.575359 0.115
INDP -0.119065 0.08321 -1.430896 0.153
UNE 0.007513 0.032238 0.233032 0.816
VAR -1.100692 1.726235 -0.637626 0.524
MRA -0.104554 0.06314 -1.655893 0.098
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.101417 0.013552 7.483327 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.32673     S.D. dependent var 0.118
S.E. of regression 0.119999     Akaike info criterion -1.168
Sum squared resid 0.287993     Schwarz criterion -0.787
Log likelihood 24.34805     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.051
Avg. log likelihood 0.869573
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 28      Total obs 28  
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Tobit Regression Result. VRS Model. Italy 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.314604 0.174351 7.539979 0.000
GDP 0.055652 0.03353 1.659759 0.097
CPI 0.071584 0.030412 2.353804 0.019
INDP -0.097403 0.043866 -2.220463 0.026
UNE -0.074831 0.016995 -4.403034 0.000
VAR 1.355655 0.910024 1.489691 0.136
MRA -0.086876 0.033286 -2.610012 0.009
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.053464 0.007144 7.483327 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.478428     S.D. dependent var 0.115
S.E. of regression 0.06326     Akaike info criterion -2.448
Sum squared resid 0.080036     Schwarz criterion -2.068
Log likelihood 42.2744     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.332
Avg. log likelihood 1.5098
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 28      Total obs 28
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.161781 0.321873 0.502624 0.615
GDP 0.051007 0.0619 0.824017 0.410
CPI 0.090469 0.056144 1.611367 0.107
INDP -0.117311 0.080982 -1.448615 0.147
UNE 0.014701 0.031375 0.468569 0.639
VAR -1.190603 1.680011 -0.708688 0.479
MRA -0.118573 0.06145 -1.929598 0.054
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.098702 0.01319 7.483327 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.317509     S.D. dependent var 0.117
S.E. of regression 0.116785     Akaike info criterion -1.222
Sum squared resid 0.272776     Schwarz criterion -0.841
Log likelihood 25.10804     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.106
Avg. log likelihood 0.896716
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 28      Total obs 28  
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Appendix VIII Efficiency Results: Japan 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.39 0.29 0.31 0.23 1.14 0.86 -0.90 3.09 -0.004
 Median 0.43 0.31 0.33 0.25 1.63 0.68 0.95 3.15 -0.001
 Maximum 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.46 2.73 1.74 3.67 4.10 0.092
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.08 -0.08 -6.87 2.15 -0.223
 Std. Dev. 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.14 1.54 0.67 4.22 0.59 0.057
 Skewness -1.11 -1.23 -0.33 -0.43 -1.04 0.02 -0.32 0.07 -1.065
 Kurtosis 3.60 3.83 1.98 2.02 3.08 1.58 1.35 2.28 5.084
 Jarque-Bera 24.55 31.00 6.83 7.84 20.14 9.36 14.48 2.50 41.093
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.000
 Sum 43.81 32.03 34.74 25.59 126.04 95.86 -99.99 342.78 -0.477
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.97 1.51 4.12 2.13 260.08 49.55 1959.64 38.59 0.360
 Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results: Japan. 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.040178 0.013757 -2.92064 0.004
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.090906 0.032203 2.822935 0.006
R-squared 0.068129     Mean dependent var -0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.05958     S.D. dependent var 0.057
S.E. of regression 0.055475     Akaike info criterion -2.928
Sum squared resid 0.335445     Schwarz criterion -2.879
Log likelihood 164.4992     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.908
F-statistic 7.968964     Durbin-Watson stat 0.976
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005658
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.037809 0.014626 -2.58494 0.01
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.081944 0.028787 2.846614 0.01
AR(1) 0.510728 0.083113 6.144968 0.00
R-squared 0.307787     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.294848     S.D. dependent var 0.06
S.E. of regression 0.048028     Akaike info criterion -3.21
Sum squared resid 0.24682     Schwarz criterion -3.13
Log likelihood 179.3934     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.18
F-statistic 23.78832     Durbin-Watson stat 2.20
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Inverted AR Roots 0.51
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.041279 0.014059 -2.93614 0.004
CRS_OBS 0.128158 0.045182 2.8365 0.005
R-squared 0.06874     Mean dependent var -0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.060196     S.D. dependent var 0.057
S.E. of regression 0.055457     Akaike info criterion -2.929
Sum squared resid 0.335225     Schwarz criterion -2.880
Log likelihood 164.5356     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.909
F-statistic 8.045729     Durbin-Watson stat 0.974
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005439
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.038734 0.01477 -2.62247 0.01
CRS_OBS 0.115226 0.039982 2.881952 0.00
AR(1) 0.511424 0.083072 6.15642 0.00
R-squared 0.308992     Mean dependent var 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.296076     S.D. dependent var 0.06
S.E. of regression 0.047987     Akaike info criterion -3.21
Sum squared resid 0.246391     Schwarz criterion -3.14
Log likelihood 179.4892     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.18
F-statistic 23.92317     Durbin-Watson stat 2.20
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Inverted AR Roots 0.51  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Japan. 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.546567 0.465879 1.173194 0.241
GDP 0.03535 0.017079 2.069766 0.039
CPI 0.02782 0.095259 0.292045 0.770
INDP 0.002446 0.005048 0.484475 0.628
UNE -0.043499 0.141785 -0.306792 0.759
VAR 2.203177 0.469825 4.689356 0.000
MRA 0.143519 0.180727 0.794118 0.427
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.145116 0.009739 14.90043 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.394657     S.D. dependent var 0.164
S.E. of regression 0.150645     Akaike info criterion -0.878
Sum squared resid 2.337474     Schwarz criterion -0.683
Log likelihood 56.75262     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.799
Avg. log likelihood 0.511285
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 111      Total obs 111
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.403804 0.331707 1.217353 0.224
GDP 0.025675 0.01216 2.111395 0.035
CPI 0.01758 0.067825 0.259194 0.796
INDP 0.001517 0.003594 0.42217 0.673
UNE -0.033069 0.100952 -0.327575 0.743
VAR 1.593454 0.334517 4.763452 0.000
MRA 0.108677 0.128678 0.844564 0.398
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.103323 0.006934 14.90043 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.288528     S.D. dependent var 0.117
S.E. of regression 0.10726     Akaike info criterion -1.558
Sum squared resid 1.184991     Schwarz criterion -1.362
Log likelihood 94.45644     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.479
Avg. log likelihood 0.850959
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 111      Total obs 111  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. Japan 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.013571 0.556801 1.820346 0.069
GDP 0.030732 0.020412 1.505579 0.132
CPI -0.077608 0.11385 -0.681674 0.495
INDP -0.001095 0.006033 -0.181415 0.856
UNE -0.203314 0.169457 -1.199801 0.230
VAR 2.499094 0.561517 4.450608 0.000
MRA 0.331371 0.215998 1.53414 0.125
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.173437 0.01164 14.90043 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.312943     S.D. dependent var 0.194
S.E. of regression 0.180046     Akaike info criterion -0.522
Sum squared resid 3.338908     Schwarz criterion -0.327
Log likelihood 36.9633     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.443
Avg. log likelihood 0.333003
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 111      Total obs 111
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.717111 0.399843 1.79348 0.073
GDP 0.022356 0.014658 1.525126 0.127
CPI -0.052394 0.081756 -0.64085 0.522
INDP -0.000572 0.004333 -0.131987 0.895
UNE -0.140664 0.121688 -1.15594 0.248
VAR 1.842591 0.40323 4.569576 0.000
MRA 0.23703 0.15511 1.528143 0.127
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.124546 0.008359 14.90043 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.230581     S.D. dependent var 0.139
S.E. of regression 0.129293     Akaike info criterion -1.184
Sum squared resid 1.721812     Schwarz criterion -0.989
Log likelihood 73.7193     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.105
Avg. log likelihood 0.664138
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 111      Total obs 111  
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Appendix IX Efficiency Results: the Netherlands 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.19 2.63 2.71 1.03 5.12 -0.012
 Median 0.48 0.35 0.30 0.21 2.94 2.69 0.08 5.24 -0.006
 Maximum 0.61 0.44 0.45 0.33 4.28 6.27 3.48 6.56 0.023
 Minimum 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.65 -0.96 -1.09 3.46 -0.062
 Std. Dev. 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.10 1.24 2.65 1.79 1.13 0.021
 Skewness -1.12 -1.19 -0.84 -0.66 -0.41 -0.02 0.39 -0.17 -0.735
 Kurtosis 4.26 4.40 2.77 2.65 1.89 1.51 1.49 1.71 3.342
 Jarque-Bera 4.98 5.75 2.18 1.40 1.44 1.68 2.17 1.33 1.707
 Probability 0.08 0.06 0.34 0.50 0.49 0.43 0.34 0.52 0.426
 Sum 8.57 6.22 4.73 3.33 47.33 48.79 18.50 92.12 -0.208
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.19 0.09 0.30 0.15 26.24 118.94 54.36 21.79 0.008
 Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results. Netherlands. 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.032672 0.023849 -1.36993 0.190
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.044319 0.04895 0.905396 0.379
R-squared 0.048737     Mean dependent var -0.012
Adjusted R-squared -0.010717     S.D. dependent var 0.021
S.E. of regression 0.021238     Akaike info criterion -4.762
Sum squared resid 0.007217     Schwarz criterion -4.663
Log likelihood 44.85461     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.748
F-statistic 0.819743     Durbin-Watson stat 2.062
Prob(F-statistic) 0.378688
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.024112 0.022925 -1.05182 0.31
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.022692 0.047648 0.476251 0.64
AR(1) -0.119923 0.246529 -0.48645 0.63
R-squared 0.031729     Mean dependent var -0.01
Adjusted R-squared -0.106596     S.D. dependent var 0.02
S.E. of regression 0.020907     Akaike info criterion -4.74
Sum squared resid 0.00612     Schwarz criterion -4.59
Log likelihood 43.27848     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.72
F-statistic 0.229379     Durbin-Watson stat 2.21
Prob(F-statistic) 0.797956
Inverted AR Roots -0.12
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.033593 0.025252 -1.33034 0.202
CRS_OBS 0.063719 0.071575 0.890246 0.387
R-squared 0.047196     Mean dependent var -0.012
Adjusted R-squared -0.012354     S.D. dependent var 0.021
S.E. of regression 0.021255     Akaike info criterion -4.760
Sum squared resid 0.007228     Schwarz criterion -4.661
Log likelihood 44.84004     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.746
F-statistic 0.792538     Durbin-Watson stat 2.060
Prob(F-statistic) 0.386524
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.02455 0.024207 -1.01416 0.33
CRS_OBS 0.032512 0.069405 0.46844 0.65
AR(1) -0.119542 0.246372 -0.48521 0.64
R-squared 0.031228     Mean dependent var -0.01
Adjusted R-squared -0.107168     S.D. dependent var 0.02
S.E. of regression 0.020913     Akaike info criterion -4.74
Sum squared resid 0.006123     Schwarz criterion -4.59
Log likelihood 43.27408     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.72
F-statistic 0.22564     Durbin-Watson stat 2.21
Prob(F-statistic) 0.800852
Inverted AR Roots -0.12  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Netherlands 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.518749 0.127464 4.069757 0.000
GDP -0.059095 0.048278 -1.224043 0.221
CPI 0.006526 0.015202 0.429307 0.668
INDP -0.017396 0.015864 -1.096611 0.273
UNE 0.038445 0.041296 0.930963 0.352
VAR 3.199075 2.657176 1.203938 0.229
MRA 0.082739 0.166893 0.49576 0.620
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.070088 0.011681 6.000001 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.476362     S.D. dependent var 0.105
S.E. of regression 0.094034     Akaike info criterion -1.589
Sum squared resid 0.088423     Schwarz criterion -1.194
Log likelihood 22.30304     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.535
Avg. log likelihood 1.239058
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 18      Total obs 18
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.377906 0.085943 4.397172 0.000
GDP -0.040847 0.032552 -1.25484 0.210
CPI 0.004931 0.01025 0.481125 0.630
INDP -0.011642 0.010696 -1.088392 0.276
UNE 0.025947 0.027844 0.931884 0.351
VAR 2.235245 1.791605 1.247622 0.212
MRA 0.055462 0.112528 0.492871 0.622
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.047257 0.007876 6.000001 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.345786     S.D. dependent var 0.072
S.E. of regression 0.063402     Akaike info criterion -2.378
Sum squared resid 0.040199     Schwarz criterion -1.982
Log likelihood 29.39778     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.323
Avg. log likelihood 1.63321
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 18      Total obs 18  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. Netherlands. 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.215351 0.210065 1.025163 0.305
GDP -0.010269 0.079564 -0.129062 0.897
CPI 0.021414 0.025053 0.854723 0.393
INDP -0.008549 0.026144 -0.326997 0.744
UNE -0.014896 0.068057 -0.218868 0.827
VAR -5.427366 4.379105 -1.239378 0.215
MRA -0.322398 0.275044 -1.172169 0.241
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.115508 0.019251 6.000001 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.262709     S.D. dependent var 0.132
S.E. of regression 0.15497     Akaike info criterion -0.590
Sum squared resid 0.240158     Schwarz criterion -0.194
Log likelihood 13.31059     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.536
Avg. log likelihood 0.739477
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 18      Total obs 18
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.14284 0.155365 0.919383 0.358
GDP -0.013923 0.058846 -0.236595 0.813
CPI 0.010411 0.018529 0.56187 0.574
INDP -0.002878 0.019336 -0.148822 0.882
UNE 0.002272 0.050335 0.045134 0.964
VAR -2.479546 3.238812 -0.765573 0.444
MRA -0.166935 0.203424 -0.820624 0.412
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.08543 0.014238 6.000001 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.185052     S.D. dependent var 0.095
S.E. of regression 0.114617     Akaike info criterion -1.193
Sum squared resid 0.13137     Schwarz criterion -0.798
Log likelihood 18.74007     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.139
Avg. log likelihood 1.041115
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 18      Total obs 18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 229
Appendix X Efficiency Results: Sweden 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.86 1.79 5.19 7.39 0.006
 Median 0.32 0.21 0.32 0.21 0.53 2.20 4.43 7.97 0.014
 Maximum 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.35 2.83 4.65 13.02 8.23 0.349
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 -0.13 -0.07 5.29 -0.339
 Std. Dev. 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.14 1.04 1.56 5.13 1.03 0.145
 Skewness -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.90 0.51 0.52 -1.21 -0.193
 Kurtosis 1.33 1.28 1.27 1.23 2.43 2.31 1.71 2.92 4.377
 Jarque-Bera 2.50 2.62 2.64 2.74 3.14 1.32 2.40 5.13 1.789
 Probability 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.52 0.30 0.08 0.409
 Sum 4.72 3.38 4.55 3.27 18.12 37.61 109.07 155.23 0.126
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.70 0.40 0.72 0.40 21.49 48.58 526.79 21.27 0.421
 Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results. Sweden. 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.003844 0.051441 -0.07473 0.941
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.043895 0.17764 0.247102 0.808
R-squared 0.003203     Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared -0.04926     S.D. dependent var 0.145
S.E. of regression 0.148624     Akaike info criterion -0.884
Sum squared resid 0.419691     Schwarz criterion -0.785
Log likelihood 11.28627     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.863
F-statistic 0.061059     Durbin-Watson stat 0.827
Prob(F-statistic) 0.80748
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.032565 0.06802 0.478763 0.64
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.023488 0.116661 -0.20133 0.84
AR(1) 0.554986 0.188817 2.939274 0.01
R-squared 0.337563     Mean dependent var 0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.259629     S.D. dependent var 0.14
S.E. of regression 0.122715     Akaike info criterion -1.22
Sum squared resid 0.256002     Schwarz criterion -1.07
Log likelihood 15.20426     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.19
F-statistic 4.331411     Durbin-Watson stat 1.30
Prob(F-statistic) 0.030181
Inverted AR Roots 0.55
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.00082 0.049995 -0.01641 0.987
CRS_OBS 0.042456 0.235927 0.179953 0.859
R-squared 0.001701     Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared -0.050841     S.D. dependent var 0.145
S.E. of regression 0.148736     Akaike info criterion -0.883
Sum squared resid 0.420323     Schwarz criterion -0.783
Log likelihood 11.27046     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.861
F-statistic 0.032383     Durbin-Watson stat 0.824
Prob(F-statistic) 0.859095
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.035072 0.067534 0.519321 0.61
CRS_OBS -0.047379 0.155667 -0.30436 0.76
AR(1) 0.555632 0.188407 2.949103 0.01
R-squared 0.339586     Mean dependent var 0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.26189     S.D. dependent var 0.14
S.E. of regression 0.122527     Akaike info criterion -1.22
Sum squared resid 0.25522     Schwarz criterion -1.07
Log likelihood 15.23484     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.19
F-statistic 4.370711     Durbin-Watson stat 1.30
Prob(F-statistic) 0.029406
Inverted AR Roots 0.56  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Sweden. 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.977274 0.554442 1.762627 0.078
GDP -0.064312 0.150467 -0.427418 0.669
CPI -0.022225 0.042786 -0.519451 0.603
INDP 0.00562 0.009059 0.620413 0.535
UNE -0.064645 0.062349 -1.036822 0.300
VAR 7.492246 4.652517 1.610364 0.107
MRA 0.129648 0.277582 0.467064 0.641
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.160427 0.024754 6.480931 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.224778     S.D. dependent var 0.187
S.E. of regression 0.203899     Akaike info criterion -0.060
Sum squared resid 0.540471     Schwarz criterion 0.338
Log likelihood 8.630577     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.026
Avg. log likelihood 0.41098
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 21      Total obs 21
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.795652 0.40344 1.972166 0.049
GDP -0.074257 0.109488 -0.678224 0.498
CPI -0.020599 0.031133 -0.661644 0.508
INDP 0.004605 0.006592 0.69863 0.485
UNE -0.053669 0.045368 -1.182954 0.237
VAR 6.184071 3.385409 1.826683 0.068
MRA 0.14698 0.201983 0.727686 0.467
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.116735 0.018012 6.480931 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.161181     S.D. dependent var 0.141
S.E. of regression 0.148367     Akaike info criterion -0.696
Sum squared resid 0.286167     Schwarz criterion -0.298
Log likelihood 15.30718     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.610
Avg. log likelihood 0.728913
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 21      Total obs 21  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. Sweden. 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.966133 0.54789 1.76337 0.078
GDP -0.063636 0.148689 -0.427978 0.669
CPI -0.022224 0.042281 -0.525639 0.599
INDP 0.005568 0.008952 0.621928 0.534
UNE -0.063535 0.061612 -1.031212 0.302
VAR 7.390504 4.597536 1.607492 0.108
MRA 0.098941 0.274302 0.3607 0.718
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.158531 0.024461 6.480931 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.216711     S.D. dependent var 0.190
S.E. of regression 0.201489     Akaike info criterion -0.084
Sum squared resid 0.527772     Schwarz criterion 0.314
Log likelihood 8.88022     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.003
Avg. log likelihood 0.422868
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 21      Total obs 21
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.786985 0.395997 1.987353 0.047
GDP -0.075635 0.107467 -0.703798 0.482
CPI -0.020898 0.030559 -0.683854 0.494
INDP 0.004581 0.00647 0.70807 0.479
UNE -0.052681 0.044531 -1.183019 0.237
VAR 6.100833 3.322947 1.83597 0.066
MRA 0.128809 0.198256 0.64971 0.516
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.114581 0.01768 6.480931 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.155501     S.D. dependent var 0.142
S.E. of regression 0.14563     Akaike info criterion -0.733
Sum squared resid 0.275704     Schwarz criterion -0.335
Log likelihood 15.69826     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.647
Avg. log likelihood 0.747536
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 21      Total obs 21  
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Appendix XI Efficiency Results: Switzerland 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.96 1.62 1.95 4.27 -0.020
 Median 0.37 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.53 0.85 2.20 4.52 -0.021
 Maximum 0.53 0.38 0.49 0.36 2.83 4.06 4.55 5.21 0.058
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.02 -1.95 2.55 -0.089
 Std. Dev. 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 1.03 1.41 2.48 0.82 0.040
 Skewness -0.47 -0.58 -0.25 -0.48 0.61 0.65 -0.41 -1.05 0.103
 Kurtosis 1.86 1.93 1.65 1.74 2.08 1.97 1.58 3.31 2.450
 Jarque-Bera 1.99 2.26 1.90 2.30 2.14 2.55 2.48 4.10 0.316
 Probability 0.37 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.13 0.854
 Sum 7.21 5.39 5.93 4.60 21.23 35.53 43.00 93.92 -0.439
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.59 0.31 0.60 0.32 22.42 42.03 128.73 14.02 0.033
 Observations 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results. Switzerland. 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.021525 0.019348 -1.11251 0.279
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.004834 0.052758 0.091625 0.928
R-squared 0.00042     Mean dependent var -0.020
Adjusted R-squared -0.049559     S.D. dependent var 0.040
S.E. of regression 0.040665     Akaike info criterion -3.480
Sum squared resid 0.033073     Schwarz criterion -3.381
Log likelihood 40.28412     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.457
F-statistic 0.008395     Durbin-Watson stat 2.423
Prob(F-statistic) 0.927908
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.017433 0.021137 -0.82479 0.42
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.004896 0.058912 -0.08312 0.93
AR(1) -0.24625 0.231816 -1.06227 0.30
R-squared 0.061132     Mean dependent var -0.02
Adjusted R-squared -0.043187     S.D. dependent var 0.04
S.E. of regression 0.04093     Akaike info criterion -3.42
Sum squared resid 0.030155     Schwarz criterion -3.27
Log likelihood 38.93448     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.39
F-statistic 0.586007     Durbin-Watson stat 1.83
Prob(F-statistic) 0.566817
Inverted AR Roots -0.25
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.024324 0.019903 -1.22213 0.236
CRS_OBS 0.017887 0.073121 0.24462 0.809
R-squared 0.002983     Mean dependent var -0.020
Adjusted R-squared -0.046868     S.D. dependent var 0.040
S.E. of regression 0.040613     Akaike info criterion -3.483
Sum squared resid 0.032989     Schwarz criterion -3.384
Log likelihood 40.31237     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.460
F-statistic 0.059839     Durbin-Watson stat 2.424
Prob(F-statistic) 0.809243
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.020227 0.02179 -0.92829 0.37
CRS_OBS 0.004564 0.08168 0.055876 0.96
AR(1) -0.247195 0.231562 -1.06751 0.30
R-squared 0.060927     Mean dependent var -0.02
Adjusted R-squared -0.043414     S.D. dependent var 0.04
S.E. of regression 0.040935     Akaike info criterion -3.42
Sum squared resid 0.030162     Schwarz criterion -3.27
Log likelihood 38.93219     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.39
F-statistic 0.583923     Durbin-Watson stat 1.84
Prob(F-statistic) 0.567927
Inverted AR Roots -0.25  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. Switzerland. 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.149243 0.60113 0.24827 0.804
GDP -0.082794 0.188344 -0.439589 0.660
CPI 0.041404 0.093821 0.441311 0.659
INDP 0.019399 0.025297 0.76684 0.443
UNE 0.007053 0.087027 0.081047 0.935
VAR -4.555541 1.91362 -2.380589 0.017
MRA 0.039579 0.230454 0.171741 0.864
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.140453 0.021174 6.63325 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.327856     S.D. dependent var 0.168
S.E. of regression 0.176067     Akaike info criterion -0.361
Sum squared resid 0.433996     Schwarz criterion 0.036
Log likelihood 11.96673     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.267
Avg. log likelihood 0.543942
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 22      Total obs 22
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.129099 0.424257 0.304293 0.761
GDP -0.071218 0.132927 -0.535771 0.592
CPI 0.027237 0.066216 0.411343 0.681
INDP 0.015745 0.017854 0.88191 0.378
UNE 0.002613 0.06142 0.042544 0.966
VAR -3.534432 1.350566 -2.617 0.009
MRA 0.039778 0.162646 0.244566 0.807
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.099127 0.014944 6.63325 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.245086     S.D. dependent var 0.121
S.E. of regression 0.124262     Akaike info criterion -1.058
Sum squared resid 0.216176     Schwarz criterion -0.661
Log likelihood 19.63313     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.964
Avg. log likelihood 0.892415
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 22      Total obs 22  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. Switzerland. 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.110428 0.572809 0.192783 0.847
GDP -0.105868 0.179471 -0.589888 0.555
CPI 0.040972 0.089401 0.45829 0.647
INDP 0.015756 0.024105 0.653626 0.513
UNE 0.008779 0.082927 0.105866 0.916
VAR -4.446588 1.823465 -2.438538 0.015
MRA 0.057857 0.219597 0.263467 0.792
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.133836 0.020177 6.63325 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.26949     S.D. dependent var 0.169
S.E. of regression 0.167772     Akaike info criterion -0.457
Sum squared resid 0.394066     Schwarz criterion -0.060
Log likelihood 13.02841     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.364
Avg. log likelihood 0.592201
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 22      Total obs 22
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.174831 0.397242 0.440114 0.660
GDP -0.128168 0.124463 -1.029773 0.303
CPI 0.016247 0.061999 0.262046 0.793
INDP 0.0187 0.016717 1.118599 0.263
UNE -0.00588 0.057509 -0.102253 0.919
VAR -3.767484 1.264567 -2.979268 0.003
MRA 0.089644 0.15229 0.588642 0.556
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.092815 0.013992 6.63325 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.209184     S.D. dependent var 0.124
S.E. of regression 0.11635     Akaike info criterion -1.189
Sum squared resid 0.189521     Schwarz criterion -0.792
Log likelihood 21.0806     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.096
Avg. log likelihood 0.958209
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 22      Total obs 22  
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Appendix XII Efficiency Results: United Kingdom 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.38 0.28 0.32 0.23 2.76 2.47 2.04 7.57 0.025
 Median 0.46 0.34 0.40 0.27 2.95 2.48 1.37 7.62 0.027
 Maximum 0.56 0.41 0.55 0.43 4.30 4.31 5.37 9.73 0.120
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 1.57 0.39 4.49 -0.058
 Std. Dev. 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.14 1.17 0.81 1.58 1.85 0.048
 Skewness -1.23 -1.26 -0.81 -0.58 -0.99 1.30 1.39 -0.46 0.297
 Kurtosis 2.97 3.05 2.35 2.05 3.61 3.93 3.64 1.81 2.431
 Jarque-Bera 7.76 8.15 3.96 2.91 5.55 9.80 10.52 2.91 0.874
 Probability 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.646
 Sum 11.69 8.60 9.92 7.21 85.53 76.45 63.11 234.53 0.761
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.08 0.57 0.93 0.60 40.78 19.79 74.43 103.18 0.070
 Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results. United Kingdom 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.019917 0.01986 1.002889 0.324
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.012284 0.047207 0.260215 0.797
R-squared 0.002329     Mean dependent var 0.025
Adjusted R-squared -0.032073     S.D. dependent var 0.048
S.E. of regression 0.049012     Akaike info criterion -3.131
Sum squared resid 0.069664     Schwarz criterion -3.039
Log likelihood 50.53288     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.101
F-statistic 0.067712     Durbin-Watson stat 1.337
Prob(F-statistic) 0.796536
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.027321 0.020496 1.333 0.19
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.002722 0.043109 -0.06315 0.95
AR(1) 0.326849 0.181108 1.804721 0.08
R-squared 0.107036     Mean dependent var 0.03
Adjusted R-squared 0.040891     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.047286     Akaike info criterion -3.17
Sum squared resid 0.06037     Schwarz criterion -3.03
Log likelihood 50.55875     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.13
F-statistic 1.618191     Durbin-Watson stat 1.69
Prob(F-statistic) 0.216899
Inverted AR Roots 0.33
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.02258 0.020024 1.12766 0.269
CRS_OBS 0.0071 0.064827 0.109527 0.914
R-squared 0.000413     Mean dependent var 0.025
Adjusted R-squared -0.034055     S.D. dependent var 0.048
S.E. of regression 0.049059     Akaike info criterion -3.129
Sum squared resid 0.069797     Schwarz criterion -3.037
Log likelihood 50.50315     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.099
F-statistic 0.011996     Durbin-Watson stat 1.323
Prob(F-statistic) 0.913539
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.029164 0.020488 1.423517 0.17
CRS_OBS -0.010444 0.058337 -0.17903 0.86
AR(1) 0.3307 0.180621 1.830906 0.08
R-squared 0.107933     Mean dependent var 0.03
Adjusted R-squared 0.041854     S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.047262     Akaike info criterion -3.17
Sum squared resid 0.060309     Schwarz criterion -3.03
Log likelihood 50.57382     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.13
F-statistic 1.633391     Durbin-Watson stat 1.69
Prob(F-statistic) 0.213977
Inverted AR Roots 0.33  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. United Kingdom 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.387057 2.227416 -0.17377 0.862
GDP 0.079089 0.328236 0.240952 0.810
CPI 0.143065 0.279126 0.512548 0.608
INDP -0.013973 0.141733 -0.09859 0.922
UNE 0.036684 0.117049 0.31341 0.754
VAR 3.204135 4.447276 0.720472 0.471
MRA 0.222027 0.373827 0.593929 0.553
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.180669 0.022944 7.874273 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.377116     S.D. dependent var 0.190
S.E. of regression 0.209749     Akaike info criterion -0.068
Sum squared resid 1.011879     Schwarz criterion 0.302
Log likelihood 9.056723     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.052
Avg. log likelihood 0.292152
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 31      Total obs 31
Dependent Variable: CRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.193242 1.619171 -0.119347 0.905
GDP 0.042012 0.238604 0.176074 0.860
CPI 0.102459 0.202905 0.504963 0.614
INDP 0.003444 0.10303 0.033424 0.973
UNE 0.018283 0.085086 0.214881 0.830
VAR 2.336398 3.23285 0.722705 0.470
MRA 0.152134 0.271746 0.55984 0.576
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.131333 0.016679 7.874273 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.277372     S.D. dependent var 0.138
S.E. of regression 0.152472     Akaike info criterion -0.706
Sum squared resid 0.5347     Schwarz criterion -0.336
Log likelihood 18.94348     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.585
Avg. log likelihood 0.61108
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 31      Total obs 31  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. United Kingdom. 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.599503 2.019082 -0.296919 0.767
GDP 0.107659 0.297535 0.361835 0.718
CPI 0.16041 0.253019 0.633982 0.526
INDP -0.028251 0.128476 -0.219896 0.826
UNE 0.050692 0.106101 0.477771 0.633
VAR 4.913224 4.031316 1.218764 0.223
MRA 0.289266 0.338863 0.853639 0.393
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.16377 0.020798 7.874273 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.320129     S.D. dependent var 0.176
S.E. of regression 0.190131     Akaike info criterion -0.265
Sum squared resid 0.831444     Schwarz criterion 0.105
Log likelihood 12.10089     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.144
Avg. log likelihood 0.390351
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 31      Total obs 31
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.35135 1.625805 -0.216108 0.829
GDP 0.062289 0.239581 0.259992 0.795
CPI 0.089225 0.203736 0.437942 0.661
INDP -0.014155 0.103452 -0.136825 0.891
UNE 0.040246 0.085435 0.471075 0.638
VAR 3.901317 3.246096 1.201849 0.229
MRA 0.210548 0.272859 0.771638 0.440
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.131871 0.016747 7.874273 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.232676     S.D. dependent var 0.141
S.E. of regression 0.153097     Akaike info criterion -0.698
Sum squared resid 0.53909     Schwarz criterion -0.328
Log likelihood 18.81672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.577
Avg. log likelihood 0.606991
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 31      Total obs 31  
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Appendix XII Efficiency Results: United States 
 
Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency Inefficiency
DEA__UNDER_CRS CRS_OBS VRS VRS_OBS GDP CPI INDP UNE STOCK_PERF
 Mean 0.39 0.28 0.35 0.26 3.58 2.57 0.42 5.80 -0.017
 Median 0.39 0.28 0.35 0.26 3.70 2.81 0.33 5.59 0.000
 Maximum 0.83 0.57 0.82 0.56 4.50 3.03 0.67 7.49 0.117
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.53 1.55 0.23 4.50 -0.256
 Std. Dev. 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.71 0.50 0.15 1.00 0.071
 Skewness 0.41 0.21 0.22 0.07 -0.30 -1.13 0.50 0.40 -1.259
 Kurtosis 6.68 5.12 4.31 3.40 1.63 2.93 1.80 1.93 4.674
 Jarque-Bera 91.14 29.90 12.18 1.12 14.49 32.87 15.70 11.50 58.683
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000
 Sum 60.62 43.87 53.27 39.92 551.55 395.23 63.95 892.50 -2.557
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.21 1.22 3.42 1.95 78.14 38.76 3.58 152.21 0.766
 Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
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Stock Performance and Bank Inefficiency Regression Results. United States 
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.022383 0.019638 -1.13983 0.256
DEA__UNDER_CRS 0.014683 0.047722 0.307673 0.759
R-squared 0.000622     Mean dependent var -0.017
Adjusted R-squared -0.005952     S.D. dependent var 0.071
S.E. of regression 0.070973     Akaike info criterion -2.440
Sum squared resid 0.765651     Schwarz criterion -2.401
Log likelihood 189.8901     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.424
F-statistic 0.094662     Durbin-Watson stat 1.380
Prob(F-statistic) 0.758753
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.015693 0.018973 -0.82716 0.41
DEA__UNDER_CRS -0.003114 0.043811 -0.07109 0.94
AR(1) 0.31124 0.077736 4.003787 0.00
R-squared 0.096705     Mean dependent var -0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.084661     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.067834     Akaike info criterion -2.52
Sum squared resid 0.690221     Schwarz criterion -2.46
Log likelihood 196.0928     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.50
F-statistic 8.029342     Durbin-Watson stat 2.05
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000487
Inverted AR Roots 0.31
Dependent Variable: STOCK_PERF
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.02243 0.019195 -1.16855 0.244
CRS_OBS 0.020453 0.064317 0.318004 0.751
R-squared 0.000665     Mean dependent var -0.017
Adjusted R-squared -0.00591     S.D. dependent var 0.071
S.E. of regression 0.070972     Akaike info criterion -2.440
Sum squared resid 0.765618     Schwarz criterion -2.401
Log likelihood 189.8933     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.424
F-statistic 0.101126     Durbin-Watson stat 1.381
Prob(F-statistic) 0.750919
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.013723 0.019052 -0.72032 0.47
CRS_OBS -0.011254 0.060959 -0.18462 0.85
AR(1) 0.312249 0.077699 4.018717 0.00
R-squared 0.096879     Mean dependent var -0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.084837     S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.067828     Akaike info criterion -2.52
Sum squared resid 0.690088     Schwarz criterion -2.46
Log likelihood 196.1075     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.50
F-statistic 8.045307     Durbin-Watson stat 2.05
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00048
Inverted AR Roots 0.31  
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Tobit Regression Results. CRS Model. United States 
Dependent Variable: DEA__UNDER_CRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.366038 0.196011 1.867436 0.062
GDP -0.058936 0.042368 -1.391028 0.164
CPI -0.028699 0.057329 -0.500604 0.617
INDP 0.23722 0.163074 1.454673 0.146
UNE 0.032875 0.015698 2.094261 0.036
VAR -2.060946 1.11063 -1.855655 0.064
MRA -0.029971 0.044364 -0.675574 0.499
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.109518 0.00624 17.55015 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.393663     S.D. dependent var 0.120
S.E. of regression 0.112478     Akaike info criterion -1.482
Sum squared resid 1.847103     Schwarz criterion -1.324
Log likelihood 122.0802     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.417
Avg. log likelihood 0.792729
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 154      Total obs 154
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.033309 0.138161 0.241085 0.810
GDP -0.004303 0.029864 -0.144091 0.885
CPI 0.026382 0.04041 0.652871 0.514
INDP -0.033377 0.114946 -0.290372 0.772
UNE 0.032239 0.011065 2.913615 0.004
VAR -1.520841 0.782846 -1.942709 0.052
MRA 0.00589 0.031271 0.188353 0.851
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.077195 0.004399 17.55015 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.284885     S.D. dependent var 0.089
S.E. of regression 0.079282     Akaike info criterion -2.181
Sum squared resid 0.917708     Schwarz criterion -2.023
Log likelihood 175.9413     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.117
Avg. log likelihood 1.142476
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 154      Total obs 154  
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Tobit Regression Results. VRS Model. United States 
Dependent Variable: VRS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.377819 0.231712 1.630556 0.103
GDP -0.050341 0.050085 -1.005113 0.315
CPI -0.10557 0.067771 -1.557736 0.119
INDP 0.107445 0.192776 0.557358 0.577
UNE 0.062526 0.018557 3.369427 0.001
VAR -2.616397 1.312917 -1.992812 0.046
MRA -0.091303 0.052444 -1.740944 0.082
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.129465 0.007377 17.55015 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.345891     S.D. dependent var 0.150
S.E. of regression 0.132965     Akaike info criterion -1.147
Sum squared resid 2.58123     Schwarz criterion -0.989
Log likelihood 96.31234     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.083
Avg. log likelihood 0.625405
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 154      Total obs 154
Dependent Variable: VRS_OBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.097043 0.164462 -0.590059 0.555
GDP 0.022271 0.035549 0.626489 0.531
CPI 0.00017 0.048102 0.003529 0.997
INDP -0.180041 0.136827 -1.315831 0.188
UNE 0.058027 0.013171 4.405567 0.000
VAR -1.265811 0.931872 -1.358353 0.174
MRA -0.017736 0.037224 -0.476476 0.634
Error Distribution
SCALE:C(8) 0.091891 0.005236 17.55015 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.259226     S.D. dependent var 0.113
S.E. of regression 0.094375     Akaike info criterion -1.833
Sum squared resid 1.300363     Schwarz criterion -1.675
Log likelihood 149.1053     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.768
Avg. log likelihood 0.968216
Left censored obs 0      Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 154      Total obs 154  
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